INCLUSIVE CITIZENSHIP AS A FRAMEWORK FOR JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS IN ISRAEL

ABSTRACT

The article deals with the civil and national status of the Arab minority in Israel with an attempt to find a balancing formula between definitions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. It discusses three paradigms of Jewish-Arab relations within Israel: the inevitable conflict, the structural conflict between the definitions of “Jewish and democratic”, and the inclusive citizenship. Using a special public opinion survey I argue that most Jews and most Arabs would like to see a State policy that fits the inclusive citizenship paradigm that the Israeli government advocates but fails to implement. The majority of the Jewish public believes that the road towards a more stable format for Jewish-Arab relations in Israel passes through a change of concept: from an exclusive citizenship that disregards the Arabs towards an inclusive citizenship that embraces them as part of the State project, and sees them as equal citizens without reducing the rights of Jews for dominance of the state and its public space.

KEYWORDS

- Israeli Arabs
- Israeli Jews
- inclusive citizenship
- ethno-national conflict
- liberal democracy

Introduction

The research of the relationship between the Arab-Palestinian minority and the Jewish majority in the State of Israel has enriched us with a number of conceptual paradigms, as well as numerous opinions on factors that affect the relationship between the two ethno-national groups. Henri Rosenfeld emphasized class status in his research, while Ian Lustick proposed a paradigm of control and cooptation, later echoed by Oded Khaklai. Elia Zureik considered the majority-minority relations in Israel to be a mirror of “internal colonialism”, while Oren

Yiftachel, As’ad Ghanem, Ahmad Sa’di and Nadim Rouhana coined Israel as an “ethnic democracy”, not at all democratic, in their view. Ilan Pappé goes as far as writing that Israel is “a hybrid between a settler colonialist state and a secret-service (Mukhabarat) regime imposed on its Palestinian population”. Elie Rekhess examined the Arabs’ approach and introduced the “radicalization” and “local nationalism” paradigm. Sammy Smooha researched the relationship on both the Jewish and the Arab sides and perceived Israel as a model of “enhanced ethnic democracy”, analyzing the relationship in terms of his “mutual rapprochement” (adjustment) thesis. This author examined the internal minority-majority conflict in Israel as a problem of “interlocking conflict”, shaped in large by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hillel Frisch saw the Jewish-Arab relations in Israel through a prism of security, unique to Israeli internal relations, and Peleg and Waxman defined the problem in terms of the Arabs’ inferior citizenship status, which everyone tends to ignore and neglect.

The theoretical and paradigmatic study has led researchers, policy-makers and shapers of public opinion alike to present various methodologies for “resolving the problem”, which revolve around the status of Arabs in the State of Israel, around the current situation, and their proposed ideals.

In this article, I will analyze the relations between the Jews and Arabs in Israel, while focusing on the civil and national status of the Arab minority. I will try to find a balancing formula between definitions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. In the first section of the article, I will analyze the concept of citizenship in liberal democracy, and its implementation in Israel. In the second section, I am going to discuss Israel’s definition as a “Jewish and democratic state” and the implications of this twofold definition on the status and civil rights of the Arab minority. In the third section, I will analyze Israeli policy towards Arab citizens, to present three policy paradigms used in public Israeli discourse, and I will outline the current Israeli policy in context of those paradigms. In the fourth section, I will discuss a liberal paradigm the State of Israel claims to implement, but it does not in fact. That is the paradigm of the Inclusive Israeli Citizenship, which embraces the Arab citizens, rather than excluding them. I will present the findings of a survey I have conducted in 2012 that put this paradigm to the test of Jewish and Arab public opinion in Israel.

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1. The Concept of Citizenship in a Liberal Democracy and Its Implementation in Israel

Minority-majority relationship is determined to a large extent from the legal and civil status of the minority, as many studies have shown in regards to the situation in Israel. In this section I will describe the status of the Arab minority in Israel in the context of western democracies’ attitudes towards citizenship.

The term “citizenship” has spun a number of definitions and discussions in Philosophy of State and Law. Mainly, it expresses the individual’s belonging to a state community within three central spheres. The legal sphere involves equal rights and obligations without the majority or state institutions forcing discrimination or acting against the opinion of either the majority or the minority. The functional sphere enables taking active part in political institutions and shaping policy via social organizations. The conceptual-psychological sphere creates the infrastructure for the sentiment of identity and belonging that contribute to social integration of all state citizens. The three dimensions are bound to create social solidarity between all citizens and State patriotism. Therefore, full citizenship in a democratic regime involves formal and substantial equality of rights and obligations for all its citizens, without discriminating against any social identity group.

One of the main questions about the essence of citizenship in a nation-state deals with the tension between the universality principle, and the principle of recognizing the uniqueness of different groups within a society. Recognition of the uniqueness of a minority group grants individual rights to express their unique culture within the culture of the majority, or collective rights to various groups at the expense of the general identity of the state (meaning of all its citizens, or that of “the nation”). The most common civil obligations are taxes, military service, obeying the law, and displaying loyalty and commitment to the political and democratic system, as well as to the state.

The State of Israel does not implement in full the liberal democratic concept of citizenship presented above, including citizens’ equality and integration, as well as appropriate representation and sense of belonging for minority groups. Contrary to western democratic nation-states, in Israel there is no congruence between nationality and citizenship. Israel was established for the Jewish nation; the Arab citizens are excluded from many expressions within its public sphere, and are not equal in obligations and all civil rights.

From a legal standpoint, the principle of equality of citizenship rights is not a constitutional principle in Israel, signified mainly by rulings of the Supreme Court of Justice on specific issues. This is a lingering process, while the discrimination is often inconspicuous and hard to prove. Even when the law includes an equality principle, such as the obligation to appropriate representation within public service, it fails to enforce effective sanctions against non-compliance with its orders and provisions. Even the Supreme Court has ruled that affirmative action is circumstantial (in the case of Arab women in directorates of government companies).

This situation implies that citizenship for Arabs in Israel remains mainly an instrumental concept, expressed by their right to participate in parliamentary elections, and exit the country with an Israeli passport. They do not share the state’s vision of identity and national goals. Moreover, they sense that the Zionist vision for Israel is imposed against their interests. One example of this gap between citizenship and nationality in Israel is the definition of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state”.

2. “Jewish and Democratic” and Its Implications on the Status of the Arab Minority

There was a delay in the formal definition of the State of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic” state, although the founding text, the Declaration of Independence, laid its foundation hitherto. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 that enforces the establishment of two states in the land of Israel/Palestine of the British Mandate: a Jewish state and an Arab state (the PLO has since recognized this resolution as well, in its November 1988 summit in Algiers, where it unilaterally declared Palestinian independence). Declaration of Independence of 14th of May 1948 declared Israel a “Jewish state”, and called on the “Jewish people” to contribute to construction of the state. Declaration of Independence did not mention the term “democratic state”, but it included the democratic values incorporating respect for the Arab minority in its wording. Until the year 1985, the laws of the state did not incorporate a combination of the terms “Jewish” and “democratic”. In the 1985 amendment to Basic Law of the Knesset (Article 7.A (a)) the term “Jewish and democratic” state made its first appearance. It established that any list of candidates for Knesset that rejects this concept would not be allowed to participate in elections. However, the law did not define the concept of a “Jewish and democratic state”, thus it remains open to interpretation. Since then, this concept has recurred and has been mentioned in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – both of them

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8 SCJ 453, 454 Israel’s Woman Network against the State of Israel, 1994, p. 501, pp. 527-528 [Hebrew].
from 1992. In neither, was this term defined. It seems that the two core definitions of Israel are an ideological and linguistic oxymoron. The state, founded to be a national home for one nation group, and that considers religious and traditional identity to be a part of it, cannot be fully democratic, i.e. a progressive democracy that does not discriminate against the minority in an unreasonable and a non-proportional way. Although the term “Jewish and democratic state” exists in state laws, the terms “Jewish” and “democratic” are subject to broad interpretation, depending on worldview. That is not a coincidence. There is no consensus in Israel about the essence underlying those two values - not even a broad agreement. Some scholars emphasize their inherent contradiction, while others assume that they do not necessarily contradict one another, and one can find their substantial congruence. State laws (versus practice, which is wider) affirm the “Jewish” definition of the state in four aspects, i.e. in laws with exclusive preference towards Jews, as detailed in Table 1.

10 The Basic Laws only mentioned, “this Basic Law is intended to protect... in order to anchor the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state within the Basic Law.”

11 For example, see interpretation by the former President of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, of the meaning of “Jewish and democratic state”: Barak wrote that a restrictive interpretation is in order, since it limits a basic right. This opposes the wide interpretation given to laws that deal with human rights. Judge Barak ruled that the minimal interpretation for the term “Jewish state” is as follows: “in the center, there’s the right of every Jew to come to the State of Israel, where Jews will be a majority; Hebrew is the primary official language of the state, and most of its holidays and symbols represent the national heritage of the Jewish people; the legacy of Israel is the main element in its cultural and religious tradition”. According to Barak, the minimal interpretation of a “democratic state” is: “recognizing the sovereignty of the people, expressed by free and equal elections; recognizing the core of human rights, including dignity and equality, segregation of powers, rule of law and an independent judiciary”. Therefore, “a list of candidates or a single candidate will not be allowed to participate in the elections if the cancellation or negation of these characteristics is central and predominant in their ambitions and actions; and they’re actively pursuing the realization of these ambitions; and it’s possible to prove the above using convincing, clear and unequivocal evidence”. Barak deliberated disqualifying a list of candidates that oppose Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic character. Finally, Barak has left this question in a state of “requires deliberation”.


Table 1. Laws that Affirm Israel as a Jewish State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Laws</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Symbolic space and public culture</td>
<td>Flag, Emblem, and Anthem Law - 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Immigration and naturalization laws</td>
<td>Law of Return - 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nationality Law - 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nationality and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) - 2003 (note: not necessarily paradigmatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jewish religion status</td>
<td>Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law - 1980 in terms of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lacking a parallel institution for non-Jewish ethnicities and inequality in religious services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lands and settlement</td>
<td>Israel Land Administration Law - 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>World Zionist Organization (WZO) – Israel Jewish Agency Status Law - 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Treaty between Israeli Government and the Jewish Agency - 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Israeli Government-WZO Treaty - 1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lacking a full constitution in Israel, state laws give Jews preference in aspects of immigration - the Law of Return was supposed to safeguard the Jewish majority within the state population, among others. Moreover, the preference is found in the dominant status of Hebrew culture in public space, in connection of the state to the Jewish Diaspora, in the official status of the Jewish religion within the state, and in the aspect of land allocation for settlement and development.

In practice, the state of affairs is different. Without a foundation in the laws of the State of Israel many Israelis (including State officials) interpret the term “Jewish state” as a justification for sweeping preference for Jews and discrimination against Arabs on many levels - mostly in resources allocation for infrastructure and services, in representation within public institutions, in shared decision-making, in government policies, and in some of the core rights and obligations. This misconception is also voiced in the discriminatory and alienating attitude of Jewish citizens towards the Arabs on a national level in a number of areas, such as public discourse, behavior, as well as housing and employment of Arabs. The Jewish preference in the symbolic aspect is penetrating all layers of life. This raises the question: did the legislature intend for that to happen? Did it deliberately mean to weaken the democratic nature of the state by anchoring its “Jewishness” as a

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14 The Arab authors from the National Committee of the Heads of Arab Localities, The Future Vision for Palestinian Arabs in Israel, Dec. 2006 are right at this point.
mandatory value, which Arab parties or Knesset candidates are not allowed to reject? The answer is probably not: the Israeli establishment considers the democratic regime to be a strategic asset, referring to Israel as “the only democracy in the Middle-East”\textsuperscript{15}.

One can assume that the legislator intended to ensure that Israel forever remains a Jewish character, and of a democratic regime and public culture. Every legislator who voted for the laws that anchored these two values of the state as Jewish and democratic had an individual understanding of their meaning, as well as an understanding of the content derived by their combination.

In contrast to the law, the majority of the Jewish public sees the Jewish character of the state as prevalent over its democratic texture, as they subjectively perceive those two values as colliding\textsuperscript{16}. That is a non-democratic interpretation of the definition of the State of Israel. Every Israeli administration tends to discriminate against Arab citizens; thus, they accept the public interpretation - not that of the legislators. The policies of the Israeli governments support this false interpretation, as we will try to outline in the next section.

3. Israel’s Policy towards Its Arab Citizens

Various approaches have developed in Israel in an attempt to address the tension between its defining characteristics as a Jewish nation-state and a democratic state. The research and public discourse in Israel congregates into three patterns of government policies towards the Arabs in Israel\textsuperscript{17}. First is the inevitable conflict paradigm, held by conservative (or “non-liberal”) Jews on the right side of the political spectrum. They think that the interests of the two national groups contradict one another. In their view, the Arabs “hate” the Jews, and are not ready to accept their status as a minority in a Jewish state\textsuperscript{18}. One can view this paradigm as an expression of “ethnic democracy”, which treats the minority with great suspicion by applying strict political and security control and supervision.

Those who hold this view propose two methods for the Israeli government to deal with the Arab minority challenge. The first mode of operation claims that the state must not try to benefit the Arab citizens with any more rights than they presently have, since every “benefit”, be it materialistic or legal, only strengthens them more, while endangering the Jews. The second mode of operation suggests that the state institutions administer national minority issues in terms of “keeping a lid on the conflict” by “releasing pressure”, by means of moderated benefits to

\textsuperscript{15} A common idiom for politicians of the Israeli establishment. For example, see political platform of the former Minister of Defense, Amir Perez, on his webpage [Hebrew]. Retrieved from http://www.amirperetz.co.il/?page_id=513.

\textsuperscript{16} See ex.: Israel Democracy Institute 2010 Israeli Democracy Index, which states that 32% of the Jewish respondents prefer Israel to be Jewish, versus 17% who choose Israel to be democratic only. Forty-eight per-cent preferred it to be both Jewish and democratic. See other attitudes in “The State of Israel as Jewish and Democratic: Dialog” and related sources, The World Union of Jewish Science, in Cooperation with Avi Chai Foundation, Jerusalem, 1999.

\textsuperscript{17} Compare with Y Reiter, Dilemmas of Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel, Shcocken, Tel Aviv, 2005 [Hebrew].

\textsuperscript{18} See ex.: R Israeli, Arviyei Israel, HaLanu Im LeTzarenu?, Ariel, Jerusalem, 2002.
the Arab sector - as part of the “damage control” strategy\textsuperscript{19}. A synonym for this pattern is the “stick and carrot” method. Those who suggest the second mode of operation claim that the Jewish public is strong enough to deal with violence of the Arab citizens; and instead of trying to resolve the conflict, they must manage the conflict. This situation is contained by lingering and minor improvements for the status of the Arab citizens, and “punishment” for the people and movements who oppose the State system.

Second is the\textbf{ structural conflict paradigm} between the characteristics of “Jewish state” and “democratic state”. This paradigm proposes to replace the Jewish state with a bi-national state. Arab intellectuals, as well as Jewish intellectuals defined by the supporters of the first paradigm as “Post-Zionists” or “Anti-Zionists”, both hold this view. They believe that the two core values of the state are contradictory and can never be settled fairly. They claim that in a real democracy, the state should never take “side” in ethno-national minority-majority relations, and that it must maintain neutrality. The second pillar of this paradigm asserts that the nationality or religion of the majority cannot define the state, since this impairs the entire concept of democracy where all citizens are equals regardless of their origin or nationality. Therefore, this pattern proposes a structural change by turning Israel into a neutral and bi-national state (sometimes mistakenly called “A State of Its Citizens”), instead of a Jewish one\textsuperscript{20}. The opponents of this pattern maintain that it is impossible to sustain a bi-national state in the setting of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and that the state would eventually be under Arab control, as Jews would lose the only state that recognizes the self-determination of the Jewish people and allows for unrestrictive practice of the Hebrew culture.

Third is the\textbf{ inclusive Israeli citizenship paradigm} that incorporates the Arabs within the state. Jewish-Arab co-existence activists and organizations, as well as Jews and Arabs on the left and the center-left side on the political spectrum hold this view. It proposes the advancement of equality for the Arab population based on a multi-cultural approach that balances a Jewish nation-state with a progressive democracy. Two foundations of this pattern are value and utilitarianism. In terms of value, Israel can be a vibrant and a progressive democracy only if it promotes the rights of the minority towards equality. This is feasible without detracting from the Jewish dominance in the State of Israel and its Jewish character (while viewing the term “Jewish state” in a narrow civil sense of three out of the four areas established in state laws and presented in Table 1 above). The majority of the Jewish population considers the following areas to be the necessary conditions: the Law of Return, the symbolic layer of the public space, and settlement). This approach requests to abolish minority discrimination as much as possible, and aptly include the minority within essential citizenship and public sphere.

\textsuperscript{19} See ex.: D Shiftan, Palestinians in Israel: The Fight of the Arab Minority with the Jewish State, Zmora-Bitan, Tel Aviv, 2012.

\textsuperscript{20} See example of opinion in the 6\textsuperscript{th} ed. of Public Sphere - a politics and society magazine at the Political Science Department of the Gershon H. Gordon Faculty of Social Sciences that deals with the issue of One State between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River: Wishful Thinking or Emergent Reality?
Israeli spokespeople such as the Minister in charge of Arab Affairs advocate its policy in terms of the third paradigm, but the practice is much closer to the first. The Israeli administration has yet to free itself of the inevitable conflict approach that has characterized its government policy for two decades of martial law in Arab population centers, between the years 1948-1966. I believe that the government policy since the end of martial law in late 1966 and until today can be defined as that of “progressive damage control”, closer to the theory of “progressive ethnic democracy” proposed by Sammy Smooha, except for the fact that since the 1980’s it’s almost impossible to enforce the “stick”. Therefore, the government gradually and incrementally offers “small carrots”.

In the last two decades, the government improved the disadvantage and exclusion of Arabs in many areas of operation, as it slowly promoted the socio-economic status of the Arab citizens\(^\text{21}\). This slow progress is barely noticeable when the prominent public discourse between extreme leaders on both sides is hostile or racial, while the gaps between the two sectors remain – their relationship is stagnant, if not deteriorating. This policy failed in achieving stability for Jewish-Arab relations, as the “Or commission” that investigated the events of October 2000 determined, and as attitude surveys, political behavior and media discourse have shown\(^\text{22}\). The situation today (2013) does not look any better than it was in the previous decade; some say it has become even more tense\(^\text{23}\). Two reasons explain the government’s failure in bridging the gaps between the current and the desired states. The first reason is the security challenge, and the fact that the broader, Israeli-Palestinian conflict often affects Jewish-Arab relations inside Israel. The second reason is that both national communities in Israel are critically devoid of trust in each other’s intentions. Government members are in captivity of this conception of distrust. Therefore, they merely generate incremental improvements for the status of the Arab minority. The government and many Israeli Jews hold the (mis!)conception that Israel does not need to prove it is a democracy, as it has been already recognized as such, while Israel critics (e.g. the 1\(^{st}\) and 2\(^{nd}\) Durban Conference) cannot change their views, anyway.

The failure of the Israeli government to bridge the gaps between Jews and Arabs drives both politicians and intellectuals to propose alternatives to the existing practice. In the next section I will discuss an alternative, which the State of Israel presumes to implement, but does not succeed in doing so – that is the “Inclusive Citizenship” paradigm.

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\(^{21}\) Reiter, *National Minority*.

\(^{22}\) Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between security forces and Israeli civilians of October 2000 (August, 2003) [Or commission report]

4. Inclusive Israeli Citizenship Paradigm in the Test of Public Opinion

The inclusive Israeli citizenship paradigm has developed recently, documented by a team of experts in The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. During the brainstorming process, the team members who wrote the document tried to find a mediating formula between the “Jewish” and the “democratic” values of Israel. One can define the mediating formula as a “deal” between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in the following fashion: the Arab citizens would recognize the primary interests of Jews that regard Israel as a Jewish and democratic state with Hebrew as its primary official language and the Law of Return continuing to be applied to Jews. The symbols of the state will remain those designed by the Jewish majority. The laws of the state and its security would be respected by all. The Arabs would complete a voluntary civil service, managed by government in collaboration with the local Arab authorities. Such recognition of primary Jewish interests would not harm the Arabs’ daily layers of life, if the Jewish character of the state guarantees not to discriminate against the Arabs. Furthermore, alongside the Law of Return, an immigration policy with universal criteria would apply (with such criteria as age preference, financial status, recognition of the social history and its core values, etc.).

On the other hand, the Jews would respect Arab primary interests in regards to equality of citizenship rights. They would regard Arabic as the second official language, and allow for its representation as such in the public sphere. The threatening discourse towards the Arabs about changing their citizenship would stop, and they would receive a substantial compensation for privately owned land the state expropriated in the past. Moreover, the Arabs would be recognized as a national minority and as a result will be eligible to numerous collective rights, without endangering the Jewish character of the state.

This balance according to the Inclusive Citizenship theory allows for Israel’s existence as Jewish per a measured interpretation of the term “Jewish”, and “democratic” per a reasonable interpretation of the term “democratic”. To paraphrase, the Jewish character of Israel will be guaranteed with the most necessary and minimal discrimination of its Arab citizens, so that they can integrate within the state as desired citizens, who feel this country is theirs, too. How is this possible?

24 The project I coordinated was supported by a grant from Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty, for which I am grateful. The participants were Dr. Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, Prof. Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, Dr. Alexander Yakobson, Dr. Abigail Jacobson, Dr. Hillel Cohen, Dr. Ephraim Lavie, Dr. Kobi Michael (until Oct. 2009), Dan Patir, and Prof. Frances Radai. The think tank of the Jewish members set the goal to propose bridging solutions for a dialog between Jewish and Arab teams, after the latter published the “Future Vision Manifestoes.” During their work, the group consulted with numerous senior public figures and Arab and Jewish experts either in person or via a roundtable discussion. The document that concludes this group’s work was published under the title “Towards Inclusive Israeli Citizenship” and it can be downloaded from the following websites: www.fnst-jerusalem.org or www.jiis.org.il. Dr. Ravi Smith and Olga Paniel at the Smith Research Institute conducted the survey for a representative sampling of 500 Jews and 500 Arabs. Statistical advisor: Dr. Maya Choshen at The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. The opinions in the document are an interpretive development that sometimes deviates from the main line of consent for the group.
The process of reaching the balancing formula between the two core values of the state relies upon the same method that professional mediators use to try to resolve conflicts between people or people-managed bodies and entities. The conflict resolution mechanism that ends with a compromise isolates conflicting parties’ “primary interests” from their “secondary interests”, terms generally used in the economic realm. A primary interest is a sort of “protected value”, which the person or the group cannot waive, as it is the basis for their existence as a separate identity group. The group can “trade-off” and compromise upon secondary interests, depending on their importance.

This mechanism identifies the primary and secondary interests of most Jews and most Arabs in Israel, when it comes to the character of the state and its regime, as follows in Table 2:

Table 2. Primary and Secondary Interests of Jews and Arabs in regards to the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Primary Interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Laws</td>
<td>Guaranteeing a Jewish demographic majority</td>
<td>There would not be a transfer of Arabs and neither Arab settlements nor citizens would be forced to move to another state entity or another country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbols</td>
<td>Guaranteeing the symbols of the Jewish heritage and the Hebrew language as primary in public culture</td>
<td>Appropriate employment of bilingual and multi-cultural values to honor Arabic language and Arab culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land and Settlement</td>
<td>Guaranteeing Jewish area control on the national and regional levels</td>
<td>The expropriation of Arab land would cease; either the state issues a realistic compensation for expropriated land, or returns it if not in use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and civil rights (freedom of expression, assembly and movement, equality in the eyes of the law, law enforcement, administrative arrests under restrictive conditions, autonomous administration)</td>
<td>As long as this does not affect state security or promote conditions that enable the development of political separatism and subversion</td>
<td>There would not be discrimination against Arabs in areas of personal rights, law enforcement and general freedoms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although categorized subjectively, the author of this article has based the above interests on his vast experience with dialogues and discourse analysis of Jews and Arabs in Israel. If I were right in my isolation of primary and secondary interests, then the balancing formula would preserve either side’s primary interests, and reach a mutual satisfactory compromise in regards to the secondary interests. Moreover, if a primary interest changes in favor of the other side, it should not damage the essence of the goal it represents. For example, Israel’s anthem is an expression of the justification for the existence of a nation-state for the Jewish people, but some prominent Zionists (for example, the late Supreme Court Justice and State Comptroller, Miriam Ben-Porat) have suggested another anthem be added on top of the existing one; a line changed in the “HaTikva” (“The Hope”) anthem; or a verse added to allow Arab citizens to identify with the anthem.26

The document of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies group, named “Towards Inclusive Israeli Citizenship” suggests a few inclusive citizenship principles applicable by means of 15 legislative actions and administrative settlements outlined in Table 3 below.27 These applications were put up to the test of public opinion in a representative sampling of 500 Jews and 500 Arab Israelis (excluding Druze).

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26 See ex.: discussion at the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in such proposals as Shahar Ilan, “The Soul of an Israeli Yearns”, Haaretz, 7.7.2005, accessible the following link: http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.102534.
conducted in the end of March – beginning of April 2012. What makes this survey unique compared to other public opinion polls and attitude surveys on the subject of Jewish-Arab relations, is that for the first time this survey presented a coherent future position for the Jewish and Arab population, a position that suggests mutual agreements from both sides. The other surveys only asked respondents about the existing situation. Surveys in Israel did not ask any questions about future political attitudes as a consolidated concept, based on mutuality as a “packaged deal”.

Table 3 displays the 15 operational recommendations of the inclusive citizenship document and their support ratios among Jews and Arabs in Israel.

### Table 3. Operational Recommendations, Survey Questions and Support Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Recommendation by the writers of the “Inclusive Citizenship” document</th>
<th>Public opinion question: do you agree or disagree with</th>
<th>Support Percentage - Jews</th>
<th>Support Percentage - Arabs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | The Knesset would establish a legislative system to guarantee essential citizenship in the spirit of principles and meanings of this document, including:  
- Equality of civil rights in the economic, social and political areas;  
- Appropriate representation for the Arab minority and the option to participate actively within political institutions;  
- Appropriate inclusion of the Arab minority in public culture, including their belonging to a state of all citizens;  
- Alongside the Law of Return, the State of Israel would implement an immigration policy that takes all citizens into account, within the principles of international law and the cultural, social and economic requirements of the state. | In addition to the Law of Return for Jews, Israel would have an immigration policy along the lines of western European policy.  
Note: The survey chose western Europe immigration policy as a model that might be clearer on the questionnaire than the lengthy formulation that appears on the Inclusive Citizenship document. | 36 | 61 |
| 2   | The government and civil community organizations will do everything in their power to develop public awareness of Israeli citizenship being a shared democratic framework for all citizens, including all content detailed in this document, and this is not conditional. | Not asked | Not asked |

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28 Due to the constraints of the phone survey, we chose the most representing and challenging operational suggestions, and rephrased the questions succinctly. Paraphrasing the question at times deviated from the suggestion’s original phrasing. For example, since the voluntary civil service for Arabs already exists, we asked about the civil service that would gradually become mandatory (within a 5-year period).

Table 3. (continued)

<p>| 3 |Israeli education system in all its appearances will educate towards pluralism within a shared core plan that will include citizenship, democracy, human rights and multiculturalism; include elements of mutual recognition of Jewish and Arab cultures, respect for the culture of the “other” and recognition that the Arab culture can be drawn upon to enrich the mutual existence. Arabic would be taught as the second official language from the earliest academic stages in Jewish and Arab schools, and Hebrew would be taught in the Arab schools. |
|   | State laws that include the term “Jewish and democratic state” would define “Jewish state” as a state that actualizes the right to self-determination and national independence for the Jewish people, in accordance with principles set forward within the Declaration of Independence, and as a state that is obligated to values of human dignity and sanctity of human life, freedom and equality for all its citizens. |
| 4 | The Arabs would get a constitutional status of a national minority in their state of Israel, and will be granted the following collective rights: democratic election of leadership, appropriate representation in public culture (in public sphere) and in public frameworks, resources allocations, national education goals, self-administration of cultural institutes and content, language and religion; an option for an autonomous administration of the Arab education system, within the educational core and the national framework; the right to decide upon the usage of language and cultural activity in municipal areas controlled by Arab local councils, and active participation in implementing Arabic language and cultural activity in mixed cities. |
| 5 | Arabic is one of the two official languages in Israel alongside Hebrew, which is the official language of the majority. The State of Israel will promote visibility of the Arab language in the linguistic and cultural public spaces. |
| 6 | All schoolchildren in the country would be required to learn about both Jewish and Arab cultures. |
|   | All Jewish schoolchildren would learn the Arabic language at a level that would enable them to read and converse in Arabic. |
|   | Arab schoolchildren would learn Hebrew at a level that would enable school graduates to integrate into institutions of higher education and into the employment sector. |
|   | Israel is and would continue to be defined as Jewish and democratic state. Do you agree or disagree that the definition of the state as democratic would ensure equality of citizenship, would not discriminate against Arab citizens, and would ensure progressive human rights? |
|   | It has been proposed that Arabs be legally recognized as a “national minority” and, as such, would have representation proportionate to their relative population size in all public institutions and in the allocation of resources. |
|   | Today Arabs have a national leadership body entitled the “High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel,” which is not elected. Do you support or oppose making this an elected body and granting every Arab citizen the right to vote for and be elected to this body, as well as having the state institutions recognize it? |
|   | Do you consider it generally acceptable or unacceptable that the Arab education system be granted a more independent status, such as the state-religious education system has, within the Ministry of Education? |
|   | Alongside Hebrew as the first official language, appropriate representation of Arabic as a second official language in the public sphere should be ensured. |</p>
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|7 | The government would ensure equality for its Arab citizens in all areas of public and civil life, including appropriate representation in appointments in public bodies. The government and public bodies would allocate equal resources allocation. It would gradually bridge the gaps created during years of discrimination until full equality is reached, especially in the education system and in economic development. It would allow fair employment in the civil and other public service, key-positions and senior positions (directors, etc.), including taking affirmative action where there is an underrepresentation. It would act to integrate Arabs into areas where it excluded them previously.
|8 | Inclusion of Arab public representatives within the government and promoting the integration of Arab parties in coalition. The Arab parties would align themselves with this process of integration.
|9 | The government would ensure to represent Arabs in all government-supported bodies appropriately, as well as in bodies it allocates finances for, proportionately to their relative population size for Arabs (as a condition to get the financing), including directorates of public companies.
|10 | The legislature would create a law to obligate appropriate representation of Arab workers (proportionately to their relative population size) in all layers of media that are subject to governmental regulations: newscasters, journalists, editors, etc., as well as for appropriate representation of the Arab population and culture in current events and entertainment media programs. The government and civil society organizations will encourage commercial and private media outlets to integrate Arab employees.
|11 | Reform in areas of land allocation and determination of municipal jurisdiction boundaries; completion of updated zoning master plans for Arab towns and villages to allow for a mixture of high-rise construction and settlements expansion based on planning and ecological considerations; realistic and appropriate compensation – by means of money or land – for loss of land (including absentee’s property); Arab representation in planning committees on all levels proportionately to their relative population size in the region; solving the problem of buildings that were constructed without a permit, including “unrecognized settlements”; resolving the land conflict claimed by Bedouin in the Negev by means of generous compromise in the spirit of the Goldberg committee. In addition to promoting conflict resolution in this area, the leadership of the Arab sector would support law enforcement and actively guide the public that breaking the law would damage the development of Arab settlements.

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<td></td>
<td>The Arab sector constitutes about 17% of the population. As a matter of principle, do you agree or disagree with representation proportionate to their relative population size for Arabs among senior positions in public service and public bodies?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In principle, Arab citizens would be granted representation proportionate to their relative population size within the media as news presenters, journalists, editors, and invited participants on radio and television programs.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arab citizens whose land the state has expropriated in the past would receive realistic compensation.</td>
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The civil service framework would turn into voluntary service by means of negotiation between the government and Arab minority representatives. Those who complete the service would enjoy the same rights as discharged soldiers, based on the period of their service. Arab citizens that are interested to volunteer for military service will be able to do so based on IDF policies and examinations. Significant progress in the civil service area would accelerate the essential equality of Arab citizens. The coordination of the civil service apparatus with the Arab leadership would promote joining the national service, based on the aspiration to make it mandatory in the future, as part of the equality principle of obligations for all components of the Israeli society.

In the framework of the operational mechanisms detailed here, a new mechanism would be established to monitor public discourse and statements made by Arab and Jewish leaders and media outlets on the topic of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel.

Strict legislation would forbid issuing racial statements and advance the enforcement on this issue. In addition, a law would forbid inflammatory and de-legitimizing speech on grounds of religion, ethnicity and nationality, regardless of the probability of its execution, and a deterring punishment would be set for this offence.

The Knesset will enact a law to establish a legal authority/commission for equality and integration of the Arab minority. By law, this commission would enjoy governmental funding, as well as operational powers, and would be subject to a public Jewish-Arab council, consisting of members of the authority’s Directorate Council. The Jewish-Arab public commission would determine the consistence of the commission and its employees, as well.

**Table 3. (continued)**

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<td>If all the proposals you have heard so far were submitted as a package deal for government and Knesset approval, would you support or oppose this “package deal”?</td>
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The analysis of the survey results will address six main attitudes of Jews and Arabs towards their mutual relationship, the definition of the state, citizenship equality for Arabs, civil and national status of the Arab minority, Arab citizens’ obligation of participation in civil service, as well as the inclination to accept the principles and applications of the Inclusive Citizenship paradigm in terms of what the think tank defined as a “package deal”.

a) Attitudes of Jews and Arabs towards Their Mutual Relationship

The survey examined the respondents’ optimism or pessimism in regards to the state of relations between Jews and Arabs in the present and in the near future. We assumed the higher the optimism, the more support the inclusive and integrative policy towards Arabs as equal citizens would get. Our assumption came true as we cross-referenced the answers to these questions with the answers about accepting the package deal.

Table 4. Question: In your opinion, two years from now will relations between Jewish citizens and Arab citizens be better than today, unchanged, or worse?

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<tr>
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<th>Jewish sector</th>
<th>Arab sector</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unchanged</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>26%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-19%</td>
<td>+24%</td>
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Table 5. Question: What is your opinion in general regarding relations between Jews and Arabs in the country?

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<th>Jewish sector</th>
<th>Arab sector</th>
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<tr>
<td>Relations are on a collision course and nothing can be done</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations are tense, <em>but the tension can be reduced and eased somewhat</em></td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Fuller integration and coexistence can be advanced*</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The answers to the two questions about the present and the near future state of relations between Jews and Arabs show that the Arab sector is much more optimistic than the Jewish sector when it comes to the relations today and to their future advancement. As for the Jewish sector, 74% of the respondents are of the opinion that the relations can be improved somewhat, or even advanced towards full integration. Hence, both the Jewish and the Arab sectors are ready for change, and interested in improving their mutual relationship. This finding contradicts the opinions of the first deterministic paradigms presented above: the inevitable conflict paradigm, and the paradigm of structural conflict between the Jewish and the democratic state that supports replacing the Jewish state with a bi-national state.

b) Attitudes of Jews and Arabs towards the Definition of State as Jewish and Democratic

It is a common conception that the Arab sector objects to the definition of the state as “Jewish and democratic”, while most of the Jewish sector is so entrenched around the Jewish character of the state that it objects to equality of rights for Arabs. We formulated the questions in a way that explicitly states that the state’s definition would continue to be Jewish and democratic. Moreover, we added an interpretation that the definition of the state this way would ensure civil equality, would not discriminate against Arab citizens, and ensure progressive human rights. Both sectors expressed their support in high rates (72% for Jewish support and 73% of Arab support). It seems that the Arab citizens are ready to accept the existing definition of the state, as long as they are not discriminated against, and as long as Jews agree that the definition of the state would not discriminate against Arabs on a civil level (separate from the national level, which we will address later).

c) Attitudes of Jews towards civil equality for Arabs

The survey presented three subjects that symbolize equality on a civil level: establishing an equality commission within the Ministry of Justice with enforcement powers; appointments for senior positions in state service; and appropriate representation in media. The survey shows that the majority of the Jews – 68% - agree with the establishment of a statutory entity for civil equality within the Ministry of Justice. A small majority (50% supporters against 45% objectors) supports appropriate representation for Arabs in senior positions in the public sphere. A larger majority (57% supporters against 38% objectors) agrees for appropriate integration of Arabs in all media outlets and all positions. These finding indicate support of over half of the Jewish sector for civil equality for Arabs in Israel, as part of a package deal that would regulate rights and obligations.

d) Attitudes of Jews towards the Civil and National Status of the Arab Minority

The survey asked a direct question on agreement or disagreement with recognizing the Arabs in Israel as a national minority, and three other questions repre-
sented the collective rights that originate from this acknowledgement: recognition of elected leadership for the Arab minority, progressive immigration law, alongside the Law of Return, and a more autonomous status for the Arab education system. These questions showed that the Jewish sector that supported civil equality is not so supportive or even objective to applications in areas of collective and national rights for Arabs. The Jewish sector produced lower levels of support for recognition of Arabs as a national minority: 45% support the recognition, while 48% oppose it. Opposition to adding a progressive immigration law in a European format alongside the Law of Return is higher – 54% against mere 36% of supporters. The question of autonomous status for Arab education system presents a similar finding: 56% opposed versus 38% of supporters. Opposition to recognizing elected Arab leadership is higher than support – 48% opposed versus 39% of supporters.

It seems that the disapproval of the Jewish sector of collective and national rights for Arabs originates in the Jews’ fear of the State losing its Jewish character, or that excessive autonomy of the majority undermines the identity and the future of the Jewish state. Moreover, the fact that 45% of the Jews agree to recognize the Arabs as a national minority leads to believe that their opposition is not critical when the recognition is part of the package deal framework for rights and obligations.

e) Attitudes of Jews and Arabs towards the Obligation of Civil Service for Arab Citizens

The issue of civil service returned to the headlines following the 2012 governmental crisis and proposals to legislate a law to set an army or alternative civil service on an equal basis for all citizens. One of the reasons for the opposition of Arab public figures to civil service for Arabs was their claim that the civil service apparatus was founded upon a security concept in the Office of the Prime Minister (General Res. David Ivry was head of the committee recommending that framework), and it was done without the cooperation of representatives from the Arab sector. Therefore, the survey included a question on the option to transfer the civil service administration from the Office of the Prime Minister to a social services government ministry.

62% of the Arabs and 61% of the Jews supported a mandatory civil service for Arabs within 5 years. As for the question of moving the administration of civil service to a social services government ministry in coordination with the local authorities, 51% of the Jews and 74% of the Arabs agreed to that. It seems that the widespread support of the Arab sector for mandatory civil service for Arabs originates in the transfer of the civil service to a social services government ministry, thus not “suffering” from the security-problem stigma. Such widespread support is also because mandatory service would be offered to Arabs as part of a package deal, alongside personal and collective civil rights for the Arab minority.

f) Support for Inclusive Citizenship Principles as a Package Deal

The survey asked interviewees from both sectors about each one of the 15 operational proposals, recommended by the think tank within the framework of the Inclusive Citizenship concept. By the end of the survey, on top of attitudes towards specific proposals, the survey asked whether the respondents agreed or disagreed with the comprehensive package deal. Eighty percent of the Arabs agreed to accept the proposals as a deal, and only 14% disagreed. The Jewish sector produced lower levels of support, but the agreement to a package deal was higher than the disagreement – 48% versus 43%, accordingly.

In conclusion, the survey found that the majority of both Jews and Arabs are interested in significantly improving their mutual relations, by means of including the Arab minority within the Israeli citizenry, and equalizing the rights of Arabs to the Jews’ rights in Israel. Furthermore, a significant number of Jews oppose recognition of Arab sector as a national minority with collective rights that sets it apart from the Israeli society as a whole, and prefer the integration of Arabs in all civil systems in Israel. A clear majority of more than 60% within the Jewish and Arab sectors agrees to a number of steps that would prompt meaningful progress in Arabs’ civil status in Israel, such as establishing a commission for equality, integrating the Arabs in the State on a constitutional basis, mandatory civil service for Arab citizens, instruction of Arabic language and culture in all education institutes in Israel, and appropriate representation for the Arab minority within the public sphere.

Conclusion

This article asserted that Israel is a democracy that does not implement the inclusive citizenship concept in its entirety within the liberal framework, which views all citizens as equals on both civil and national levels. This is due to the regional territorial conflict of Israel’s being in an Arab and Palestinian environment, and due to the purpose of establishment of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state that implements Zionist ideology. Nevertheless, Israeli governments declared that their policy is equal, at least in direction and aspiration, but they have not succeeded in realizing this aspiration. The reasons for this failure are mainly the definition of the state as “Jewish and democratic” – a definition that prevented the legislators from clearly describing those characteristics and their practical meaning within the law, due to the many tensions within the Israeli society. This dual definition affects the status of the Arab minority in practice, due to its broad and unwritten public interpretation that implies preference for Jews over Arabs on a variety of levels in civil life.

Out of the three paradigms displayed above - the inevitable conflict, the structural conflict between the definitions of “Jewish and democratic”, and the inclusive citizenship – the first two paradigms are deterministic and if adopted officially, may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is because a hostile Jewish majority policy could alienate the minority and push it into a corner. Hence, it
seems that the majority of Jews and Arabs do not behave in practice (versus their discourse and ideology) according to the first two paradigms.

The gap between the current and the desired situations is explained by the huge distance between identity and ideology on the one hand, and realpolitik on the other. It is true that many Arab leaders and intellectuals have an ideology that objects to the Jewish definition of state\(^1\), and that many Jews on the right side of the political spectrum see Arabs as a hostile element\(^2\). Nevertheless, ideology is not everything. In practice, we see that the broad Arab public has tight connections with state institutions and its Jewish citizens. One can say the same about attitudes of many Jews in Israel towards its Arab citizens. Attitude surveys\(^3\) found that many Arabs feel Israeli pride, and express patriotism towards the state\(^4\). They do not want to move to the Palestinian state, and they do not act violently towards Jews. Their political leaders, on the other hand, have challenging maximalist demands. However, the balance of power between the majority and the minority understates these suspicions. Moreover, presenting maximalist demands can bridge between the dissonance of sentiments and requirements, and contribute to moderate political behavior, as this rhetoric mainly has a psychological effect that safeguards collective honor.

The 2012 survey I implemented found that most Jews and most Arabs would like to see a policy that fits the third paradigm. The Inclusive Citizenship paradigm strives to bring Israel closer to the liberal democracy model, and to form practical meaning for an equal relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel. The survey found that the majority of Jews and Arabs agree to a future settlement as part of a package deal, where Israel remains Jewish and democratic with Hebrew as its main official language, and where the Law of Return continues to grant citizenship to Jews automatically. This is as part of an understanding that the state would not discriminate against Arabs on the daily civil level, enable appropriate representation for Arabic as secondary official language in the public sphere, and according to most Arabs, legislate an immigration law alongside the Law of Return, such as in western Europe. Another finding is that the majority of Israelis prefer the equal citizenship approach. A major part of the Israeli citizens is satisfied with civil equality for the Arab minority and opposes recognition of Arabs as a national group. The majority of the Jewish public believes that the road towards a more stable format for Jewish-Arab relations in Israel passes through a change of concept: from an exclusive citizenship that disregards the Arabs towards an inclusive citizenship that embraces them as part of the State project, and sees them as equal citizens without reducing the rights of Jews for dominance of the state and its public space.

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\(^3\) See surveys of National Strength Index since 2000 conducted at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa.

\(^4\) See ex.: Israeli Democracy Institute 2012 Democracy Index shows that 44.5% of the Arabs are proud of the State of Israel.
References


Shiftan, D, *Palestinians in Israel: The Arab Minority and the Jewish State*, Zmora-Bitan, Tel Aviv, 2012 [Hebrew].


