UNESCO
United Nations
Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization

International
Peace
Cooperation
Center

The Jerusalem Institute
for Israel Studies

The Evaluation of Cooperation Between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs: An Assessment

Prepared for
UNESCO's "Civil Societies in Dialogue" Program
by
the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC)
and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS)

Maya Kahanoff, Walid Salem, Rami Nasrallah and Yana Neumann

2007

**The Evaluation of Cooperation Between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs:
An Assessment**

Prepared for UNESCO's "Civil Societies in Dialogue" Program

Maya Kahanoff, Walid Salem, Rami Nasrallah and Yana Neumann
Consultant: **Rita Sever**

Contents

Foreword

This research was done during the violent Israeli-Palestinian conflict that began in September 2000 and continues, in one form or another, to this day. This violent outbreak not only put an end to the Oslo Process but brought the Israeli-Palestinian relationship to a grave new low.

The violent conflict also seriously damaged the work of organizations on both sides that sought to further the cause of peace. Yet the joint activities of these organizations did not cease entirely: lately, it has even experienced an upswing, due to the awareness on both sides of the importance of this work in assisting the advance of the peace process. Most recently – in June 2007 – a large gathering was organized at the initiative of the Tuscany region of Italy at which 50 Israeli organizations and 20 Palestinian organizations met to jointly assess the means to widen cooperation between the two sides, under European auspices.

The report following is of central importance not only as a critique of past cooperation. Beyond that, it proposes new guidelines for dealing with the current conflict and the asymmetrical relations between the sides. The research points to the need for ongoing critical analysis of the process of cooperation in order to be both more effective and to serve the basic interests of both sides, and will also assist external supporters in keeping track of the results of their efforts.

Introduction

In December 1993, an international round table on 'Peace, the Day After' was held in Granada (Spain), on the initiative of UNESCO. At this event Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals and eminent figures from the Arab World, Asia, Europe and the United States discussed their roles in projecting a vision of a shared future and in bringing about peace and reconciliation in the Middle East. Even before this date, and ever since, UNESCO has been involved in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, supporting activities of reconciliation through various projects in education, culture, communication and the sciences.

The most important preconditions for any sustainable and credible UNESCO action in the Middle East remain the perception of its role as an honest and trusted broker, and the consent of the different parties to work together. While in the current situation, such consent may be very difficult to obtain, the priority nevertheless remains to gradually create new levels of engagement and confidence and thus bring the partners together at the same table in an issue-oriented approach addressing shared problems and seizing opportunities as they arise.

Within this framework, the UNESCO 'Civil Societies in Dialogue' programme, initiated in 2002, intends to help leaders of civil society organizations share and construct a vision of a common future through dialogue and policy research.

The hopes raised by the Oslo Accords and the Road Map have been dampened by realities on the ground and the perpetuation of violence. This mood does not prevent, however, the continuous search for peace as shown in recent years by the signing of the Geneva Initiative, 'The Campus Does Not Keep Quiet' petition, the Memory to Peace initiative of Father Emile Shoufani, the Parents Circle – Israeli-Palestinian Bereaved Families Forum for Peace, or the Israeli-Palestinian Science Organization. In fact, hundreds of initiatives for dialogues, meetings and joint projects have taken place since the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993 as means of strengthening the peace process through the involvement of civil society organizations. It is estimated that 20 to 25 million US$ were allocated for the funding of these projects by donors such as Norway, the European Union, Canada, Switzerland, Ireland, Denmark and Belgium. Many of these projects have been discontinued, even though some major joint work continues to be funded

by the EU, while women's movements and peace organizations have maintained their cooperation. While no in-depth evaluation of these activities – except by the EU and Norway – seems to have been conducted, many people in Israel and Palestine point to the general lack of impact on public opinion, lack of follow-up, insufficient or inexistent coordination, deficient methodologies, unreconciled expectations in terms of outcomes, and participation generally limited to the 'converted'.

UNESCO wishes to act as an honest broker in situations of conflict focusing on the contributions of civil societies towards the shaping of a better future for all. Through this project, it seeks to build a commitment by civil societies to live side by side in peace and to contribute jointly to the future well-being of both communities.

The 'Civil Societies in Dialogue' programme is therefore an essential element in UNESCO's efforts to contribute to reconciliation in the region. Aimed essentially at encouraging open exchange between members of civil societies and their organizations, it seeks in particular to: (a) support a permanent forum for dialogue in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, enabling representatives from both sides to work effectively through various forms of partnership and action; and (b) to promote academic cooperation between researchers in Israeli and Palestinian universities, particularly in the social and human sciences, so as to jointly address common policy issues through research and policy advice.

The purpose of the programme is not simply dialogue but also 'internal dialogue'. The interest is to see what Israelis and Palestinians take back to their own societies once they have shared a common understanding. The aim is to bring together influential group actors from women's organizations, trade unions, medical doctors, associations of workers, etc. Thus it is concerned with civil society rather than with the political sphere.

As part of this programme, UNESCO has commissioned an assessment of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian NGOs, the implementation and results of which are duly reflected in the present publication. Its purpose is to give an overview of the evaluation of collaboration between Israel and Palestinian NGOs made by the NGOs themselves. In the resolution of many deep-rooted conflicts around the world, NGOs, and in particular women, and initiatives and organizations that they have created and carried on their shoulders, have played

a key role in building the conditions essential for a peacemaking environment, including developing alternative visions for the future. The cooperation assessment is reaching beyond generalized analysis and examining in a specific manner the past and potential contributions that NGOs can make in building peace in Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

To this end, this work offers in-depth evaluation of dialogue initiatives, past and present, literature reviews from which lessons can be drawn, including mapping of new or innovative initiatives, proposals and recommendations to conduct future dialogues.

Concerning Palestinian NGOs, while there is no uniform position with respect to cooperation with Israeli NGOs, the following needs and interests are expressed: a basic consensus on the key issues needs to be achieved through internal dialogue within Palestinian society, and efforts need to be made to strengthen institutional capacities of Palestinian NGOs. These NGOs consider the media as a powerful means of reaching out to public opinion; however they feel that Palestinian media professionals suffer from a lack of adequate infrastructure. And for dialogue to take place a locally based structure is required, inside Palestine and Israel. In addition, an innovative methodology must be built up to deal with mistrust and fear. Efforts towards a dialogue with Israelis started in the 1970s; since then, the political situation has changed dramatically. The essential question today is how to make dialogue meaningful between two unequal societies. Here again, the importance of having internal dialogue within Palestinian society is repeatedly emphasized. The weak coordination amongst Palestinian NGOs is often pointed out as a principle reason for their feeble impact. Many of them say that the work of NGOs must remain free from any pressure, both internal and external. Any future dialogue should be structured in such a way as to make peace visible. Dialogue, in addition, should not be limited to the academic level, but should be extended to other sectors of society.

Concerning Israeli NGOs, many of them are trying despite difficult conditions to rebuild communication with the Palestinians. Some NGOs have actually institutionalized their partnership with Palestinian counterparts (e.g. Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information, Middle East Children Association, Israeli-Palestinian Science Organization, Israeli-Palestinian Bereaved Families Forum for Peace, etc.). They even try to hold meetings at border checkpoints. All agree that channels for dialogue should be maintained and recognize the need,

as do the Palestinians, to start with internal dialogue, in order to address and influence domestic public opinion. Each party needs to build 'trust' within its own society before directly interacting with the other.

A number of organizations and associations on both sides have been working, through educational activities, on the issue of violence, in particular in terms of its impact on children and youth. Some innovative dialogue initiatives exist: for example, the Parents Circle tries to overcome hatred through meetings between Israeli and Palestinian families who have lost members in the conflict. Others are working to eliminate discrimination against Arab Israelis.

It also appears that many, although not all, NGOs have been involved in cooperative dialogue projects. The need for an evaluation of the mechanisms was thus stated repeatedly during missions and meetings: what impact have these dialogues had, especially on public opinion? Have they influenced policy-making? What type of follow-up has been implemented? Has the methodology for the workshops been adequate? Have expectations been met? Has the influence of the donors been too overwhelming? Any major re-launch of the mechanism and projects would greatly benefit from an examination of lessons learned in order to propose a more scientific framework for future dialogue and joint projects.

It has been reiterated throughout discussions and exchanges with both Israelis and Palestinians that the dialogues need to move from individuals (the 'converted') to institutions, from those at the 'margin of public opinion' to 'mainstream' organizations. However those deeply involved in communication and joint action (women and peace advocates) should be further encouraged to persist, while adopting methodologies aimed at reaching out to public opinion in a more systematic way.

A systematic identification of the mainstream civil society organizations that extensively contribute to shaping public opinion in both civil societies – a key building-block to setting the stage for productive and effective dialogue – has also been commissioned by UNESCO and carried out by one Palestinian and one Israeli partner. This component includes determination of the likelihood to which each of the mainstream organizations would be interested in and likely to commit to such a program of dialogue and to an examination of the issues which may condition or pre-empt their involvement. This work will be published separately in 2007.

Missions and discussions held with both Israelis and Palestinians have also clearly demonstrated the following: a need on both sides for the development of a set of guiding principles for academics and intellectuals. Such guiding principles could be developed on the basis of past experiences of cooperation and would be helpful in clarifying the role of academics in channeling dialogue towards peace. The process of reaching a consensus on the guiding principles themselves could be further considered as part of the dialogue. A project carried out by a Palestinian research institute and an Israeli university institute to develop such a set of 'Guiding Principles for Dialogue and Cooperation' is soon to be completed and will be published in 2007. This instrument is anchored in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other basic principles such as freedom of opinions and speech, unrestricted access to education for students, freedom of movement of academics and students, an end to university closures and collective punishment, reciprocity and mutual support among Israeli and Palestinian academics and institutions, and the achievement of intellectual, cultural and scientific progress.

At the end of the day, these three complementary elements, (a) the evaluation of past dialogues, (b) the identification of mainstream civil society organizations that should be involved in future dialogues, and (c) a set of proposed guiding principles for the NGOs on such dialogues, will help in making dialogues more effective in the future. As a final outcome, it is our sincere hope that a methodology on dialogue could be jointly developed and replicated in other regions in the future.

UNESCO's contribution to peace and reconstruction in the Middle East is through 'social peace'. The aim is to engage intellectuals and civil society organizations in charting a vision for the future, taking into account the lessons learned from past experiences and using methodologies conducive to affecting public opinion. In this context, the 'how to' becomes as important as the dialogues and cooperation projects themselves. The opportunity to make this contribution is right now and should be seized by UNESCO.

Pierre Sané

UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences

Preface

This study was initiated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the framework of its Civil Societies in Dialogue program. The basic goal of the program is to create conditions for effective dialogue between civil societies in conflict, and UNESCO decided to launch this preliminary research study on the Palestinian and Israeli civil societies in part as a way of helping it design future Civil Societies in Dialogue projects.

The main aim of this study—a meta-analysis of evaluations available in this field—is to identify successes, challenges, and lessons learned regarding joint ventures so as to inform the Social and Human Sciences (SHS) section of UNESCO and its partners about the key components that should be integrated in the "civil societies in dialogue" methodology. Our declared mission was two-fold: to summarize lessons learnt from Palestinian-Israeli cooperation, and to recommend guidelines for future cooperation endeavors. Specifically we were asked to review evaluations that had been conducted on various cooperation projects, a difficult mission in light of the scarcity of evaluation in this field; due to this scarcity, a third goal was defined – that of shedding light on the state of evaluation and suggesting principle guidelines for future evaluations in this field.

The research was carried out in two stages. In the first stage two separate but parallel studies were undertaken: one was conducted by an Israeli team at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS), while the other was carried out by the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC), run by a Palestinian team. In the second stage the two teams worked together, and on the basis of the two initial documents produced a third, joint report presenting their combined conclusions. In addition, a workshop was held at which the joint report was discussed in a forum composed of representatives of various NGOs, researchers, and evaluators: the proceedings of the workshop, including the comments and contributions of the workshop participants on the subject, were recorded and also written up as a separate document.

Since formal and systematic evaluations were scarce, we conducted a number of interviews with central figures in various NGOs in order to informally

gather their insights and impressionistic evaluations, thus thickening our data and getting a fuller picture. Ten Israeli organizations and eleven Palestinian organizations, representing different forms of action (dialogue, peace building, advocacy, reconciliation, etc.) were chosen. In addition four international funding organizations were selected for in-depth study of their perceptions and experience with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation.

We analyzed cooperation projects throughout the different stages of their course using four parameters: context, input, process and product (inspired by the CIPP model for program evaluation, Stuffelbeam 1983). Certain themes arose time and time again throughout the different stages, and are discussed extensively in the report: asymmetry in political, societal physical context; designing cooperation partnerships dealing with the changing context and the prevalent asymmetry; diverging agendas; questions of social legitimacy for cooperation, etc. Based on our findings regarding cooperation and the challenges encountered in joint ventures, we suggest a number of recommendations regarding the design of a joint project and explore different conceptions and designs of partnerships across conflict lines such as parallel work, overcoming asymmetry with reciprocity etc. We conclude with a number of general principles we suggest applying to the work of organizations dealing with conflict transformation in the Israeli – Palestinian context.

Evaluations, though asserted by all interviewees to be an important investment, were very scarce and generally lacked characteristics which could make them of greater use to organizations in the field. We thus outline a number of suggested evaluation techniques and guiding principles, mainly participatory action evaluation and a comprehensive approach (combining formative and summative evaluation).

The challenge in writing a joint report was to integrate two separate perspectives into one comprehensive document of consensus, in itself an exercise in Palestinian-Israeli cooperation. Since the emphasis was on reaching agreements regarding the necessary guidelines for cooperation and evaluation, the joint report may not reflect existing differences or divergences in approaches, assumptions and analyses, stemming from our different societal and organizational realities (which can be discerned in the separate reports). We thought it appropriate to include all three reports – the Israeli report, the Palestinian report, and then the joint

report – together in one volume: in this way the reader will get a comprehensive picture and a better grasp of the separate and joint perspectives, as well as the specific and unique characteristics and difficulties each side faces. Thus the first section of this publication is the report of the Israeli team from the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, and the second portion is that of the Palestinian team of the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC). The joint report by the two teams appears as section three, and the proceedings of the workshop on the subject, held in May 2006, constitute the fourth section.

It is our hope that this study will both provide insights into the current state of Palestinian-Israel cooperation efforts and present conceptual and practical guidelines for future dialogue and cooperation programs.

Maya Kahanoff   **Walid Salem**

An Assessment of Cooperation Between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs: An Israeli Perspective*

Principal investigator: **Maya Kahanoff**

Research assistant: **Yana Neuman**

Introduction

This study was conducted for UNESCO by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, and complements a similar study carried out by the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC)—Jerusalem during the period of February-July 2005, (appearing as section two of this publication). It presents our findings on cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), discussion of main issues and dilemmas, and recommendations for future cooperation—from an Israeli perspective.

Theoretical and conceptual framework

This study adopts a comprehensive approach to conflict analysis and to evaluating efforts toward resolution. Following Galtung (1969, 1996), our aim is to understand the diverse work of Israeli nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that cooperate with Palestinian NGOs in promoting peace in the framework of a conflict transformation process.

Galtung (ibid) viewed conflict as a triangle with attitude (A), behavior (B), and contradiction (C), as its vertices. The A vertex, Attitude, includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves (in violent conflicts these include demeaning stereotypes of the other side), and emotions

---

* Project consultant: Dr. Rita Sever

such as fear, anger, bitterness, and hatred. The B vertex, Behavior, includes cooperation or coercion, and gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. The C vertex refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between the parties. In an asymmetric conflict, Galtung argues, the contradiction in goals is defined by the parties, their relationship, and the conflict of interests inherent in that relationship.

We adopted this comprehensive approach to our analysis, stressing the importance of taking into account all three components—conflict structure, hostile attitudes, and conflictual behaviors—in any effort to analyze conflict or promote a process of transformation. Since conflict is a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes, and behavior are constantly changing and influencing one another, we argue, like Galtung, that efforts to resolve it should include a set of dynamic changes, involving de-escalation of conflict behavior, attitudinal change, and a transformation in the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure (see Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 2000: 14-15).

This framework guided our choice of which organizations and activities to include in the study. Therefore, we included activities that attempt to change structure as well as those directed at attitude change; activities that are long-term oriented as well as those that seek immediate changes on the ground; and activities aimed at reducing inter-group tensions and hostility, as well as others that provoke conflict and challenge the existing social order (as elaborated below).

Background: Mapping the field

Many attempts have been made to classify non-governmental approaches to conflict transformation or peace building in various arenas of protracted conflict. A prominent example is Northern Ireland, where "people-to-people" ("P2P") or "cross-community" projects of various kinds have been developed by a vibrant voluntary sector, with considerable financial support from the British government. Some of the classification schemes proposed include: economic or social needs vs. justice, violence, and community relations (Morrow and Wilson, 1995); political ("structural") initiatives vs. community relations ("cultural") initiatives

(Fitzduff, 1995). One comparative study of peace and conflict resolution organizations (P/CROs) in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa proposed the following four categories: service providers, advocacy, dialogue, and consciousness-raising (Gidron et al., 1999). Perlman and Schwartz (2000) based their classification on the types of activities in which organizations were engaged (rather than varying approaches to peacemaking or reconciliation). The categories they used were policy development, service providers, and classic peace groups.

Our study concentrates on organizations that seek to promote dialogue and cooperation in civil society. Given that most organizations perform more than one kind of activity—which, according to the conflict transformation model, is necessary—we propose a classification based on a categorization of activities and their relation to peace, or to potential conflict transformation processes.

The following categories were chosen:

I. *Peacemaking activities:* attempts to promote political or policy changes that further conflict resolution and peace. Forms of activity in this category include strategic planning, attempts to influence decision-makers, supporting official peace processes, initiating processes of second-track diplomacy, and grassroots political dialogue. Peacemaking work can be conducted by NGOs from within political institutes—for example, think-tank work on policy papers to be presented to politicians and policymakers, support or development of policies promoted in track 1—or outside the official institutes, such as second-track diplomacy, political dialogue at various levels, and diverse activities in support of peace.

II. *Advocacy or Protest activities:* attempts to challenge the existing political process and policy. Here we include protest organizations against the government or military that seek to generate support for their positions through demonstrations, public symposia, and the mass media.

III. *Peace-building activities:* attempts to create infrastructure for peace or conflict transformation both in terms of material or structural activities, such

as capacity building in health, economics, or environment, and in terms of attitude transformation, trust building, and promotion of open communication channels between the societies. The goals of these processes are generally long-term and can be framed within the overall attempt to build or strengthen civil societies, achieve a high level of trust between them, and maintain communication.

The context of a conflict affects the goals and strategy that organizations adopt in seeking to promote peace or conflict transformation. Knowing the rationale for the choice of activities is essential in order to categorize activities and to understand the different forms of cooperation initiated by organizations.

We turn now to the rationale for the strategies of peace building, peacemaking, and advocacy and protest activities included in our research.

Peacemaking activities represented in our research sample included think-tank work, which is performed at the organization's own initiative with the aim of providing policymakers with strategies and solutions to conflict-related issues that policymakers cannot deal with – either because of lack of time or due to their official status. As one of the interviewees stated: "Any organization dealing with strategic planning in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will tell you that they do their work without the request of a government, because the governments aren't doing it and the political situation does not allow them the time to think about these topics, nor do they generally have the legitimacy to discuss them."

Think-tank work and second-track diplomacy processes enable creative, unconventional, unofficial thinking that may provide useful solutions.

Advocacy and protest activities are usually based on the commonly-stated rationale that there is a need to change Israeli policy and end the occupation. The target population of these organizations is generally Israeli public opinion and the international community. One interviewee stated that: "Humanitarian aid and dialogue do not deal with the inequality of the occupation. Dialogue is important but should be used at the reconciliation stage of the conflict. At present, work should concentrate on the occupation."

Peace-building activities are based on a rationale that includes the following components:

Peace education: "No political arrangements will be sustainable without investing in education, and the work has to be done within the education system and not by an outside body," as stated by one of the leading NGOs focused on education.

Capacity-building cooperation: As described by one of the organizations in the field: "Israel has over the years oppressed the Palestinian people, obstructing development and often even ruining infrastructure. It is therefore Israeli organizations' responsibility to assist the Palestinians in creating and developing civil structures, economy, culture, and education." Furthermore: "Our basic assumption is that if things are done to assist [the Palestinians] combined with a dialogue with Israelis, this will contribute to the relationship."

The rationale behind professional to professional activities is that professionals are able to make connections regarding the issues at hand, and create channels of cooperation and dialogue. One of the final reports on a major health project stated that: "Those involved in health cooperation seem to have a clear understanding of its dual purpose: to develop services that meet the real needs of the population, and to maintain open channels of communication with the 'other' in the conflict" (Garber et al., 2003: 26). Another report stated that: "When Israelis and Palestinians cooperate on an issue that is not at the heart of the political conflict, the political 'other' is not at the heart of their cooperation and this allows interactions on a human level" (Garber et al., 2002: 25).

Dialogue: The rationale for dialogue is that encountering the "other" enables people to confront their stereotypes and build trust. One of the NGO directors said: "For a peace process to succeed, it can't depend solely on a top-down process. The lack of familiarity between societies creates misperceptions and a distorted image of reality. This must be changed to enable a real peace process. One of the big mistakes of the peace process was the assumption that 'peace' and 'process' would speak for themselves. Anything that is not done simultaneously with a bottom-up approach will not contribute to a larger historical process."

Based on the South African experience as described by Taylor (2002: 69-94), we argue that the combination of all the above forms of activity, involving attempts to influence different target populations with different means, is a necessary part of the conflict transformation process.

Therefore, we prepared an organizational mapping that depicts the breadth and diversity of Israeli NGOs cooperating with Palestinian NGOs. It was compiled via consultations with practitioners and a review of the relevant organizational, academic, and professional literature. This is by no means, however, an exhaustive list of the organizations in this field, nor an inclusive list representing all forms of activity in the conflict transformation domain.

The organizations chosen were those that deal primarily with dialogue in some form, whether professional to professional, grassroots, political dialogue, joint activity, or any other sort. In addition, we included a small representation of advocacy and activist organizations, which, we contend, are also part of the conflict transformation field, since it is necessary to view civil society as a whole for a full understanding of the context.

See Appendix 2 for our mapping of the field.

Methodology: Data collection and framework of analysis

A. Data Collection

Given the initial goals of this research — to assess existing evaluations of cooperation efforts, and to identify areas needing further evaluation — we first reviewed the literature of existing evaluation studies that had been carried out by various institutions, donors, or independent researchers. We found that most organizations do not make a point of ensuring ongoing documentation and monitoring, and internal systematic evaluation is scarce. We then decided to interview central figures in various NGOs representing the abovementioned categories, and informally record their insights and impressions.

We further considered it important to take into consideration the variety of perspectives from which these evaluations are made, that reflect a range in distance and closeness, or in involvement and detachment from the local

conflict. We expected this variance would illuminate areas of which we would otherwise have been unaware, and hope the effort to represent these multiple perspectives on Israeli-Palestinian cooperation will broaden our understanding both of the potential of this work and of the challenges. Thus, we included various stakeholders involved in Israeli-Palestinian cooperation efforts: the local/insider point of view represented by Israeli NGO directors; the international/outsider point of view represented by donors and by international representatives who have accompanied cooperation efforts for a considerable time; and the professional evaluators or academics who seek an integrative view of this sphere.

We selected ten Israeli organizations that represent the above categorization, and four international funding organizations for in-depth study of their perceptions and experience of cooperation with Palestinian partners. It should be noted that this is neither a systematic nor a random sample, but rather one that attempts to reflect the diversity of organizations in this field while relating to the three categories of organizations in our mapping.

Our interview explored four main areas: a description of the cooperation projects and the form of cooperation; the successes and the lessons learned about cooperation; the difficulties encountered; and, throughout the interview, the evaluation process of the cooperation (see Appendix 3 for the text of the interview).

The material we gathered reflects varying degrees of formal and professional evaluation standards. Only a few of the documents are formal evaluation reports; others are internal evaluations conducted by the NGOs' staff; still others are of a more sporadic, impressionistic nature. We also reviewed academic studies, articles, and some book chapters (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list).

B. Framework of analysis

Conceptual framework—criteria for assessing the evaluations:

Our analytic framework is inspired by the CIPP model for program evaluation presented by Stuffelbeam (1983) (cited in Sever, 2002: 3). Besides its heuristic value for analyzing the material, our framework may be helpful in planning future projects, in keeping with UNESCO's overall aim (see Appendix 4).

The CIPP model is a comprehensive approach to evaluation. It combines a summative orientation (judgment of a program based on the cumulative evidence of how it meets the stated goals of the project, or the needs of the clients) with a formative orientation (whereby the evaluator collects and reports data and judgments during the project to help in developing and improving a program). The model includes four components to be evaluated: context, input, process, and product. These may be used both to guide decision-making in a framework of formative evaluation, and to supply information for accountability in a framework of summative evaluation.

Context evaluation serves as a basis for selecting and shaping project goals, and refers to needs assessment, perceptions about problems that warrant change, and efficacy of institutional goals and priorities. In other words, it concerns the choice of objectives and assignment of priorities. Evaluation criteria within this category may be formulated as follows: to what extent were the project's objectives attuned to the needs of the populations served, their strengths, weaknesses, and problems?

Input evaluation relates to choice of program strategy, and choice of procedural designs for implementing the strategy. Evaluation criteria may be: to what extent was the strategy chosen reasonable (vis-à-vis what is being done elsewhere and what is proposed in the literature); relevant; feasible; responsive to the assessed needs?

Process evaluation concerns implementation, and encompasses such issues as the extent to which the project plan is implemented; defects in the procedural design or its implementation; and obstacles in the implementation process. Within this category we examine decision-making practices, and symmetry or asymmetry in cooperation between organizations, on both the administrative and substantive, professional levels.

Product evaluation involves assessing performance in relation to previously diagnosed needs, and examining the results with regard to the following questions/ evaluation criteria: to what extent has the program met the needs of the target population; to what extent has it achieved the goals as defined by the project. Furthermore, the evaluation at this stage examines the program's impact on the participants, the local community, and the broader community.

Analysis procedure:

For each organization we summarized the reported successes, problems or areas of difficulty (sometimes viewed as challenges), and recommendations made (in either the written evaluations or the face-to-face interviews). We further analyzed this data with regard to the four categories of context, inputs, processes, and product (CIPP, for which the model is named). We then created clusters of organizations according to similarities that we identified (such as organizational characteristics—defining major goals; type of cooperation; target population; areas of success or problems identified regarding the context, input of the organization, processes, and product). At the end of this stage, we summarized all lessons learned from the organizations' point of view.

We similarly analyzed materials gathered from international representatives with regard to successes, difficulties or challenges, and recommendations made, in relation to the CIPP components. We then summarized lessons learned from the donors' point of view.

In a similar manner, we also reviewed the formal documents, research papers, articles, and formal evaluations, again considering the same criteria and summarizing them with regard to our CIPP categories.

Our report presents an integrative summary of lessons learned in the context of these cooperation efforts, regarding conditions that may be changed, or not; input of the organizations and donors; cooperation processes within and between organizations' staff (and between organizations and donors); strengths and difficulties (or potential and limitations); and finally, outcomes of these cooperative efforts (successes and failures), including recommendations.

Successes, challenges, and recommendations concerning cooperation

A. Context of cooperation

1. Findings regarding the context of Palestinian-Israeli cooperation

Before dealing with organizations themselves and the strategies they choose, it is important to note the difficult intercommunity reality within which they work. Tamar Hermann, in her article "The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement 1967-1998" (Hermann, 2002), notes that despite their diversity, all political agendas presented by the peace movement were criticized over the years, mostly by centrist and right-wing organizations or individuals, although the left-wing establishment also expressed reservations about certain tenets. The mildest criticism was that the peace activists were politically naïve: they were ignorant of the dominant role that power plays in interstate and intercommunity relations, and did not fully understand that Israel's existence was dependent on its ability to maintain military superiority. Critics also questioned the movement's basic loyalty to Zionism and Israeli national interests. The peace activists were virtually accused of being unpatriotic, preferring the Arab/Palestinian cause over the Israeli/Jewish one, and giving precedence to "bleeding-heart," universalistic values (Herman, 2002: 109). Thus a general characteristic of the context in which these organizations operate is amidst tension between an organization and its home community on the one hand, and the other/opponent community on the other. In other words, activities currently taking place that are aimed at conflict transformation may meet resistance from one or both sides.

Transformations in organizations' work after outbreak of the second Intifada:

The Oslo process and the signing of the Declaration of Principles seemed, at the time, to be the dawn of a new era. New NGOs were founded, and people-to-people projects, think-tank activities, and various Israeli-Palestinian cooperation projects were funded generously by the donor community, which viewed the Oslo accords as symbolizing a transformation in the conflict and sought to accelerate the process. Some would say a "peace industry" developed.

The Al-Aqsa Intifada, or second Intifada that began in 2000, brought many of these activities to an abrupt halt. A few causes for this change can be identified. First, funding for many NGOs was withdrawn by funders who reassessed the likelihood of the activities' success given the breakdown in the peace process. Second, NGOs were unable to cope with the drastic changes in the political environment. Third, relationships with Palestinian partners broke down and Palestinians viewed cooperation with Israelis negatively, some of them seeing it as promoting normalization and maintaining the state of occupation. One of the NGO directors told us: "They [the Palestinians] do not want to work toward normalization in education, dialogue, economic development, or reconciliation with Israeli partners before the occupation is over. This is because they are frightened, and rightly so, that if Israel can reach normalization and cooperation without ending the occupation, it will have no reason to do so…. Normalization is a factor that enables the continuation of the occupation." Thus, whereas many previously cooperative Palestinian organizations and individuals rejected cooperation initiatives (mainly of the peace-building kind), perceiving them as acts sustaining the status quo, in a parallel development disappointment, frustration, and suspicion spread among Israeli citizens and some organizations, with a sense that there were no partners to work with.

Many organizations simply ceased to exist following the second Intifada, while those that survived could not remain indifferent and underwent various transformations (in goals, mode of operation, etc.), also developing diverse coping mechanisms in the new situation.

Israeli NGOs operating in the peace and conflict field responded to the change in various ways. While some experienced a kind of paralysis and confusion, others started working separately/in parallel (in a "uninational" framework); or underwent political transformation; or chose to stay away from politics and emphasize the humanitarian aspects; yet others maintained their previous line of activities despite the changing circumstances.

A common reaction to the changing situation—the difficulties in movement that followed the Intifada, the breakdown of trust between the sides, and the opposition to cooperative work—was the increase in unilateral activities, or activities conducted in parallel in each society rather than in a joint cooperative forum. An NGO director told us: "There are many projects that became unilateral

following the Intifada…. We started concentrating on unilateral meetings because the situation was very uncertain. It is a problem when teachers suddenly cancel, or require changes (in date, time, place); one has to supply them with some reliability. Unilateral meetings meet that need, because they take place regularly despite the surrounding uncertainty."

There are also NGOs that redefined their goals and activities and adopted more political approaches, as explained by an interviewee from one of the women's organizations: "During the first years of Oslo we conducted all sorts of cultural activities, and there was a feeling that it was not necessary to go out and demonstrate…there was a transition from protest activities to activities focused on building cultural bridges….Before Oslo officially collapsed, it was obvious to us that on the one hand the rhetoric was of peace, while on the other hand the settlements were being expanded…and the issue of citizenship of Jerusalemite Palestinians had not changed. We went back to protest activities fairly quickly. We got the message that what was called 'normalization' could not continue."

Other, less transformational modalities included ongoing attempts at keeping the cooperation and communication channels open during the conflict, and ongoing work on humanizing the "other" and building trust so as to create support for a potential peace process.

When Israelis and Palestinians cooperate on an issue that is not at the heart of the political conflict, the political "other" is not the focus of their cooperation and this facilitates interactions on a personal level. At times when the political conflict heats up, the political "other" re-enters the cooperation, pushing other issues aside. Whether the political conflict completely overtakes the issues at the heart of the cooperation depends on the will to continue of those involved, and on the macro-political environment (Garber et al., 2002: 25).

Challenges posed by the context:

Below is a summary and analysis of the ongoing challenges and gaps created by the current state of the conflict, as described in the evaluation reports and by our respondents.

◆ *Asymmetry—different realities, different agendas*

One of the basic difficulties or gaps concerns the asymmetry of the current situation. The two sides face very different realities, and view the goals and value of cooperation differently. For example, the evaluation report on UNESCO's academic cooperation project stated that: "While the expectations of Israelis from academic cooperation focused on the professional/academic level, the expectations of Palestinians related to the political level, towards changing their unlivable socio-political reality."

Similarly, one of our NGO interviewees described the gap between the sides as follows: "The two sides have different agendas, the Palestinian side having a more political one. They are interested in politically influencing Israelis. Israelis are more interested in the process and Palestinians in the results." And one of the donors, reflecting on the different goals the two sides try to advance, said: "The Israelis want to prepare the ground for a sustainable peace and signing the final status agreement, while the Palestinians want to advocate their cause and influence the Israelis."

An additional point made by many donors and organizations concerned inequality of resources (such as trained human resources and equipment) between the Israeli and Palestinian organizations. "Israeli partners are better prepared and have more capacity. Therefore, the Israeli position always prevailed over that of the Palestinians."

The abovementioned evaluation described the asymmetry between the groups with regard to both the political and intellectual levels, causing frustration on both sides. "Palestinian members emphasized the political asymmetry as a point of departure for any discussion and possible action, expecting the Israelis to admit this asymmetry and act accordingly, and they were frustrated with the other side's indifference to, or denial of this situation. The Israeli members, on the other hand, felt the lack of symmetry in the group with regard to the academic level, academic interest, or commitment to academic standards. Whereas the entire Israeli group consisted of professional academics, the Palestinian group was primarily, in their eyes, a political one with few academics."

Maddy-Weitzman (2002) points out that Israeli intellectuals work within a well-established, well-funded framework of universities, and therefore have the option to avoid taking an overtly political stance either out of a belief

that academia and politics should not mix, or because they fear for their jobs. Furthermore, he maintains that: "Israeli intellectuals find themselves in the post-heroic phase of their national life" (ibid.: 15). In other words, Israel has reached a maturation point at which it is ready to be deconstructed, whereas Palestinians are still saddled with the task of constructing a state and a national ethos. Therefore, Maddy-Weitzman explains, many Palestinian intellectuals are involved with NGOs or political parties rather than universities, a situation compounded by the fact that Israel has shut down many Palestinian universities and that roadblocks and other obstacles make it difficult for students and professors to get to class.

Many interviewees mentioned the limited freedom of movement that Palestinians face as a severe challenge to cooperation. Some organizations, as mentioned above, found solutions in the form of more unilateral work and a diminishing number of joint meetings.

Another gap related to the asymmetrical realities, and the societal threat of participation in cooperation or normalization activities in Palestinian society, concerns contradictory stances toward publicizing cooperation. As one NGO director stated: "Our cultural background is different, we are an independent and open society, whereas they are under occupation, and they perceive the threat from their society as more serious than we perceive it. We Israelis always want to externalize and publicize our activities and they want to minimize publicity… they feel that what they do may threaten their life or status."

◆ *Limited scope of target population*

The context also imposes a limitation on possible outreach to other circles and the wider society, both on the organizational level and in terms of the target population. On the Israeli side, fear and distrust of the Palestinians together with delegitimization of the left have made it more difficult to recruit people for dialogue or cooperation. Many of the donor representatives mentioned the need to widen the target population and expand outreach to marginalized communities, including spoilers of agreements, extremists, security personnel, labor unions, and so on.

Some donors mentioned the Israeli Arabs as a societal group that is barely represented in cooperation efforts. As they are a central part of the context,

many of these donors stressed the necessity of including them in cooperation processes, arguing that: "Those who do not include Israeli Arabs in the Israeli group in dialogue processes with Palestinians are making their life easy and dissembling."

◆ *Donor-organization relationships*

Many organizations and some evaluation reports made remarks about the donor-driven agendas. Donors' decisions have great influence on the field of action chosen by organizations but do not necessarily reflect needs on the ground. Another issue here is the difficulty of long-term planning. A few organizations mentioned the difficulty in providing a long-term plan given that the donors change their focus every few years. One interviewee confessed: "One could say there is no order in our work. I do not have a five-year plan. What we do is a result of needs, opportunities that come along, our understanding of the appropriate strategy, and sometimes in response to donors' stated agenda." He went on to say: "The ideal would be if someone would give me $10 million and tell me to do what I thought best with it." Another NGO interviewee voiced criticism of the donor community: "The donors are not coordinated enough. They decide every couple of years to put their effort into an area that is considered to be of acute importance; they are not united in their funding efforts…. They should not spread the money among numerous projects that have no cumulative impact, but rather decide jointly on an investment."

2. Recommendations regarding context

a. Dealing with asymmetry

Some organizations and donors suggested that the first step in dealing with the inevitable asymmetry is "being aware of it and putting it in the open." Awareness on the Israeli side and attempts at empowerment of the Palestinians is the proposed coping mechanism.

Unilateral, or parallel activities within the respective societies rather than full joint cooperation, were suggested by some donors as the appropriate solution to the problem of asymmetry and inequality of power between Israeli and Palestinians: it was said to us that "Many organizations that work separately work much better."

One of the directors who has worked extensively on joint planning for Jerusalem suggested a mixed model consisting of parallel work by professional teams of Palestinians and Israelis, then their coming together to present and discuss the groups' products or papers. He further recommended taking into account two important components of such cooperation projects: the actual work that can be done separately in uni-national forums, and the symbolic or ritual component that can only be addressed in joint meetings.

b. Promoting intra-communal dialogue

One of the donors suggested that to promote cooperation between the sides in the current context of deep mistrust, it is necessary first to "promote dialogue within each society and across the whole spectrum of social actors, including those marginalized in previous similar processes"—for example, settler-peace camp dialogue, Arab-Israeli dialogue regarding vision of the future, and so on.

B. Input of the organizations

1. Findings regarding the input during implementation of joint programs

Evaluation of the input into a project relates to the chosen strategies, and to specification of procedural designs for implementing those strategies. When evaluating input, a few parameters must be taken into account including: characteristics of the organizations that will implement the program, suitability of strategy and design, target population, and participants. The latter concerns the organizations' contribution to a program's success.

◆ *Choice of topic—common interest*

Several organizations and evaluation reports stated that cooperation between the participants was usually enhanced when the topic chosen addressed a common interest. Regarding strategic planning work, one of the interviewees stated that: "Choosing an ad hoc subject is the name of the game. If you identify a topic that is important to both sides, the work will be efficient…choosing a long-term subject is a lot more complex…the hypothetical aspect of the topic is an obstacle.

Working on a futuristic topic could be perceived as saying that what is happening at the moment is not important, and it raises the question of whether working on the subject actually means you are prepared to give them something…." Evaluations of agricultural research cooperation (Kumar and Rosenthal, 1998), and health cooperation (Skinner et al., 2005: 4) suggest that research and projects addressing regional needs may promote cooperation and enhance support of officials, therefore gaining support necessary for conducting the project.

◆ *Defining and recruiting target population*

The term "the usual suspects" was used many times, by organizations and donors, when speaking both of organizations and especially of figureheads participating in political dialogue. It seems that not enough effort is invested in recruiting other players. "In our field it is very obvious, it doesn't matter if we are IPCRI or the Peres Center, you will generally see that on the Palestinian side, less so on the Israeli, there are the usual suspects, people who have turned this [political dialogue] into their profession."

Another problem is actually defining and focusing on a certain population rather than reaching those who are easiest: "We need to develop a clearer strategy regarding who we want to reach out to and how that can be done in a more systematic way."

One of the directors interviewed reflected on the advantages of professional-to-professional cooperation in regard to group composition. Cooperation based on professional aspects brings together a set of people holding a range of political views, thus enabling a diverse and genuine interaction: "Dialogue should not be aimed at those who are already convinced. One should not take organizations like Bat Shalom or Peace Now, but rather a section of society as it is. If I take a hundred doctors, fifty Israelis and fifty Palestinians, I get the whole range of the political spectrum and create a dialogue initially based on professional aspects."

◆ *Legitimacy*

Legitimacy from its constituency is a central asset to the work of any organization, and to cooperation. Lack of support or legitimacy for an organization can inhibit

its impact on the wider society. In education work, this legitimacy may be gained by working through an institution (e.g., the Ministry of Education); think tanks' legitimacy depends on their access to decision- or policymakers. Organizations face a challenge in gaining legitimacy when they promote an oppositional or critical perspective.

◆ *Trust building: A necessary part of the design*

Many indicated that trust building between both organizational staff and participants was an essential initial stage in the cooperation process. It may be worth addressing this topic in the initial stages of design rather than letting it develop naturally during the implementation process, as suggested by one of our interviewees: "The first thing that needs to be done is to build trust and build a relationship. In some research projects people assume that cooperation requires no investment. They will go straight to the research subject matter. The first thing is to build a relationship and to prepare and teach people skills necessary to talk across the divide."

◆ *Staff: Issue of professionalization; building a body of knowledge and training*

One of the problems mentioned regarding the work of NGOs is the lack of a written body of knowledge. The knowledge tends to exist within people and organizations but not in a format that can be passed on from one to another or that can assist a process of professionalization in this field. One program director stated: "In organizations like ours there is no process of professionalization, there are no professional training workshops, this field is not developed in the academic sense. Political dialogue is regarded as based on experience, as a field for politicians." A donor observed: "Staff is recruited according to alliances, political affiliation, and not according to skills."

Additional challenges

◆ *Need for strategic planning*

Several evaluation reports noted that many organizations lack long-term strategic planning. This may be the result of numerous factors, including: a constantly

changing reality that demands continual adjustment; funding that is generally given to support short, limited rather than long-term projects; difficulty in focusing and defining goals and suitable strategies.

One NGO director reflected in an evaluation: "We were told our work was scattered and unfocused and that we lacked strategy." Another asserted: "In liberal and left-wing circles there is generally no strategy, there is only a bunch of activists." Another interviewee said the problem is lack of commitment and accountability: "Not having a strategy and a program is a comfortable situation to be in, because then you do not make any promises. And if you do not promise, you do not have to deliver in the end. You are exempt from difficult questions such as—how efficient are you?"

◆ *Design of dialogue programs*

Many programs that intend to include or have a subgoal of promoting dialogue demonstrate partial inclusion of this factor in their design. For example, many stated that people-to-people dialogue should include more than "getting to know the other." One director said it should also create a product, an impact on the wider society: "I realize humans have a basic need to meet the other in an encounter in which stereotypes are shattered. My problem is when the dialogue stops there, and some of the Israelis participating in the dialogue do not realize that they have to take responsibility…this is the reason why Palestinians oppose dialogue groups. Dialogue groups are like applying cosmetics to the problem and not solving it."

One major flaw in the design of professional-to-professional projects happens when only a professional dialogue takes place while discussion of the conflict is put aside. This was mentioned as a drawback: "One of our big mistakes was that we did not include, in the project design, structured discussions on the conflict and attitudes regarding the conflict. We ignored this topic, saying it would arise in informal discussions when both sides were ready, after a relationship was formed. In many cases, especially with doctors, it was easy to avoid the subject, to ignore it." Dialogue about the conflict should be part of the design.

2. Recommendations regarding the input of the organizations

a. Defining project goals and strategies

It may be fruitful to include different goals and strategies in binational projects, representing the unique needs of each side.

For example, in one of the educational programs: "The Palestinian teachers feel it is necessary to talk about the situation and the daily difficulties they and the Palestinian people encounter. They expressed their need to protect the children and to teach them how to defend themselves against the occupation. The Israelis also feel it necessary to protect the children. This is done by not letting the 'situation' enter the kindergarten, shielding the children against external reality, and helping them cope emotionally with the terrorist attacks." It is more fruitful to include both perspectives.

b. Overcoming lack of strategy

The lack of strategy and ad hoc fashion in which many organizations are run could be overcome by using a professional steering committee composed of experts in the field to guide program development and implementation (Goren, 2004). Furthermore, as one NGO director suggested: "A strong, influential board can be useful beyond the initial benefit of societal legitimacy. A board can serve as a forum in which strategic discussion takes place, so as to prevent ad hoc activities. In addition, a board can serve as a checks-and-balances mechanism with regard to executive management, and can be a system of quality assurance."

Another recommendation regarding the definition of project goals, strategy, and so on was to involve stakeholders in this process: "Stakeholders were not part of the initial design of the program, they were not consulted as a group, had no formalized structures or institutions for regular input into the design or shape of the program. This entails threats to project sustainability—missing the opportunity to build sustainability into the peace community, less identification with objectives, and fewer achievements among the community of partner organizations. Significant multiplier effects were thus lost."

c. Long-term design

An important factor mentioned by many was program continuity, or the impact or multiplier effect. The long-term desired influence should be taken into account in the design stage. As Goren (2004: 38) recommends in his research report:

> "In order for joint activities to have a significant and sustained effect on Jerusalem's society, preference should be given to multi-stage projects, in which each stage of an activity leads to the next…over short-term projects that end after a conference or a single meeting. Thus, the success of one activity would be utilized as a catalyst for the next. The number of participants would grow, and with it the overall impact of the project on society."

Another suggestion was to view every activity as part of the conflict transformation activities occurring at any given moment: "Don't just fall into mutual understanding and peace-building work by default but think strategically about one's own program, how it fits with other work by other donors and change agents in the region, and make a conscious choice of where and how to work and with whom."

d. Design of partnership

A partnership that combines different roles, based on professional characteristics of each organization or person, was found useful: "Each of the different partners in the project brought a commitment to professional excellence, a distinct knowledge based on experience.... Project management structure was defined to recognize and take advantage of each partner's strength. Each partner conducted a different role accordingly" (Garber et al., 2003: 4).

e. Allocation of resources within partnership design

Most cooperation efforts are based on equal use of resources and equal shares. This fifty-fifty model does not take asymmetry into account, observed one of the interviewees. One director suggested that as the Palestinians are generally the weaker partner, "there should be extra investment in the Palestinian side

by capacity building, training, mentoring, and so forth...." Creating symmetry requires empowering the weaker partner, for which the fifty-fifty model is not suitable. "The fifty-fifty approach is mistaken, but then again the Israelis would probably not agree to receive less, thinking 'Why should we get less than the Palestinians?' while on the Palestinian side there may be issues of pride such as 'Why should more be invested in us to do the same job?'"

f. Choice of organizations for partnership

Donors suggested that it is advantageous to invest in local initiatives growing from within the community, rather than in large, mainstream NGOs whose unfamiliarity with local reality and lack of legitimacy could be drawbacks.

Another observation on the issue of asymmetry was that since there is rarely equality between partners, whether it is two organizations cooperating or a binational organization, major investment should be directed at unilateral projects.

C. Process of programs implementation

1. Findings regarding the implementation process of joint programs

Cooperation during the actual project may be greatly influenced by the extent to which the project design took into account the parameter of good partnership between the organizations and the participants. But there are always factors not taken into account or not spelled out, and there is a constantly changing context that organizations have to cope with during the implementation process.

Challenges

Working toward a better reality within the conflict context

There is an inherent difficulty in the work of peace-building NGOs, and it is prevalent in internal organizational work, work between organizations, and in the actual program or project. The difficulty stems from trying to create a new reality

(of symmetry, peace, understanding, and equality) while being enmeshed in a completely different one.

This central difficulty was aptly expressed by Perlman and Schwartz in their evaluation report (2000:12-13):

> "P2P necessarily encounters conceptual difficulties because it must cope with and in some ways indeed mirrors, the reality in which it is being conducted. Because P2P is not conducted in a vacuum, a detached "fantasy island" posture is simply untenable. This inevitable feature of P2P presents difficulties at virtually every level of activity including the nature of relations between partners and the choice of content and methodology of a given project. All this prompts the fundamental question of how P2P may both reflect and reframe reality at the same time?"

Influencing one's own society

Many projects include goals beyond the direct influence on group members participating in the project. The process of implementation and influencing one's own society is often difficult and raises many questions. One director raised the issue that: "The Israeli groups always felt more comfortable approaching Israeli society with a Palestinian partner at their side—in order to show that there was a partner. At a certain point the Palestinians said we were using them! And said we should do the work and find the way into our constituency."

The idea of political change within Israeli participants and public raises the question of how far one can go without losing the Israeli constituency completely. Perlman and Schwartz (ibid.) raise the dilemma of wanting to cater and be empathetic to the Palestinian partner and establish a shared political agenda, while fearing to alienate the Israeli public by challenging their collective self-interest.

In addition, the evaluation report on academic cooperation notes a tension "between the motivation of group members to move towards the other and cooperate as individuals, and their collective identifications and loyalties, or their feeling as representatives of their respective national groups, which hold them back."

Asymmetry

Asymmetry was raised by all organizations and donors as prevalent during the implementation process with the Israeli side. In professional-to-professional cooperation, the Israeli group generally has more professional training, is more fluent in English, and has more resources. For example, in academic cooperation projects the Israeli group is composed of academics from universities while on the Palestinian side there are many intellectuals who are affiliated with research institutes or NGOs or are unaffiliated. Analysis of the group discussions reported in one of the evaluation reports pointed to somewhat different foci of discussion, or perhaps a difference in the agendas put forth in the focus groups on the two sides: "On the Israeli side, the agenda of the discussions focused on cooperation with Palestinian academics (in these groups, the code of ethics was presented as a means for such activities). By contrast, on the Palestinian side, discussions focused on internal societal issues and the need for an academic code of ethics in that context (i.e., mainly for developing or strengthening a democratic Palestinian society). Palestinian cooperation with Israelis was presented as a more minor topic of discussion, and even so, as something that could happen down the road, in the future."

In political dialogue, there tends to be asymmetry in the groups' composition. Whereas the Israeli group generally consists of experts on the topic to be discussed, the Palestinian side generally consists of officials. This asymmetry generates problems in the dialogue because academics can speak freely about ideas whereas officials must take into account social and political taboos.

The fact that the Israelis are the strong side in the conflict and face a different reality than the Palestinians face is the common explanation given for the inequality in intergroup encounters: "It doesn't matter how hard you try [to create equality]; the external reality is much stronger. Trying to create equality in the room by saying, for example, 'you decide on the agenda today' or saying these are the things that are important to me…but the situation in the room is artificial; it is an attempt to empower to create equality."

Some of the donors and most of the organizations reflected on the proactive nature of the Israeli co-partner as compared to the Palestinians, with one stating: "Very often the work division was not fifty-fifty, Israelis generally being more proactive."

42

Coping mechanisms addressing asymmetry problems with regard to the cooperation process:

Different organizations adopted different coping mechanisms in order to tackle the problem of asymmetry.

The first coping mechanism, in view of the Israelis being the stronger partner, is a paternalistic approach of helping out the weaker side. This involves taking control of the situation and assisting to the best of one's ability and resources. To a certain extent this mechanism mirrors the external reality.

Equal management and parity in all is another generally adopted coping mechanism. Budget management, decision-making, and so on are all done in unison by both partners.

A third mechanism is empowerment of the weaker side, encouraging them to take the lead so as to enable capacity building. Attempts at empowerment require acknowledgment of the lack of symmetry and attempting to amend the situation and enhance parity. A more extreme form of this mechanism, implemented by one of the interviewees, is to define the strong party (the Israelis) as the junior party in the cooperation, that is, to reverse roles.

Creating continuity despite an extreme reality

Creating continuity in the face of extreme conditions and changes in reality is one of the major challenges confronting organizations. Many stated that the element of trust between the two sides was essential for enabling the program's continuity and implementation despite the difficult times. As one interviewee put it: "The factor that enhanced and enabled the continuous dialogue was the trust built between the sides…. During the second Intifada while bloody terrorist attacks were being committed against Israelis, the Israeli women were furious at the Palestinians. The Palestinian women were furious at the IDF's reactions to terrorist attacks and were angry at the Israeli women for not being able to see that the occupation was actually an institutionalized form of violence." The group was able to tackle these extreme challenges successfully because of the trust that had been forged. It was suggested that trust is built "not through pretty words regarding cooperation or women's dialogue, but through dealing with the crude reality."

2. Recommendations for an effective partnership process

a. Both donors and organizations stressed the importance of *continuous sharing* and joint deliberation and decision-making during the project. One director stated: "It is important that work be based on full understanding of the what, why, and how—what is to be done in the project, how to work together, joint responsibility on decision-making starting with small technical things such as signing checks, a structure of joint meetings and consultation. The technicalities of joint work are crucial."

In their evaluation report, Perlman and Schwartz (2000: 11) describe the difficulties entailed in cooperation and suggest a process of constant negotiation between the sides at all levels:

"At virtually every level of P2P projects, there is a complex process of negotiation between the partners. Palestinians have their own aims, Israelis have theirs, and the two sides come together to identify and create additional shared aims. This proves particularly difficult when negotiating these divergent agendas at the many levels of a given project i.e., heads of organizations, project directors, coordinators, facilitators and of course participants. This, coupled with the partners' differing cultural cues and backgrounds, necessarily makes for a demanding on-going process of working together. On the programmatic level, co-facilitation is a vivid expression of the need for on-going negotiation between the partners."

Aside from the abovementioned measures to enhance cooperation, some reflected on the more cognitive-emotional aspects of the joint work, which require that the two sides acknowledge and accept the differences between them. One director said: "There is no strong side and weak side. Everything is carried out in parity—acknowledging the fact that the two sides have different interests, different narratives. We might find ourselves in a situation where one side does not agree with the other's narrative—still we can acknowledge/ accept that there are two narratives."

Another, more psychological aspect of cooperation is trust. Trust between partners was declared an important element of joint facilitation, as one director explained: "The relationship between the facilitators is essential. They know

that they are different, but it is important that there is mutual trust so that at least they can sit and talk. Trust is built the longer they work together."

Creating an atmosphere of trust between all partners, and acknowledging the differences between them, enhances the communication process between the sides.

b. One recommendation regarding the actual joint process of work was to *acknowledge differences* in approach and training between the two sides and let them coexist within the partnership. One educational director reflected: "Whereas most of our facilitators are experienced facilitators, on the Palestinian side we have more teachers from within the education system who are doing the facilitation…. This poses are many difficulties. The concept of facilitation differs between the two groups. They [the Palestinians] come in order to conduct a conversation, while we put more emphasis on the process. That raises the challenge of supplying different cultural needs. The Palestinians like working in groups because it gives them power, the Israelis prefer working in pairs because it gives them more space…. Today we recognize that there are different needs and different standards, and that is okay."

She concludes: "We tried to combine the concept so that we all spoke the same language, but that didn't work. Today we understand that it is okay, and that we should accept each other's different needs."

Moreover, it could be enriching to have two approaches to facilitation operating in parallel in the same program (for example, one psychologically oriented and one didactically oriented; content and process).

D. Product of cooperatiom

1. Findings regarding the product of cooperation

Difficulty evaluating success

The most often-heard remark regarding the product of cooperation concerned the difficulty in evaluating success. This was due both to the difficulty in defining

(a) the concept of success and (b) measurable criteria. One interviewee said: "It is difficult to evaluate what happens to a participant when you leave him. I met a person who took part in our activities two years ago and he has become the leader of a peace movement, but how could I have checked or evaluated this during the process?"

One major challenge in defining success for many of these projects concerns divergent perceptions of what constitutes a successful or good product. There is generally a gap in this regard between Israelis and Palestinians (organizers and facilitators, as well as program clients). As one director stated: "We saw that the projects were taken in many different directions, and this created tension between the Israelis and the Palestinians who asked each other, surprised, 'what, that's what you've been working on?'"

High expectations on the Palestinian side regarding advocacy or political challenge may sometimes be another factor affecting perceptions. "They sometimes expect us to be able to prevent house demolition, which generally we can't. Sometimes, when we approach them and suggest that we'll rebuild their house as a political gesture, they ask—then what use are you to us? You will rebuild the house just for it to be demolished again." The Israeli organization may be interested in making a point by rebuilding the demolished house, while the Palestinians may disregard the political reasoning and focus on their more basic needs.

A third factor posing difficulty is the ad hoc nature of the work and the lack of good documentation: "We do not have a document declaring our goals and vision. By the time we get to working on things, they change."

Most organizations and donors cited an ongoing evaluation process as an essential tool that could be of great assistance during the project, especially in making adjustments during the course of the project, and helping the project achieve the intended product both in terms of short- and long-term goals.

Success

As our goal was not to evaluate actual projects but rather the cooperation process between organizations, this section is based mainly on the observations of others.[1]

A. Short-term goals: Effects on program participants' perceptions and attitudes

An EC representative reported that the EU Partnership for Peace programs have contributed to reducing ignorance of the "other" among participants targeted by the projects—students, journalists, political activists. They are more sensitive to what the others have to say, and to their different perspectives on shared issues. There has been a larger focus on pluralism. Participants in workshops and dialogue have reported changes in their perspective on traditional enemies. Many participants experienced a change in attitude, and some a change in behavior towards the other. However, the report notes that there is no guarantee that this shift in perspective will remain stable under the influence of events.

B. Midterm goals

The EC report stated several successes regarding midterm goals.

First, the programs succeeded in opening communication channels where none existed before. New forms of bi- and multilateral cooperation began. The fact that only a few of these continued after the project ended must be taken into account and investigated, since long-term commitment could promote the achievement of long-term goals.

An important aspect of the programs was change in attitude and skills. In his report, Stanley states that there are more individuals with a better understanding of the concepts of conflict handling and with useful skills for managing conflict when it arises. In addition, key concepts and skills for dealing with conflict

---

[1] Our analysis in this section is based mostly on the following evaluation reports: Perlman and Schwartz (1999, 2000); the Yes, PM report by IPCRI (2002); the Wye River projects report by Adwan and Bar-On (2004); the IFA (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations) report (2004); Kahanoff and Qaymari (2005); and the P2P evaluation presented by EC—Stanley (2005) (based on a comprehensive evaluation study conducted on all EU Partnership for Peace programs).

have spread to the broader community. Members of new constituencies such as the business, sports, and religious communities have been given new skills via training.

Although the programs did not have a sustained impact on the broader community's attitudinal perspective, there were instances of important changes in attitude to immediate family and community networks. These occurred most clearly in the education work on mutual understanding and in the workshops on interfaith dialogue. The report concludes, however, that this spillover effect has limits in the present situation where the general atmosphere remains suspicious of peace and partnership.

Another success of the programs was the ability to work with blocker/veto groups. The projects had modest objectives but also important successes. People often avoid working with these groups, and many donors stopped working with extremists on the Palestinian side. Work with nonconsensual sectors needs to be revaluated.

A third achievement was the sustaining of local heroes. Affirming such actors is crucial in order to transform conflict. "We should help them to continue, because they provide society with an alternative" (Stanley, 2005: 5).

A fourth effect observed was the public affirmation of the relevance of dialogue amid intense conflict. Dialogue programs affirm certain principles: a just peace is possible; the path to peace requires cooperation, dialogue, and commitment.

Despite the limited effect, Stanley reports that influential figures in government and civil society, beyond partners, recognized the contribution of this type of work, acknowledging that it helps set a context for conflict resolution. At the same time, notes the report, "it must be mentioned that there is resentment, de-legitimation and apprehension attached to individuals who are supported by the program" (Stanley, 2005:5).

A very important point raised in the report is that the capacity of the peace-building "sector" has been strengthened by the diversity of projects supported by the program, enabling the program to affect a wider constituency than that directly involved with funded projects.

The evaluation report on UNESCO's academic dialogue and cooperation noted that: "The researchers initiated an awareness-raising process among academics

and intellectuals, motivating them to assume social responsibility with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Dozens of people on both sides were involved in creative thinking about the situation and discussed issues of cooperation towards the advancement of peace and social development. This process is remarkable, especially on the Palestinian side. The discussions were reported to have made an essential contribution to internal development, empowerment and raising a greater awareness of the role of academics and intellectuals in building their society. As for the Israelis, the main contribution of these discussions is hopefully initiating movement away from indifference and apathy and towards differing degrees of academic and intellectual involvement in changing the prevailing situation."

Challenges in achievement of mid-term goals

Contextualized dialogue

Several concerns were raised regarding dialogue: the usefulness of dialogue in a political vacuum; the issue of normalization and asymmetrical power; and the purpose of dialogue. One report states: "Donors must remind themselves that their support for the principle of dialogue cannot be simply an affirmation of dialogue for its own sake, but must be embedded in a broader process that has clear objectives" (Stanley, 2005).

Need for multiplying effects

Another challenge to the success of projects was the fact that many of them have included one-time activities that are not embedded in a plan for multiplying their impact on beneficiaries or institutions (isolated one-time activities). In addition, many programs do not support long-term capacity building, P2P having failed to challenge partners to include such a component in their proposal.

In the same sphere of multiplier effects, a few of the organization directors we interviewed mentioned the challenge of creating any form of impact on the wider Israeli public, which is a goal of many dialogue programs. One director stated: "There are several circles of influence that political activities strive to affect. One is the international arena, and the other is the local arena, i.e., Israeli society…. Reaching and influencing Israeli society is a difficult task…. We try to work with

the Israeli public, but that doesn't work, that is why we turn and try to persuade and bring a change of attitudes within the international community."

A personal challenge was mentioned in regard to having a political impact on the rest of society following encounters with Palestinians. A particular question that reflects this difficulty was raised a few times in the interviews: "How far can I go with my understanding of the Palestinians without losing connection with my society?"

C. Long-term impact

The EU evaluation team found that there has been no identifiable impact on the macro Middle East peace process that can be traced directly to the P2P program. The impact reported is predominantly on the individual level, and only secondarily upon certain organizations. The report notes that: "With governments, civil society and the street…it is impossible to point to even clear indirect impact. This is partly the problem of this type of work, notes the consultant, but also of not making sure that projects have this component built in."

Summary of main findings

The NGOs promoting peace building, peacemaking, or advocacy all work in a complex reality. At the community or societal level, it is clear that Israeli NGOs must overcome difficulties on two fronts. The first, which is external, involves cooperation with Palestinian organizations whose reality is so dramatically different from that of the Israeli NGOs. The Palestinian side has problems of limitation of movement; growing resistance in Palestinian society to cooperation with Israelis, symbolizing "normalization," accompanied by threats to cooperation; and lack of resources. The second front, an internal one, involves facing an Israeli public that since 2000 has become more apprehensive and critical of the NGOs' activities. In their attempt to impact and recruit more diverse sectors of Israeli society, Israeli NGOs have to face, according to Hermann (2000), the overriding stigma that they are "naïve and unpatriotic." Bar-Tal (2001) further suggests that the prevailing emotional state of fear and mistrust in Israeli society constitutes a barrier to conflict transformation efforts.

This complex reality poses challenges to cooperation at every stage of a given project: from setting goals, deciding on the target population, selecting a strategy, through the implementation process and working together across the divide, and finally the assessment of the project outcome (success and impact).

◆ One of the major issues regarding Israeli-Palestinian cooperation raised throughout this report—a direct consequence of the sociopolitical context—is the *asymmetry* between the two sides. This topic was raised again and again, regarding all four components of our evaluation. Unequal power structure and relations, along with inequality in available resources, have created a different set of needs, agendas, and expectations from these cooperation efforts.

As described above, asymmetry in professional-to-professional cooperation was created by the fact that the Israeli group generally has more professional training, is more fluent in English, and has access to greater resources. A common finding in the evaluation reports was that of asymmetry in *group composition*. The Israeli group generally consists of experts on the topic to be discussed, while the Palestinian side is generally made up of officials. This difference, it was suggested, leads to additional asymmetry in the dialogue, as the Israeli academics can speak freely about ideas whereas the Palestinian officials must take into account social and political constraints.

An evaluation report on an academic dialogue and cooperation project noted that the Israeli participants were academics from established universities, while the Palestinian participants were recruited not only from universities but also from research institutes, NGOs, and the general intellectual community. One of the explanations offered for this asymmetry emphasized the sociopolitical context, arguing that whereas one may recruit sufficient numbers of Israeli academics for such projects, it is much more difficult to do so in Palestinian society, especially given the official Palestinian academic boycott of cooperation with Israelis. It was stated that consequently, and in order to compensate for Palestinian resistance to perceived normalization, Palestinian organizers also recruit intellectuals from outside the universities.

A second aspect of asymmetry that emerged from the evaluation of academic cooperation concerns *differences in agenda* assigned to the project in general.

51

Whereas the Israelis emphasized cooperation with Palestinian academics (viewing the specific project as a means to that end), the Palestinians were interested mainly in advancing their internal societal issues (in terms of the project's possible benefits for developing or strengthening a democratic Palestinian society), and the cooperation with Israelis was presented as a more minor topic of discussion and as something that could possibly happen in the future. This discrepancy in agenda was once again attributed to the asymmetry of the social and political contexts in which Palestinians and Israeli academics operate, which generates different concerns in the two societies. It was argued that: "Although cooperation with Palestinians may be a relevant issue in Israeli society, Palestinians' main concerns currently focus on internal development, empowerment, and capacity building. In addition, Palestinian intellectuals are often seen, and see themselves, as the spearhead of the struggle against occupation."

Moreover, differences in cultural codes, socialization patterns, standards of professionalism, and levels of politicization seem to have created frustrations on both sides. Israelis frequently express disappointment with what seems to be Palestinians' lack of professionalism, or adherence to scientific/objective standards; Palestinians frequently are dissatisfied with what they regard as Israelis' reluctance to be politically active.

It was recommended to take these differences into account when planning and defining cooperation between academics, as well as when specifying the required conditions for the success of such a project.

Thus, asymmetry in goals or program design must be considered in the planning stage. It is prevalent in the implementation stage (both between participants and generally in the working relationship and cooperation between organizations), and it may also be exhibited in the level of satisfaction or evaluation of the product.

The partnerships we reviewed displayed a variety of coping behaviors for addressing asymmetry. One basic mechanism suggested by practically all organizations and donors was continuous communication, consultation, and joint decision-making. It was recommended that an open, all-encompassing communication process be established as the working frame, from the onset of the project, thus making it possible to raise questions, cope with challenges, and evaluate and reevaluate both the project goals and the actual cooperation process. One of the donor representatives remarked that: "Only projects in which the

two sides constantly meet, discuss problems together, try and understand things together, and it isn't a case of one side promoting suggestions and the other reacting, only then can cooperation be successful."

When asked to reflect on a successful cooperation, the representative responded: "Maybe it was the fact they decided ahead of time that they were going to do everything together, and share everything. They also spoke openly with the participants regarding the disagreements they had had and compromises they came to." He added: "Maybe another factor is that the Palestinian side demands that the Israeli side be conscious of the need to invest significant time and effort in creating serious and comprehensive cooperation. They [the Israelis] should not make it easy for the Palestinians by accepting their limitations and thus making all the recommendations and doing everything themselves."

◆ Another theme throughout the report is that of limited impact, and *the narrow range of population sectors involved* in these programs. Emphasis is placed on the need to enlarge the circle of participants and engage in outreach to marginal groups, as well as those who oppose dialogue and cooperation. This can be viewed as an ongoing problem that may even be rooted in the organization's composition. Hermann's research suggests that one problem with the Israeli peace movement is its extreme social homogeneity, which makes it a sort of subculture: "The peace movement was almost entirely composed of middle class, highly educated, urban Ashkenazi Jews—Ashkenazi being both the national majority and the dominant ethnic group in Israel" (Hermann, 2002: 115). This homogeneity may affect the ability to recruit other segments of society, and thus the desired target population. Meron Benvenisti, reflecting on the problems of recruitment to the Israeli peace movement, wrote (Haaretz, 7 May 1998):

"The movement actually preaches to the converted. Further, quite often it creates resentment on the part of those who do not belong to the "left camp." The outcome is of course the opposite of the one desired. The public in the Center and moderate Right resent what the peace movement symbolizes and therefore will never embrace its message, even when the message is close to mainstream belief, such as the "two states for two peoples" idea. (quoted in Hermann, 2002: 122)"

Clearly, this may not be the central or only factor. The political context of violent conflict with the attendant suspicion and distrust further restrict the impact of these projects.

The difficulty in expanding the circles of population involved raises questions about the possible impact of dialogue on the wider society. A study aimed at assessing the role of civil society in Jerusalem in improving Israeli-Palestinian relations in the city noted "the tendency to convince the convinced":

"The graver the political security situation, the more difficult it became to find Israelis and Palestinians willing to take part in joint activities. This led to a significant drop in the impact of these activities, not only because of the smaller number of both participants and activities, but also because of the character of those willing to take part in them.

… During the Intifada, when participants are being recruited for the most part on an individual basis, a vast majority come from…the peace camp….

Such a situation facilitates joint activities in that there is a lower threshold of hostility amongst the participants,…however, such meetings do not contribute much to creating a comprehensive change in positions among the various populations of the city (although they do deepen cooperation between populations who are ready for this)…."

The report concludes: "Attempts to expand the circle of participants in the joint activities, rather than focusing only on those holding moderate views about the 'other,' are of great importance" (Goren, 2004: 28-30).

One of the suggestions made in this regard by some of the organizations studied was to conduct intrasocietal dialogue, within one's own community, so as to promote and enhance the impact of any project. Moreover, it has been suggested that such internal dialogue frameworks should include those groups and individuals who oppose dialogue and cooperation, and can sometimes be spoilers of the process. This point raises the ultimate question of influencing the consensus while maintaining attitudes and views that are not consensual.

Another suggestion in that regard was the involvement of international organizations in the Israeli-Palestinian activities. Goren (ibid.: 31) suggests that:

54

"The solution to a reality whereby many Palestinian elements refuse to have direct contact with Israeli organizations may take the form of increased involvement of international bodies. Sponsorship of a European or American organization for a proposed project may significantly increase its chances for success." He further suggests that such sponsorship places the project in an international context and facilitates participation on both sides.

◆ Last but not least, the *subject of evaluation* was raised frequently. Many interviewees indicated that the evaluations they conduct were created mainly for the donor, who is interested in assessing output rather than outcome or impact, and are generally similar to a "checklist" of the activities that took place. Furthermore, most stated that this form of evaluation does not help the organization itself because it is usually conducted at the end of the project, does not contribute to improving the project while it is underway, and does not help to accumulate knowledge or suggest new conceptualizations (Projects conducted in the health field seem to be the exception in that they practice recording and evaluating in a manner that could serve organizational learning).

Discussion and general recommendations

1. Expanding the definition of the field: Cooperation toward conflict transformation

The first point we propose is a conceptual expansion of the field of NGO cooperation, inspired by Galtung's (1969, 1996) model for conflict analysis and conflict transformation. This holistic approach (as elaborated in the introduction above) suggests that institutional, attitudinal, and behavioral changes are all required for a conflict transformation process to succeed. Thus, we suggest the conceptualization of the three forms of activity—peacemaking, peace building, and advocacy and protest—as complementary and necessary components of any serious conflict transformation process.

Our recommendation, therefore, is to include advocacy or protest NGOs in the discussion on cooperation, in addition to those organizations advancing dialogue in civil societies. At first glance, these organizations do not seem relevant to the

discussion as they generally work outside mainstream institutions, are opposed to their policies (hence are sometimes called radical or oppositional), and often are excluded from the map of NGOs working for peace. However, we maintain that the critical and challenging perspectives these organizations promote are of utmost importance for a serious discussion of conflict transformation. Moreover, we believe that these organizations are important actors that should be included in any emerging civil society dialogue forum. Their importance stems mainly from the fact that most peace NGOs stress commonalities, cooperation, and symmetrical visions of the future, whereas these organizations are attuned to the current injustice and asymmetry in power relations, thus acting on a different but very important level of transformation, namely, the structural level, aiming to balance the power relations between the sides. Their attempts to relate to the grievances and act together with the "other" against injustices, are a way of answering the Palestinians' criticism about lack of a political agenda on the one hand, and of promoting a self-critical perspective in Israeli society on the other. This aspect can complement the work of peace-building and peacemaking NGOs.

Furthermore, based on the successful South African experience (as analyzed in Taylor, 2002), it is useful to view the field as an ecosystem in which different organisms have different and unique activities that complement each other and are necessary for conflict transformation. In his article, Taylor suggests viewing peace and conflict resolution NGOs and anti-apartheid NGOs (which generally took more risks and actions against the apartheid policies and regime) on a continuum. He writes:

> "The real significance of P/CROs in South Africa lay in how they complemented the broader anti-Apartheid struggle, how they meshed with other social actors struggling for progressive social change…. P/CROs did not operate in isolation. Their impact resulted from interactions with the other components of a complex multi-organizational field characterized by manifold reciprocal inter-organizational links and influences." (ibid.)

He concludes: "These organizations overlapped and combined, influenced and penetrated each other, evolved together, and eventually came to project a new 'emergent reality'—a virtually non-racial democratic South Africa" (ibid.).

The combined approach we advance in this paper could further be useful in choosing organizations and projects for participating in the Civil Society for Dialogue Program, so that the different categories of activities—peace building, peacemaking, and advocacy/protest—are represented. We believe this will create a more balanced and heterogeneous field, enabling an integrated and comprehensive process of transformation.

2. Asymmetry and the notion of cooperation: Reevaluating cooperation

The second point we propose is the need to reevaluate and rethink the concept and practice of cooperation in light of the asymmetry between the two societies— a phenomenon cited by all organizations, and in all the materials analyzed, as a constitutive factor that informs the entire gamut of Palestinian-Israeli cooperation.

Projects intended to advance cooperation between peoples in the midst of a violent conflict operate in a very asymmetric situation, one that produces constant tension even within the framework of a given project itself. On one side, Israelis are living in an established and organized society, albeit seriously conflicted about what ought to be the nature of their relationship to Palestine; on the other side, Palestinian society is in a process of development and is striving to become free of occupation. This asymmetric situation manifests itself in high levels of politicization within Palestinian society, particularly among academics and intellectuals, and in low levels of involvement in social and political affairs in the Israeli community. The resulting imbalance is reflected in dissimilar expectations from cooperative endeavors, different discourses about joint work, and different norms of behavior.

We argue that the reality is of people not at all concerned about the same things, who might therefore require very different program designs and discussion topics (within a joint program). Moreover, it became apparent that for many Palestinians, cooperation with Israelis, while the occupation continues, is perceived as a threat to their cultural, national, and religious integrity.

We suggest, then, the need to reevaluate and rethink cooperation in an effort to advance new, creative ways in which NGO work can enhance conflict

transformation. As cooperation in many cases has become the goal rather than the means, diverting and perhaps limiting strategic thinking and implementation in ways that may substantially decrease the impact of a project, we suggest opening a thorough discussion of the notion of cooperation: under what circumstances? toward which goals? in what frameworks/arrangements? and so on.

Furthermore, we propose expanding the concept of cooperation to include a variety of strategies of working together and separately. Discussions of cooperation should include the possibility of working in parallel and its advantages in responding to different needs such as community empowerment, capacity building, identity building, democratization, or developing critical thinking. Working in parallel, in uninational frameworks, makes it possible to take into account unique cultural characteristics and structural and political forces at work in each society. Furthermore, parallel work may enable including populations commonly excluded from Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, such as extremists on both sides and marginal populations. Cooperation and separate or parallel work should be thought of as a continuum encompassing a variety of modalities of cooperation and degrees of separateness.

Our preferred model is a mixed one. Combining two elements could take the form of cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians at several points along the project followed by parallel, internal work in each community. This would work to widen the discussion and the impact on each community (see above for suggestions for the actual cooperation process). We recommend that at the initial stage of any project, serious thought and debate should be invested in making the right decision on whether to cooperate and to what extent, taking into account possible gains and losses.

3. The need for evaluation as an integral component of projects

Evaluation was cited as a need both by organizations and donors, who expressed a new awareness about the potential contribution of evaluation, both conceptually (supporting a process of professionalism in the field, enabling building a body of knowledge) and instrumentally (guiding decision-making and advancing fulfillment of the project's goals).

Project products and processes could yield more benefit if the knowledge of skills or lessons learned were disseminated among other peer organizations and in society in general. This step is generally not done. One director complained: "There is a feeling that there is no sharing of the benefits outside the workshop itself."

Practically all organizations and donors viewed action evaluation as necessary. "Reports are generally based on data such as the number of times we spoke abroad, the number of films we produced. Generally output is included in reports rather than outcome." This "checklist" approach to evaluation does not serve a learning process, professionalism, or proof checking of process and product; it generally serves the donors rather than the organization or project manager. A process of action or formative evaluation could be useful.

We highly recommend incorporating an ongoing evaluation process throughout the project, involving donors, project directors, and staff: this mechanism can be helpful in developing and improving a program, encourage self-reflection, and facilitate organizational learning. In addition, an evaluation process, if shared, could contribute to the general learning process and professionalism in the field. We cannot overemphasize the contribution of good documentation for better understanding and the importance of building a database as a basis for analysis and reflection.

The preferred evaluation, in our opinion, is a comprehensive one, combining both a formative orientation (collecting and reporting data during the course of a project) and a summative orientation (judging a program based on the accumulated evidence about how it meets the stated goals of the project). We also wish to emphasize the need for a systematic evaluation, based on professional skills and on theoretical knowledge in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

Bibliography

Bar-Tal, D. (2001). "Why does fear override hope in societies engulfed by intractable conflict, as it does in the Israeli society?," *Political Psychology*, vol. 22, no. 3, 601-627.

Fitzduff, M. (1995). "Managing Community Relations and Conflict: Voluntary Organizations and Government and the Search for Peace," in N. Acheson and J.A. Williamson (eds.), *Voluntary Action and Social Policy in Northern Ireland*. Aldershot: Avebury.

Galtung, J. (1969). "Conflict as a Way of Life," in H. Freeman (ed.), *Progress in Mental Health*. London: Churchill.

Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage.

Gidron, B., Katz, S.N. and Hasenfeld, Y. (eds.) (2002). *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hermann, T. (2002). "The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967-1998," in B. Gidron, S.N. Katz and Y. Hasenfeld (eds.), *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 94-129.

Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (2000). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Perlman, L. and Schwartz, R (2000). "A Preliminary Stocktaking of Israeli Organizations Engaged in Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Activity," manuscript submitted for publication in SID Journal: Special Issue on People-to-People Peace Building.

Rouhana, N. N. (2000). "Interactive Conflict Resolution: Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Conducting Research and Evaluation," in: P. Stern, A. George and D. Druckman (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War: Techniques and Evaluation*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Sever, R. (2002). "60 seconds on…: Conceptual Framework for Evaluators," unpublished manuscript.

Skinner, H. et al. (2005). "Promoting Arab and Israeli Cooperation: Peace-building Through Health Initiatives," *http://image.thelancet.com/ extras/04art3217web.pdf, p. 4*.

Solomon, G. and Kupermintz, H. (2002). *The Evaluation of Peace Education Programs: Main Considerations and Criteria*. Research conducted for the Center for Research on Peace Education, Haifa University.

Stuffelbeam, D.L. (1983). "The CIPP Model for Program Evaluation," in: G.F. Madaus, D.L. Stuffelbeam and M.S. Scriven (eds.), *Evaluation Models*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 117-141.

Taylor, R. (2002). "South Africa: The Role of Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations in the Struggle Against Apartheid," in B. Gidron, S.N. Katz and Y. Hasenfeld (eds.), *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 69-93.

Appendix (1)
List of organizations and material reviewed

The following **organizations**' directors or representatives were interviewed:

1. Bat Shalom—Israeli women's organization for a just peace
2. ECF—Economic Cooperation Foundation
3. ICAHD—Israeli Committee against House Demolition
4. IPCRI—Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information
5. Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies
6. MECA—Middle East Children's Alliance
7. Middle East Young Leadership Program
8. Peres Center for Peace
9. PRIME—Peace Research Institute in the Middle East
10. Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace
11. EU Partnership for Peace
12. Swiss Foreign Ministry Representative Office
13. Heinrich Böll Institute

The following **evaluation reports** were analyzed:

1. Middle East Children's Association: internal evaluation reports and other materials, 2005.
2. People to People: An Evaluation and Future Prospects, Stanley, Bruce—Consultant, European Commission, presented at the Jerusalem Conference initiated by Canadian, Norwegian, and EC delegations, 5 April 2005.
3. Evaluation of Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), Swedish group international consultants, February 2004.

4. Yes, PM—Years of Experience in Strategies for Peace Making: Looking at Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Activities 1993-2002, IPCRI, December 2002.

5. Peace Building under Fire: Palestinian-Israeli Wye River Projects, eds. Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-On, April 2004.

6. Evaluation report of the project Guiding Principles for Dialogue and Cooperation between Academics, submitted to UNESCO by Maya Kahanoff and Ata Qaymari, February 2005.

7. A Preliminary Stocktaking of Israeli Organizations Engaged in Palestinian-Israeli People to People Activity, Lee Perlman and Raviv Schwartz, paper presented at the workshop "Evaluating Israeli-Palestinian Civil Society Cooperative Activities", Helsinki, Finland, November 1999.

8. Evaluation Study: Crisis Prevention and Peace-building Projects of NGOs in Israel Supported by the German Federal Foreign Office, IFA (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations), Dr. Angelika Timm and Dr. Oliver Wils, 2004.

9. Going Against the Wind: The Role of NGOs in Jerusalem under an Ongoing Conflict, Nimrod Goren in cooperation with Mohammed Nakhal, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2005.

The following **research reports** were reviewed:

A. Research reports on health cooperation projects

1. Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in the Health Field 1994-1998—Study Report, JDC, Al-Quds University, by Tamara Barnea, Ziad Abdeen, et al., May 2000.

2. Serving Palestinian Children with Disabilities: Child Development Program, Idna Village 1999-2001—Final Project Report, AJJDC, UPMRC, PIHCG, by Randi Garber, Jihad Mashal, and Kate Sugarman.

3. Development of Palestinian Lending Centers for Assistive Devices and Medical Equipment 1997-2002, Final Project Report, JDC, UPMRC, Yad Sarah, by Randi Garber, Jihad Mashal, et al.

4. The Virus Does Not Stop at the Checkpoint, by Tamara Barnea and Rafik Houseinni, Am Oved, 2002.

B. Scientific cooperation

1. Scientific Cooperation and Peace Building: A Case Study of USAID's Middle East Regional Cooperation Program, by I. Kumar and I. Rosenthal, 1998.

C. Interfaith Activities

1. What Works: Evaluating Interfaith Dialogue Programs, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 123, July 2004.

D. Intellectual cooperation

1. Palestinian and Israeli Intellectuals in the Shadow of Oslo and the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv, 2002 .

Appendix (2)
Mapping of fields of activity

Peace building	Peacemaking	Advocacy/protest
Dialogue—Peres Center, Bat Shalom	Strategic planning/policy development—ECF, IPCRI	Demonstration—Bat Shalom, ICAHD
Peace education—MECA, Peres Center	Second track—ECF	Activities against the occupation—Bat Shalom, ICAHD
Environmental cooperation —IPCRI, ECF, Peres Center	Initiation of peace agreements—ECF, Geneva Initiative	Advocacy—ICAHD
Economic cooperation/ capacity building—Peres Center, ECF	Political dialogue— IPCRI, ECF, Bat Shalom, Peres Center	
Cooperation in health/ health capacity building— JDC (Joint Distribution Committee Israel), Peres Center		
Research/academic cooperation—PRIME, Truman Institute		

Peace-building processes are activities conducted by NGOs that seek to build relationships, health, economic or environmental infrastructure. The goals of these processes are usually long-term and are part of the general attempt to build or strengthen civil societies, maintain open communication channels between them, and achieve a high level of trust.

Peacemaking processes involve activities directed at political change that will promote peace. This includes strategic planning, attempting to influence decision-makers, supporting official peace processes, and challenging political process and policy. Peacemaking work can be conducted by NGOs from within political institutes—for example, think-tank work and attempting to influence decision-makers—or outside of official institutes.

Advocacy/protest refers to activities whose main goal is to protest government/military policy and to generate support through demonstrations, public symposia, and mass media.

Appendix (3)

Interview questions

What kind of cooperation projects between Israelis and Palestinians do you conduct?

What are the main goals of these cooperation projects?

Have any evaluations been conducted on these projects, externally or internally (reports, expert opinions, research projects)?

If so, what methodologies were used in these evaluations?

What were the main findings regarding these projects?

What were the recommendations?

Were the evaluation processes effective? How were the reports used?

What would you pinpoint as the main lessons learned from such cooperation projects?

What were the main difficulties encountered? How did you cope with these difficulties?

Were there changes in the projects because of the Intifada? Can you specify the main changes that took place following the Intifada?

What were the main lessons learned regarding cooperation? What would you recommend as necessary criteria for success if asked by someone who wanted to start such a project? What kinds of organizations would you choose? What kind of project would you suggest? What kind of processes, if any, would you suggest the cooperating parties undergo?

Finally, we would like to ask about the contribution of evaluation to your organization.

If evaluation has been conducted, what are its main contributions?

Did it satisfy your expectations?

If evaluation has not been conducted, what are your expectations of such a process? Could it be useful to you?

Appendix (4)

CIPP model for evaluating programs

The CIPP components (as presented by Stuffelbeam, 1983)

Context	**Input**	**Process**	**Product**
Serves as a basis for selecting and shaping project goals. It refers to a needs assessment; perceptions about problems that warrant change and the extent to which the project's objectives are reflective of, or attuned to, the needs of the populations served.	Relates to choice of program strategy; specification of procedural designs for implementing the strategies. Evaluation criteria may be the extent to which the strategy chosen was: reasonable (vis-à-vis what is being done elsewhere and proposed in the literature); relevant; feasible and responsive to the assessed needs.	Relates to implementation. It includes reference to topics such as the extent to which the project plan was implemented; defects in the procedural design or its implementation; barriers in the implementation process. Within this category we examine decision-making practices and issues of symmetry/ asymmetry in cooperation between organizations.	Relates to assessing performance in relation to previously diagnosed needs; examining the results obtained with regard to the following questions: to what extent has the program has met met the needs of the target population? To what extent has it reached the goals that had been defined for the project? Furthermore, the evaluation at this stage examines the effect of the program on the participants, the local community and the broader community.

This model is suggested here as a framework for comprehensive project management, including program design, process management, monitoring, and evaluation.

It could be used by UNESCO for program initiation and planning, and by any organization involved in the project. Use of this model could assist overcoming key challenges, such as mapping the field, examining the whole context before designing the project, strategic planning with consideration of short- and long-term goals, helping evaluate and modify during the course of the project, examining relationships and processes, and evaluating products.

An Assessment of Cooperation Between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs: A Palestinian Perspective

Walid Salem

Rami Nasrallah

Introduction

At UNESCO's request, the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) carried out a two-phase project. The project's main objective was to review the evaluation of past cooperation efforts between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs, in an attempt to assess the Palestinian-Israeli civil interaction and dialogue programs. It also aimed to study the impact of the current Intifada on peace and on the possibilities of conciliation and peace-building processes. The assessment deals with the scope and the nature of evaluations which have been carried out by different organizations and donors. The IPCC will focus on the reasons behind the failures and successes of cooperation programs and the barriers that hindered achieving the desired goals of the past ten years.

The goal of our assessment is to identify the areas of cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis in which further evaluation is required. Furthermore, the assessment will highlight models, concepts and mechanisms that may be useful in building a positive and constructive peace partnership. Needless to say, the assessment will in no way judge the institutions and bodies that were in charge of implementing such programs, or the previous evaluations.

This report will assess the evaluations of the cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli civil society and NGOs; the assessment was conducted by the IPCC parallel to a similar effort by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS). The IPCC was responsible for the evaluation from a Palestinian perspective and the JIIS for that from the Israeli perspective. In order to coordinate the work between the two institutes, which began from an early stage, a joint steering committee was

set up and several joint meetings were held by the committee members leading to the production of the two reports of the first phase of the project.

The project team included Walid Salem, Rami Nasrallah, Sari Hanafi, Shahd Waari, and Bex Tyrer.

Project phases and aims

The project consisted of two phases:

The first phase was intended to produce two evaluations; one from a Palestinian perspective, and the other from an Israeli perspective.

Implementation of the first phase included the following:

1) Determining criteria for the analysis of existing evaluations.

2) Conducting reviews of literature and consultation to determine whether there are currently sufficient evaluations of Israeli-Palestinian NGO peace-building cooperation, and drawing lessons from the evaluations that have been already conducted.

3) Identifying existing evaluation studies carried out by different institutions.

4) Conducting interviews with key Palestinian NGOs that have been involved in Israeli-Palestinian cooperation efforts.

5) Articulating lessons learned from the aggregate findings of existing evaluations.

The second phase, to be completed by September 2005, aims to develop concepts for dialogue programs, based on the lessons learned from the first phase of the study.

Implementation of the second phase includes the following:

1) Identifying the key evaluation gaps via the analysis of the first phase data.

2) Establishing clear criteria and recommendations for further evaluations, if necessary.

3) Recommending guidelines and principles for the design of civil society dialogue and cooperation.

This report includes the results of an assessment of phase one of the project.

Theoretical framework

There is a tremendous body of theoretical literature about conflict and peace studies, including different schools of thought that sometime converge but mostly diverge with one another.

The studies about peace are divided among those which focus on peace-building and those which focus on the peacemaking process. There are also studies that concentrate on peace as a no war situation, and those which consider structural peace which includes the provision of security and safety to all citizens. Some researchers go even further by citing the buildup of economic and social sustainable systems as additional preconditions for peace. Galtung, Bjorn Hettne et al. wrote extensively on this issue. There is also another dimension in peace studies which concentrates on human security as a condition to achieving peace, including having all people free from fear and free from want: Mary Kaldor, the UNDP, UNESCO, and several Canadian academics are the pioneers in this approach, which also gave rise to new approaches to peace-building and peacemaking such as the "humanitarian intervention approach," "the humanitarian military intervention approach," and the "responsibility to protect approach."

The field of conflict studies is also divided among between those who focus on conflict prevention (such as the studies of European Center for Conflict Prevention: ECCP, and Kofi Anan), others who explore conflict prevention (John Burton), a third group that considers conflict resolution, a fourth group that investigates conflict management (such as Ya'acov Bar-Siman-Tov in the Israeli-Palestinian context), and a fifth approach that focuses on conflict transformation (Galtung and Ledarech).

In this report all of the above-mentioned schools of thought regarding peace and conflict are very important, but the question to be addressed here concerns the link between peace building/making on one hand and conflict prevention/

management/ resolution/transformation on other hand. We will not delve into the details of this link from a theoretical point of view, since this might lead us towards different research than the one for which we are aiming, but it should be stated that this link was discussed at length by the project team. The conclusion was that the two processes should be combined: For instance, at a certain moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, before the Oslo agreement was signed in 1993, the process might have been peace building and conflict resolution/transformation mainly by the civil society, while during the Oslo process it may have become more peace making/conflict resolution by the official actors on both sides, but also peace building/conflict resolution-transformation on the part of civil society on both sides. When the Intifada of 2000 erupted, the process shifted more to conflict management from both the official actors and the civil society in both societies, while the processes of peace building and conflict transformation retreated. This is a very schematic description of the main process in each period, and of course one can find the other processes in each period, although in a latent and not manifest way.

Later in this report we will show how different evaluation reports were unable to deal properly with these changes in the political context regarding peace and conflict relationships between the two peoples, as well as in the two civil societies and the two official structures. Neither were they able to clarify the differences in the roles and strategies of the different actors: official, civil society, and citizens.

Methodology

In this phase, the literature on Palestinian/Israeli civil society cooperation was reviewed. The purpose of the review was to determine whether there is sufficient evaluation of Palestinian/Israeli NGOs peace-building cooperation and in which areas.

We believe that a satisfactory evaluation should answer the following ten questions:

1) What was done in the past and what should have been done differently?

2) How did these programs address the issues of attitude, perceptions, and images?

74

3) What were the tools and methods of implementing peace-building programs?

4) Which areas of cooperation were dominant? Was diversity in terms of sectors and target group considered in the design and the implementation of dialogue programs?

5) What is the profile of the involved organizations and participants, and how representative are they?

6) Which areas have "more potential" for positive interaction?

7) To what extent were the local partners involved in decision-making concerning the needs and the priorities of the programs?

8) How did each side promote the dialogue?

9) How did the partners deal with the escalation of the conflict? And did the initial goals of the dialogue shift from achieving peace into merely "keeping the channels of dialogue open" until the time of peace arrives?

10) How did these programs deal with the "Peace Agenda," and did they guarantee wide participation and empathy?

In addition, an appropriate evaluation should cover a wide range of the areas of cooperation that existed between the two parties, the main activities that occurred in each area, the model of cooperation between the Palestinians and the Israelis (whether the cooperation was on equal basis), the relevance of the activities to Palestinian needs and reality, the involvement of the mainstream, the impact the activities had on their target groups and the impact that those target groups had on the civil society. This last point will be measured according to the number of the people in the target group, the diversity of the target group (laymen or just elite), the ability and willingness of the target group to promote change in the civil society after the end of the project/activity.

The task in this phase was to locate, assess and find the gaps in such evaluations.

Based on the work of phase one, the need to conduct further assessment and evaluation will be determined in phase two.

This phase was conducted by means of reviewing evaluation reports requested by donors. Examples of these include the evaluation conducted by IPCRI and supported by the British government, internal evaluations of the "People to People" Norwegian program, and the evaluation of the "EU peace partnership" program. Ten interviews were conducted, and different studies reviewed including Yes,PM, the Ministry of NGOs (Michel Warshawsky, Ghassan Andoni, Nasif Mu'allem – Wye River projects review), individual assessments written by Abu Mazen, Sa'id Zeedani, Manual Hassassian, Musa Budieri, Jonathan Kuttab, Edward Said and Walid Salem, and workshops and conferences proceedings reviewed, (Fafo Istanbul workshop of 2001, Jerusalem Center for Women workshop of April 2005, workshop of the Canadian and Norwegian representative offices and the European Commission).

We also include reviews of the meetings of the Palestinian team as well as the joint meetings with the JIIS team and the joint questionnaire that we developed together, which appears in the appendix.

Materials and reports, including articles and presentations dealing with evaluation aspects, were also considered, especially published materials in the Palestinian media. Interviews with a sample of NGOs' representatives involved in past evaluation reports will be conducted in order to learn more about the criteria of evaluation, and to measure the success and/or failure of the programs in the following spheres of interest:

1. Academic and research programs

2. Human and civil rights programs

3. Women's organizations programs

4. Peace and democracy education programs

5. Community-based cooperation programs

6. Professional-professional cooperation programs

7. Economic cooperation programs

8. Track II diplomacy activities

9. Other activities

The Palestinian-Israeli Civil Society Cooperation: A Historical Review

Israeli-Palestinian civil society cooperation began in the early years of the 1967 occupation; first as cooperation between peers from both sides, including between Palestinian communists and the Israeli Communist Party, the PFLP, and the DFLP collaboration with the Israeli Trotskyite organization called Matzpen. The PLO began contacts with what they called at the time: "The Jewish Democratic Progressive Forces," such as the Israeli Communist Party and Israeli Zionist parties that are on the left of the Israeli political map (for example, Mapam and some doves in the Israeli Labor Party).

It is difficult to term these contacts "cooperation" because they were simply contacts. The PLO initiator of those contacts at the time, Abu Mazen, referred to them in his booklet "Why these contacts?" At times they were even called "Dialogue with the enemy" in order to become familiar with the enemy's position, and also to introduce the Palestinian point of view to that enemy.

Contacts with Israeli society were expanded during the 1980s. That decade witnessed a series of meetings between academics from both sides in order to develop scenarios for a political solution[2]. In addition, PLO meetings with what they termed the "Israeli Progressive Forces" were intensified with the participation of PLO representatives from the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem[3]. PLO representatives in Europe also participated in these meetings[4], in addition to some Palestinian academics living in the USA and Europe[5].

During the first Intifada of 1987 several Israeli solidarity movements from the left were established such as "The Committee Against the Iron Fist" among others. With that, the two sides began to move from "contacts" to "cooperation." This began as solidarity from Israeli left wing organizations with Palestinian suffering. This period witnessed the emergence of different dialogue groups on

---

[2] Such as: Dr. Salim Tamari, Dr. Nabil Kassis, Dr. Sari Nusseibeh and Dr. Khalil Mahshi (all teaching at Birzeit University at the time).

[3] Hanna Saniora (journalist from Jerusalem), Fayez Abu Rahmeh (lawyer from Gaza), and many others.

[4] Isam Sartawi and Said Hamami. among others.

[5] Edward Said and others.

the level of the civil society. The aim of the Palestinians was to try to influence Israeli society regarding Palestinian rights, while the aim of the Israelis was to try to get bottom up recognition of Israel from Palestinian civil society.

Therefore, it appears that there was no real Israeli-Palestinian civil society cooperation until the end of the 1980s, apart from the cooperation between the communists on both sides and the solidarity activities conducted by the radical Israeli left wing organizations with Palestinians. So-called "civil society cooperation" did not begin until the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP) or the Oslo Agreement was signed in the White House garden in Washington on September 13, 1993.

In the Declaration of Principles the following is stated in Article VII: The People to People Program:

1. The two sides shall cooperate in enhancing the dialogue and relations between their peoples in accordance with the concepts developed in cooperation with the Kingdom of Norway.

2. The two sides cooperate in enhancing dialogue and relations between their people, as well as in gaining a wider exposure of the two publics to the peace process, its current situation and predicted results.

3. The two sides shall take steps to foster public debate and involvement, to remove barriers to interaction, and to increase the people to people exchange and interaction within all areas of cooperation described in this Annex and in accordance with the overall objectives and principles set out in this Annex."

With this annex of the Oslo Agreement, different People to People (P2P) projects were established. One was sponsored by Norway, where the official authorities in Israel and Palestine would decide on the projects, and the other sponsored by USAID and the EU, which are directed to the Palestinian-Israeli civil society without intervention from political official bodies on either side.

This report will deal mainly with these types of "cooperation" that emerged after the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles.

The Oslo DOP opened the door for these types of new projects, which are not "solidarity- oriented" but rather are conducted by organizations from both

sides which are different and have many points of disagreement but should find partnership and a joint space. This joint space might be through professional efforts that avoid politics, such as joint ventures aiming to develop scientific research, or might be through creating economic joint ventures, and the like.

Was this new strategy (civil society cooperation) an appropriate strategy for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Did it promote Israeli-Palestinian relations on the public level? Did it lead to more understanding between the two nations? Did it suit the strategies of the different groups in both societies?

These cooperation projects were defined as "Israeli-Palestinian people to people activities. They include those actions and activities that aim at bringing Israelis and Palestinians together with the expressed aim of peacemaking and peace-building between the people of Israel and the people of Palestine."[6]

This definition includes bringing Israelis and Palestinians together, but what about joint projects that aim to separate the two people from each other in two distinct political entities, such as the Nusseibeh-Ayalon initiative? Are these not a type of "cooperation project"? Therefore, the question of how cooperation was envisioned will also be discussed.

Components of this report

This report will discuss the evaluation of the Palestinian and Israeli NGOs' cooperation within the framework of four strategies across the Israeli-Palestinian divide.

These strategies include the strategy of peoples' cooperation, the strategy of solidarity, the strategy of healing within the path towards forgiveness and reconciliation, and the strategy of coordinating together but acting separately.

Israeli and Palestinian organizations have intra-and inter-divisions based upon these strategies.

---

[6] Yes, PM, P. 59.

After providing an assessment of the four strategies, this study will examine the evaluations conducted in order to determine to what extent these evaluations were able to deal with all the previous mentioned strategies, develop their impact through sufficient recommendations (or sufficient policies recommended) and/or suggest other new strategies and trends that are able to promote peace within both civil societies and also within the Palestinian and Israeli societies.

Later, the study will summarize the lessons learned from existing evaluations and the gaps in those evaluations. It will propose ways to proceed towards the production of the second phase report, which will include suggested criteria for the future evaluations, as well as guidelines and principles for the design of dialogue and cooperation in civil societies.

The NGOs in this report will be defined in such a way that also includes grassroots organizations, such as women's and youth organizations, as well as those which are connected to political parties (such as Fatah Shabibeh, Fatah Youth) and others. Excluding grassroots organizations and including only those NGOs with a professionally registered membership leads to a lower impact of the 'cooperation projects," because the latter lack the influence enjoyed by the grassroots organizations.

Strategies of Israeli-Palestinian NGOs Cooperation

First: The strategy of people cooperation

This is the most common strategy built by the Israeli and Palestinian peace movements. The main assumption of this strategy was and still is that peace-building between the two peoples is a bottom up process that needs to be built step-by-step over the long term. People calling for such a strategy consider it vitally important to continue bringing together academics, young people, women and other social and economic sectors from the two sides in order to promote bottom-up peace. Moreover, they note that bringing these groups together in the years before and after Oslo led to the following positive conclusions:[7]

---

[7] The assessment mentioned was used by Ron Pundak in the evaluation meeting organized by the Canadian and the Norwegian Representative offices with the PA on 4\4\2005 at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem.

- That Israelis and Palestinians change their attitudes and positions towards the other side after these meetings;

- That these meetings helped the Israeli left to move to a supportive position towards Palestinian rights after Oslo;

- That the strategies of peoples' cooperation led to the participation of people from the Israeli right wing in the meetings, and the subsequently were influenced by this participation;

- That cooperation proved that there is a partner for peace on the other side, in contrast to all right-wing claims that there is no partner on the other side, and that it is not possible to trust the Palestinians;

- That peoples' cooperation helped to develop bottom-up visions for peace that were instrumental in reaching Oslo.

The first question to be asked in this report is whether this strategy was explored by the evaluations carried out so far for Israeli-Palestinian civil society cooperation, and whether the strategy's strengths and pitfalls were stated (including any suggested alternatives to pitfalls). This question also addresses the issue of whether the evaluation of this strategy was carried out in an objective fashion or an empathetic one; was it compassionate with Israelis and Palestinians working together, whatever the outcome might be from this cooperation?

Second: The strategy of solidarity

This strategy was and still is practiced by Israeli radical left wing organizations (such as the Israeli Communist Party, Yesh Gvul and others), who are against the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories and therefore tend to struggle against the "crimes" of that occupation against the Palestinian people. During the Intifada new groups that are either apolitical (such as Ta'ayush) or grassroots left wing organizations such as Green Action, Physicians for Human Rights, the student coalition at Tel Aviv University, the Israeli Palestinian Action group for peace[8], and others joined the solidarity activities.

_____

[8] This organization includes the radical left wing organizations in both societies.

There are several differences between the strategy of solidarity and the strategy of people cooperation:

◆ The strategy of solidarity is action driven, while the people cooperation strategy is project driven;

◆ The strategy of solidarity is practiced mostly by grassroots organizations, while the people cooperation strategy in practiced mostly by non-membership professional NGOs;

◆ The strategy of solidarity is based on joint Israeli-Palestinian coordinated actions in solidarity with the Palestinians, while the strategy of people cooperation is more dialogue, and less joint action[9] oriented;

◆ Representatives of the strategy of solidarity from the Israeli side are those who work in Israel in order to transform the positions of the mainstream to become aware and supportive of Palestinians rights, while Israelis who support the strategy of people cooperation consider themselves to be closer to the mainstream, and therefore representatives of that mainstream in the dialogue with the Palestinians.

A member of Ta'ayush[10] expressed the differences between the two strategies as follows:

"We also understood that just creating a joint Arab-Jewish group is not enough by itself to enable us to make a real contribution to establishing peace and equality. During the first discussions it became clear to us that we have to break with the old concept of "co-existence." Co-existence, and many of the joint dialogue groups based on this concept, served, intentionally or unconsciously, to perpetuate unequal power relations between the two communities. They civilized them through dialogue without questioning them. Moreover, for some of us, coexistence meant a search for civilized patterns of interaction between antagonist communities, while tacitly accepting the essential division into two different – and often opposing – national-ethnic groups.

_____

[9] The joint actions they do encompass are rarely based upon joint interests.

[10] Gerlado Leibner unpublished conference paper, May 2003.

Coexistence initiatives mitigated some of the segregation practices and offered fairer treatment of the minority. This is important, but is based on the acceptance of the supposedly inscriptive identities as something immutable, as well as the Jewish identity of the State of Israel."

The second question posed in this report is whether this strategy was appropriately evaluated and if suggestions were made to find the best strategy of people cooperation, and strategy of solidarity, in order to recommend ways to promote coordination between both strategies for the sake of peace building?[11]

Third: The strategy of healing within the path towards forgiveness and reconciliation

This strategy includes two trends: one tends to work on healing and reconciliation primarily with a view to the future, and the other tends to achieve that by addressing the past of the two peoples.

The approach of looking to the future is represented by organizations who seek to create a bottom-up healing process. This is exemplified by the Bereaved Families organization, which brings together parents of people killed on both sides of the conflict in order to relate their stories of suffering, and then to forgive.

The other trend tends to believe that reconciliation is not possible as long as the two sides do not address the root causes of the conflict in the past – the past of the Holocaust for the Jews, and the past of the Nakba of 1948 for the Palestinians. Some groups are calling to develop a joint narrative of the past, while others find it sufficient to develop an understanding of each other's narrative. An example of this is the project "shared histories" between Panorama-Jerusalem, Yakar, and the Truman Institute. The aim is to begin to provide a "shared history"– ending with "shared histories" between the Israeli historians, and shared histories between the Palestinian historians.

---

[11] See more about the strategy of solidarity in: Michel Warshawsky et al., *Critical Views Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Camp*, The Alternative Information Center, Jerusalem 1994.

It was interesting to discover the diversity in the narratives on each side.[12] Another example is the project "Zukhrout: Remembrance," which aims to bring Israelis and Palestinians together to visit certain locations inside Israel in order to remember together the Palestinian history in these locations before 1948, and to reach a point of forgiveness and healing about this matter.

The strategy's second trend is not contradictory with the first and the second strategies. It is also possible that some people who worked on the first and second strategies, also worked in projects following the third strategy. The reason for this is that the third strategy is "neutral," and can be used in order to reach an understanding with each other's narrative which fits with the first strategy. This also conforms to the second strategy, where the aim is to promote the Palestinian narrative within Israeli society.

The third question asked in this report is whether this strategy was evaluated appropriately, whether the idea of conciliation/reconciliation was examined in the Israeli-Palestinian context, and if the evaluations conducted were able to make recommendations about the conditions of conciliation/reconciliation and its relationship with the past and future relations between the two peoples.

Fourth: The strategy of coordinating together, but acting separately in both societies

The idea behind this strategy is that peace is created between past enemies, and when agreement is achieved with the other side, it is not achieved in order to develop coexistence or friendly feelings. Rather, it is achieved in order to separate the two sides from each other: "These are our borders and we will defend them and die for that aim, and vice versa."[13]

---

[12] See the outcome of this project in Paul Scham, Walid Salem, and Benjamin Pogrund, "Shared Histories", 2005.

[13] Ami Ayalon in a meeting, Britain, 2001.

According to this strategy, peace should be based upon one side's interests more than on a sense of caring for the interests of the other side. Therefore, it is the responsibility of peacemakers to remain national patriots in their own societies, and not to defend the rights of the other side in a way that would cause their own communities to accuse them of being disloyal.

These main assumptions led Ami Ayalon to reach an agreement with Sari Nusseibeh (Ayalon-Nusseibeh Plan). The two sides began to coordinate which types of activities they could pursue in each society in order to promote the plan. Later on, they began working separately in order to collect signatures to support the plan, and managed to create two cross-cutting grassroots political movements in both societies that include members from different political organizations on each side. One organization, in Israel, is called "The Popular Peace Campaign" in Arabic and "HaMifikad HaLeumi" in Hebrew ("The People's Voice" in English); the second, working on the Palestinian side, is called "The Peoples' Campaign for Peace and Democracy." Hundreds of thousands of signatures were collected by both organizations.

The idea of "you should die for yourself and not for the other, care for your interests more than for those of the other" is a new idea for joint ventures. The Nusseibeh-Ayalon initiative is a clear example of this approach, while the Geneva Initiative involves working separately in both societies in addition to the idea of cooperation between the two peoples as a bottom up process leading to peace.

The fourth question addressed in this report is whether this strategy was evaluated, and whether recommendations were developed in order to promote its influence. Examples of this are: ways to develop social cross-cutting movements based on the experiences of other countries; ways to develop joint and unilateral non-violence strategies; ways to promote education about the other in each society; ways to promote voluntarism for peace building, and so on.

Questions regarding the four strategies

Taking the four strategies together, a fifth set of questions with regard to the evaluations will include the following:

◆ Did the evaluations present suggestions and recommendations regarding how to create a network between these four strategies?[14]

◆ How might a code of ethics (or ground rules and guiding principles) be developed for this network, in order to promote it and enhance its sustainability?

◆ Do the evaluations conducted develop sufficient methodologies for assessing these different strategies, and do they suggest a formula that includes the best of all of them?

◆ Do the evaluations suggest answers for the crucial issues presented by these strategies such as:

◆ What cooperation between the two sides is needed? Is it between the "usual suspects" only, or also between the two peoples?

◆ What is the content of the unilateral and bilateral activities (and not only the types of activities) that is consonant with the strategies as well as the context?

◆ What is the role of the third party in both unilateral and bilateral activities?

◆ What kinds of solidarity/sympathy/empathy do both sides need towards each other? How would these practices stop peace activists from being considered less patriotic (Israel) or normalizing relations with the enemy (Palestine)?

◆ What constitutes forgiveness/healing/conciliation and reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian context? What is their connection to the future process and past narratives?

---

[14] Another way to classify these strategies is as follows:
1) Cooperation between friends
2) Cooperation with a joint political plan: Geneva Initiative, Nusseibeh- Ayalon, etc.
3) Cooperation across the divide without a joint political plan:
    a. Professional cooperation: health, education, environment, etc. (cooperation on projects)
    b. Cooperation together across the divide more than working with the mainstream in each society (solidarity activities, and also joint projects)
    c. Cooperation across the divide in order to coordinate activities in both societies
    d. Cooperation in order to work for forgiveness, healing and conciliation/reconciliation
4) Relatively speaking non-existent model: A formula for cooperation between all the strategies across the divide, and also in each society, on themes and long-term plans, while keeping the independence of each/group/movement.

◆ Should we look for joint narratives or for an understanding of each other's narratives?

◆ Within the current context of disengagement, wall building in the Palestinian territories, and the activists' lack of freedom of movement in order to meet, what are the strategies of working together?

These are some of the macro questions that the evaluations would address.

Micro questions

In addition to the macro questions presented above, there are other micro questions that also relate to the four strategies mentioned earlier:

◆ What evaluations were conducted?

◆ For what type of programs (unilateral, bilateral or trilateral)?

◆ For what projects (national or local)?

◆ What were the evaluation methodologies used?

◆ What type of evaluation was carried out: short-term or long-term? How sustainable was it?

◆ What evaluations were missing?

◆ Who are the initiators of the evaluations? Why? Are they evaluations by the donors? Local organizations: NGOs and grassroots organizations? Whom do they represent, what were their expectations from the evaluations, and were these expectations fulfilled?

◆ Who are the people targeted by each evaluation and why? Where were they targeted and why?

◆ What information is included about the targeted participation in the needs assessment, planning, design and implementation of each evaluation?

◆ What impact does the evaluation have on the targeted group's attitudes, perceptions, and images? Did it promote coexistence or separation? What was the impact on conflict resolution/transformation/solution/management/freezing in general; geographical or sectorial? What was the impact on the

relations between the two peoples from different groups of women, youth, Jerusalemites/non-Jerusalemites, refugees, academics, the disabled, business people?

◆ What strategies did the evaluation develop in order to respond to the escalation of the conflict in recent years?

◆ What lessons were learned from the evaluations conducted?

◆ What are the gaps in these evaluations? And how should they be bridged?

Assessment of the evaluations of cooperation between the Palestinian and Israeli civil societies

First: Theoretical background

There are different approaches used in the evaluation of projects. These include cooperation projects across the divide.

This report reviews four approaches of evaluation:

1) The CIPP approach (Context, Input, Process, and Product evaluation of Daniel L. Stuffelbeam, developed in the late 1960s)

2) The Formative Summative approach developed by Michael Scriven in the late 1960s

3) The Action Evaluation Approach developed by Jay Rothman

4) The Theory-based Evaluation (TBC) developed by Weiss in 1971

1) The CIPP approach

This approach, devised by Daniel L. Stuffelbeam, includes four types of evaluation,[15] as presented in the following table:

---

[15] Stuffelbeam, D.L. (1983). "The CIPP model for program evaluation", in: Madaus, G.F., Stuffelbeam, D. and Scriven, M.S. (eds.), *Evaluation Models*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publishers,. pp. 117-141.

The CIPP components (adapted from Stuffelbeam, 1983)

Context	Input	Process	Product
Serves as a basis for selecting and shaping project goals. It refers to a needs assessment; perceptions about problems that warrant change and the extent to which the project's objectives are reflective of, or attuned to, the needs of the populations served.	Relates to choice of program strategy; specification of procedural designs for implementing the strategies. Evaluation criteria may be the extent to which the strategy chosen was: reasonable (vis-à-vis what is being done elsewhere and proposed in the literature); relevant; feasible and responsive to the assessed needs.	Relates to implementation. It includes reference to topics such as the extent to which the project plan was implemented; defects in the procedural design or its implementation; barriers in the implementation process. Within this category we examine decision-making practices and issues of symmetry/ asymmetry in cooperation between organizations.	Relates to assessing performance in relation to previously diagnosed needs; examining the results obtained with regard to the following questions: to what extent has the program has met met the needs of the target population? To what extent has it reached the goals that had been defined for the project? Furthermore, the evaluation at this stage examines the effect of the program on the participants, the local community and the broader community.

2) The formative summative approach

This approach, according to Michael Scriven, includes two stages:

◆ A formative stage which includes collecting quantitative and qualitative data about the project.

◆ A summative stage which includes rendering judgments on the project by comparing it with other similar projects regarding meeting the needs of the beneficiaries.

The summative stage might also include an evaluation of the project outputs and outcomes in comparison with the project objectives.

The difference between CIPP and the formative summative approach is that the CIPP approach is more appropriate when the aim is to improve the project[16]. This includes improving performance and decision-making. The formative summative approach, on the other hand, is appropriate when the aim is to give a judgment about the project's accountability, and to prove whether the project is appropriate for fulfilling the needs indicated.

In this sense, the two approaches are complementary and are very important in assessing the evaluations of civil society cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis.

3) The action evaluation approach

This approach is a development of Michael Scriven's previous model. The difference is that it is participatory with the project participants, and not evaluator-centered as in Scriven's earlier model. In addition, this approach features the integration of evaluation in all stages of the project cycle. Therefore, the evaluation is part of the project action/activities, and it leads to modifications in the project during the design, implementation and final evaluation periods. In this regard, the evaluation team is part of the project team. They participate in the project team meetings where they give their input, but are not part of the executive body of the project.

The action evaluation approach includes three stages:

◆ Base line stage: includes cooperative goals and objectives setting.

◆ Formative stage: is conducted in a cooperative participatory way.

◆ Summative stage: is also conducted in a cooperative participatory way[17].

---

[16] Stufflebeam wrote: The most important purpose of the program evaluation is not to prove but to improve."

[17] See more on this approach in Jay Rothman ,"Action evaluation in the theory and practice of conflict resolution," Peace and Conflict Studies. 8 (Spring 2001), 1, 1-15.

In order to include participation in the evaluation, ten interviews with Palestinian participants in joint projects were conducted (see below).

4) Theory based evaluation (TBE)

TBE "explores how and why an initiative works," according to Weiss, the founder of this model. The theory is defined as a "set of hypotheses upon which people build their program plans." Therefore, by reviewing these hypotheses, modifications may be made to the project in its early stages, even before it starts. The process works by assessing the hypotheses vis-à-vis the relative theories, and concluding ways and strategies for project development. One way of implementing TBE might be according to the three stages suggested by Connell and Kubisch in 1996:

1. Surfacing and articulating a theory of change.
2. Measuring a project's activities and intended outcomes, and
3. Analyzing and interpreting the results of an evaluation, including their implications for adjusting the initiative theory of change and its allocation of resources."[18]

The significance of the TBE approach is that it does not end with the evaluation of the project's technical issues as the previous approaches do. Rather, it tries to improve the project content by providing it with theory-related experiences and comparative lessons generated from different case studies and concluded from different conflict areas.

In this sense, the TBE will need a type of evaluator who is not only an expert on evaluation techniques, but also has expertise in conflict resolution theories and practices in different countries in the world.

A combination of the four approaches

The study by the INCORE institute mentioned above builds upon evaluations of workshops by academic experts. The study's conclusion was that "evaluations

---

[18] All quotations about TBE are taken from: Churck, Cheyanne, and Shouldice, Julie, The evaluation of conflict resolution interventions Part II: Emerging practice and theories. INCORE the University of Ulster, Derry Londonderry, March 2003.

to date have provided some useful information, yet they remain severely under-utilized and often overly simplistic" (p.45). It was also stated that "conflict resolution evaluations are often based on generic evaluation approaches that do not meet many of the unique needs of this field" (p.5). One of the problems of these evaluations is that they try to work on "intangible areas such as perceptions, trust, attitudes, levels of cooperation and relationships" (p.5). As a result, it is important to find ways to make the practitioners interested in the evaluations in a tangible way, one that impels them to read the evaluation comments and develop policies for action accordingly, because only "few practitioners have the time and space to consider the comments and the recommendations emerging from the evaluations" (p.7). It is generally the case that practitioners use the evaluations to submit them to the donors in order to help them obtain more funding, while there is rarely any use of evaluations as a base for policy development. On the other hand, the competition among donors "decreased the motivation to share lessons about practice" (p.7).

Conclusions

◆ Evaluations should be relevant to the needs of the practitioners and all the other beneficiaries.

◆ Evaluations should be conducted in participation with the beneficiaries from A to Z, in order to create a friendly learning environment where both the evaluator and the participants will benefit.

◆ Evaluations should learn from the relevant theories and help in enriching these theories.

◆ Evaluations should bring comparative lessons from different conflict areas for cooperation between the civil society in Israel and that in Palestine

◆ Evaluations should be built on professional methods, and should not be generic and overly simplistic.

◆ Evaluators in the field of civil society cooperation in the conflict area should not merely be "technicians," but also experts in conflict resolution and knowledgeable about different conflict areas, in order to give substance the project's further development.

◆ In addition to the partial evaluations that are conducted on occasion, there is a need for a strategic evaluation based on both theory and comparative practices of civil society cooperation in conflict areas, including Israel and Palestine.

◆ A formula should be devised for sharing the lessons learned from the evaluation between different stakeholders, including the donors and the implementing organizations, and for overcoming competition as an obstacle to this process.

Summary of the criteria for assessing the evaluations about Palestine-Israel civil society cooperation

A) *Criteria for evaluating the comprehensive evaluations*

should deal with the following questions:

◆ To what extent were these evaluations able to include the different cooperation strategies in their content?

◆ What methodologies were used? And to what extent were they participatory with the stakeholders?

◆ Which groups were targeted (Did they include NGOs and grassroots organizations)?

◆ How were the needs of the targeted groups addressed in the evaluation?

◆ What input did these evaluations present in order to develop the content of the projects evaluated (theoretical inputs, experiences from other countries, and other projects, etc.)?

◆ What input did these evaluations provide to the strategies of cooperation in times of conflict?

◆ What input did these evaluations introduce to the hard issues of conciliation/ reconciliation, solidarity, cooperation between the usual suspects, between people, to the content of unilateral and bilateral activities, to the role of third parties, etc.?

◆ What ideas did these evaluations develop in order to create a network between different stakeholders and for exchanging lessons learned from the different evaluations?

◆ What ideas did these evaluations develop in order to promote the impact of the projects, and their influence on decision makers in both societies?

B) *Criteria for evaluating the partial evaluations*

◆ What was the field of evaluation?

◆ Is the methodology used appropriate for that field?

◆ Was the entire process of evaluation participatory with the stakeholders? To what extent did it express their needs?

◆ What input did the evaluation give in order to promote the project work within a difficult context?

◆ What is the evaluation's contribution to improving project input and process?

◆ What input did the evaluation provide to the project's products?

◆ What input did the evaluation provide so as to modify and enrich the project?

◆ What input did the evaluation provide for the project's sustainability?

◆ What input did the evaluation provide in order to promote the project's impact?

The rest of the criteria that address the overall evaluations (and not the partial ones) will not be used in this report, but were stated here as a suggestion for further research.

Key findings based on the above criteria

Annex no. 1 presents an analysis of the evaluations conducted for Israeli-Palestinian civil society cooperation that were mentioned earlier (see the section on methodology).

In Annex no. 2 are summaries of interviews held with two Palestinians academics (Hassan Dweik and Samir Hazboun), with a grassroots movements activist (Terry Bullata), with the Geneva Initiative (Nazmi Al- Ju'beh), with the One Voice movement (Dr. Fathi Darwish), with a donor organizations (Akram Attallah), and four interviews from the NGOs community (Riad Malki, Natasha Khalidi, Nasif Mu'allem, and Bassem Eid).

In this section we present a summary of the findings from these evaluation studies and the interviews:

Findings from the evaluation studies

Finding 1: Lack of overall evaluations of civil society cooperation strategies

There is a lack of overall evaluations to Palestinian-Israeli civil society cooperation projects from the Palestinian point of view. The Yes, PM study by IPCRI (which is a joint Israeli- Palestinian evaluation study, not a Palestinian unilateral one) focused solely on the P2P projects and not on all the strategies of cooperation between civil society from both sides. In addition to this study, Fafo held an evaluation meeting of P2P on 2001 in Istanbul but no report was issued. The Canadian and Norwegian Representative offices held a workshop workshop on April 4, 2005 in Jerusalem, although no proceedings have been published. The IPCC and the Jerusalem Center for Women held several meetings on the macro evaluation issues (with no publication), and an Israeli-Palestinian review was conducted regarding the Wye River projects.

It is remarkable, then, that the number one finding is there is no satisfactory overall assessment of the evaluations conducted for Israeli-Palestinian civil society cooperation from the Palestinian point of view.

In the absence of such an assessment, individuals have tended to introduce their personal estimations (see names mentioned in the methodology section).

The evaluations by Yes, PM, Wye River, Fafo, IPCC, Jerusalem Center for Women, and the Canadian and Norwegian Representative offices will be considered in this report as semi-overall evaluations.

Finding no. 2: Lack of evaluation methodology

With the exception of the Yes, PM evaluation study, the other semi-overall evaluations mentioned lack a methodology. The Wye River report includes a list of projects and a description of them only, while the IPCC, Fafo, and Jerusalem Center of Women were only reports of meetings and were not based on any clear methodology. While the IPCC tried to develop some kind of SWOT analysis[19] of the cooperation projects, this was not carried through until the project's conclusion, and therefore the results were not final.

As regards the Canadian and Norwegian Representative offices meeting, there were speeches from Israelis and Palestinians, and an EU expert presented only a summary of his findings from an evaluation study[20] he conducted. This summary appears in Annex no. 1, which is clearly built on a solid methodology.

Finding no. 3: The participation of stakeholders was not sufficient (no clear objectives)

In the case of the Yes, PM study, the stakeholders participated through interviews and completing questionnaires. The Wye River study is a project description, not an evaluation by the stakeholders. The other three studies were basically descriptive, with no clear guidance or methodology presented (except in the case of IPCC, where the methodology used was a SWOT analysis). Therefore, in most of the evaluations the stakeholders' participation lacked any indication of the aim or anticipated achievements.

Finding no. 4: NGOs did not include the grassroots organizations

The five semi-overall evaluations mentioned above concentrated more on evaluating the NGOs' projects than on grassroots projects. For example, they include the cooperation between Fatah youth and the Likud and Labour youths, and the Geneva and Nusseibeh/ Ayalon initiatives, etc.

In the case of Yes, PM, the "grassroots dialogue groups" as they are called, were mentioned within the list of cooperation projects evaluated, but the authors

---

[19] Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats

[20] His name is Bruce Stanley.

note that "about this type of P2P we have the least information" (Yes, PM, p.17). In the Fafo meeting in Istanbul, most of the participants were NGOs without inclusion of grassroots organizations, while the Wye River projects evaluation did not include any grassroots project except for the "Parents-Families Circles Forum" (one of 18 projects).

When the grassroots is not properly included or represented, the impact of the peace cooperation will be assumed to be less than it is in reality.

Moreover, on this basis the evaluations did not offer enough input on how to develop strategies of non-violence in the grassroots movements. They also did not give any input about how to build and promote social movements and grassroots movements.

Finding No. 5: No contribution to the theory of change, and no comparative approach

The semi-overall evaluations noted above failed to provide any theoretical basis to the cooperation projects evaluated, nor was any comparative approach applied regarding other countries in conflict in order to address lessons learned. Therefore, all of the recommendations made by these evaluations were restricted to recommendations concluded from the Israeli Palestinian context alone and only from the projects evaluated.

In addition, the evaluations were not able to develop recommendations about the issue of reconciliation, solidarity and the other questions facing the four strategies of cooperation.

Finding No. 6: Insufficient recommendations about the projects in times of conflict

Although the Israeli-Palestinian context was addressed thoroughly by the evaluations mentioned, no sufficient tool were proposed that could overcome the reality confronting the peace activists who cannot meet because of the restrictions on movements. The effect of the separation wall on joint work strategies was not sufficiently addressed. Moreover, a strategy of joint coordination by the "usual suspects" while working separately in both societies was not discussed, and no mechanisms and actions plans were offered in its place.

Consequently, no strategies were developed about what is unilateral and what it bilateral, and what should be the role of the third party in both of these cases.

On this basis the evaluation also failed to develop recommendations regarding how to gain the support of the mainstream in both societies for peace making though sufficient unilateral work, including with the religious groups in both societies.

Finding no. 7: Failure of networking and exchange of lessons

Except for the study by Yes, PM and Wye River, the other evaluations were not published and distributed. Moreover, with regard to the other partial evaluations it was found that:

◆ Most are internal, and for internal use only.

◆ Most are "confidential" and not for distribution.

◆ Most are short-term.

◆ Most are not performed systematically, only at the funder's request.

◆ Most are not for general reading and or policy development, but only for the donors.

◆ Most are prepared by people who were not sufficiently trained in conducting evaluations.

There is a pressing need for a network that can collect and distribute the evaluations, draw lessons, train evaluators, and develop a general code of ethics for evaluators.

Finding No. 8: Insufficient impact assessment

With the exception of the Yes, PM evaluation, the other reports did not include any study of the impact of civil society cooperation projects (geographically, different social groups, different sectors, different ages, and so on).

The failure of all the evaluations to include grassroots parties in the NGOs definition led to a reduction in the assessment of the project's impact.

Furthermore, the evaluations did not present clear-cut strategies to sustain the impact of civil society peace cooperation projects on decision makers.

Summary of the problems in evaluation from the Palestinian point of view

◆ Lack of enough professional evaluators

◆ Lack of strategic macro evaluations

◆ Lack of exchange of experiences

◆ The confidential nature of evaluations

◆ The competitive agendas of the donors

◆ The competitive agenda of the NGOs

◆ The provisional use of evaluations, also for short-term purposes

◆ The lack of sufficient evaluation methodologies and indicators

◆ The lack of evaluations to find solutions to the main questions of civil society cooperation

Findings from the interviews

The interviews did not add much substance to the 8 main findings cited above. It was also the case that the interviews were conducted to evaluate the projects themselves rather than assess the evaluations, which is the purpose of this report. In regard to civil society cooperation, the interviews raised the following points:

◆ Professional cooperation on water issues, environment, agriculture, and so on continued to be handled well during the last Intifada, but they need a political decision about their underlying Palestinian aims.

◆ More solidarity field activities are needed, primarily against the construction of the separation wall and in Jerusalem.

◆ More grassroots organizations need to be built (or strengthened), and more non-violence and voluntary work should be included.

◆ Cooperation should take care to avoid repeating certain projects through "political tourism" made by "peace businessmen" who present themselves as experts in every area.

◆ There should be new projects related to civilization, culture, architecture, and the like that provide a humanistic picture of each side.

◆ Grassroots groups should be involved in peace projects, such as the workers trade unions, ex-prisoners and students councils in the universities.

◆ Civil society projects should be affiliated with the official level, and therefore put in the service of the negotiations (developing Track II).

◆ There should be a link between the professional and the political spheres in civil society cooperation.

◆ There should be a focus on joint youth work.

◆ Human rights professional cooperation should be fostered to combat violations of human rights by both sides.

Specific findings according to the CIPP evaluation model

Findings regarding the methodology

◆ Most formal evaluations are not based on theoretical and methodological tools. That is, existing formal evaluation reports do not reflect a comprehensive approach that examines activities rather than using limited criteria designed by donors who are usually the initiators of the evaluation process, or by evaluators who consider the number of cooperation activities and level of participation in them as a main criteria of evaluation.

◆ Most evaluations focused on outputs and not on outcomes, and not on the implication of the context on project design, course of the project, and the way it relates to the needs of the target groups.

◆ No systematic and combined methodology (surveys, interviews, public opinion polls, focus group discussions, observations, analysis of documents and records) was used by the evaluations. All evaluation reports were inclusive in their methodology, relying mainly on one method.

- There was no clear indication of the level of documentation and institutional memory of activities used for the sampling activities of the evaluation reports.

- Most evaluations related to the Palestinian-Israeli context and did not draw on lessons learned from conflict areas elsewhere, and did not apply a conflict transformation process.

- Most evaluation reports were commissioned by donors after the project was implemented, mainly for activities conducted in the past; none of the evaluators accompanied the different activities during the various implementation stages.

- The evaluations were intended to help donors set their priorities and decide whether they should continue supporting Palestinian/Israeli dialogue programs. The evaluation process was not meant from the beginning to "improve" the performance of the organizations and staff involved in the activities. Rather, its main aim was to provide justification and legitimacy for the need for dialogue programs. The evaluation targeted the donors to convince them to continue supporting these organizations.

- Most evaluation reports were requested after the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, at the time of conflict and escalation when most cooperation and dialogue activities halted. Past evaluations were not helpful then in confronting the new reality and collapse of most cooperation partnerships.

- There was a lack in sectorial evaluation. Evaluation reports did not consider all sectors, test their "advantages" and "disadvantages" compared to other sectors, or investigate the way they serve the overall goals of dialogue programs and cooperation.

- The connection between activities, target groups, and actual participants in the programs mentioned in the evaluation reports is not clear in terms of impact. There is no indication of the outreach strategy used, especially to those who had never met Israelis or participants from peripheral areas.

- The evaluation reports do not consider the preparation stage of the implemented programs (initiation of the idea, writing the proposal, fund raising, action planning and selecting target groups). Responsibilities and work division is a good indicator of the obstacles encountered in program implementation.

◆ The evaluation reports attempt to avoid "judging" the institutions involved in cooperation programs. This prevents any evaluation of the capacities and the qualifications of the involved partners. An organization's audit of involved partners is essential to any evaluation report, at least in terms of defining the responsibility of those organizations in the success/failure of programs.

Findings regarding context, input, process and product

◆ It is not clear whether the chosen case studies in the evaluation reports reflect the Palestinian-Israeli cooperation context in general. The reports deal with the context of cooperation in a very minimal fashion; usually, the gaps between the two sides are not addressed in detail, and the scope of target groups and the recruitment process is not clearly formulated.

◆ Most evaluations focus on the actual meeting between sides, and this alone is considered an achievement. The number of meetings were quantified, and used as evidence to show the importance of dialogue and interaction between the two conflicting parties, without any focus on the content or product.

◆ The ad hoc type of evaluation is easily identified as a common factor of most projects. The absence of long-term goals and the need to implement activities in a relatively short time does not facilitate planning for a cumulative process, which can be modified and redirected during different stages of the work.

◆ None of the evaluation reports indicates the level of knowledge and familiarity with each side's problems and fears, perceptions and ways to modify them. These issues did not receive enough attention.

◆ There was no indicator concerning the "flexibility" of most of these programs' implementation in terms of topics, participants and venue; this includes the changes introduced to the program because of restrictions on the freedom of movement, the motive to participate in the activities, the political circumstances at the time of the event, and so on.

◆ Each side's agenda and perception of how it could serve/not serve peace and each side's interest was hardly mentioned in the evaluation reports. The contradictory agendas and search for a common agenda did not receive enough attention, and was not reflected in the cases used for evaluation.

- The evaluation reports indicate the need to integrate marginalized groups, people against dialogue, peace spoilers and extremists, without analyzing the impact of the dominant participation of the elite and English speakers in most of these activities. In addition, they do not mention how this created a negative reaction among groups that oppose the people involved in cooperation programs, rather than opposing the idea of dialogue and interaction with Israelis.

Findings regarding the context of the conflict and the peace process

- The political connotation of cooperation is virtually not mentioned in the evaluation reports. The relationship between the peace process and the political leadership on one side, and that of the cooperation projects and involved parties on the other side was considered a factor which could indicate the level of independence/dependence needed to design and implement cooperation projects.

- There is a gap in defining the political goals and impact of dialogue and cooperation. Palestinians consider cooperation with Israelis a gradual process, which will develop when a final status agreement is finalized. Involved Israeli parties advocate cooperation outside of the political context in order not to be hostage to political developments. This gap in understating the need for cooperation and its connection to the political process created many obstacles. Palestinians consider the Israeli approach an attempt not to recognize Palestinian national rights, and to normalize with Israelis without paying the price of a final peace agreement (free normalization as defined by Palestinians). The Israelis, on the other hand, consider this to be a polarization of the cooperation between civil society organizations.

- The impact of the complex reality caused by the delay in implementing signed agreements, the continued occupation, increase in settlement activities and the restriction of movement was mentioned in the evaluation reports without any further study of its impact on the motives and willingness of partners to cooperate with Israeli organizations and individuals. The two different realities experienced by Palestinians and Israelis pose challenges to cooperation. This was not properly addressed in the evaluation reports.

◆ The fact that the Palestinians consider themselves to be undergoing a transitional period, which should lead to national liberation and independence, created a discrepancy in the agenda of dialogue activities, which usually starts with Israel's responsibility to end the occupation. Palestinians wanted a clear end game and Israelis preferred the process. Evaluation reports do not address this gap in the political and social contexts of the conflict.

Findings regarding structural differences

◆ The evaluation reports do not refer to the social, political, cultural and economic structures of the two different societies, which are characterized by huge gaps and disparities. It is essential to address these structural differences in order to identify the tools needed for promoting a better understanding with respect to this situation.

◆ The long tradition of institutional work and democratic values which informs the work on the Israeli side cannot be compared to that of the Palestinian society under transition. There is asymmetry not only with respect to the type of relations between the involved partners, but also more basically in the different structures, setups and recourses. This aspect was not considered in the evaluation reports.

Evaluation of the Cooperation

The limited number of formal and professional evaluation reports and the narrow scope of these reports forced us to gather all related materials concerning cooperation programs between Palestinians and Israelis including articles, individual opinions, internal reports, internal evaluation by organizations, results of workshops and interviews with leading heads of NGOs with long experience in Palestinian-Israeli cooperation. Most of these materials are sporadic and of an impressionistic nature, but served as vital empirical material to complement the formal evaluation reports.

From the Palestinian side, the following is a generic evaluation of the cooperation with Israeli civil society.

◆ Lack of clear political support and linkage made by politicians between negotiations and contacts with Israelis. At time of crisis, politicians tended to limit their contacts with Israelis, especially in issues related to the permanent status.

◆ In many cases, the multiplicity of Palestinian political leaders working in these programs (i.e., the Ministry/Agency of NGOs, Palestinian Peace Center, Peace Coalition, People Peace campaign and Ministry of Planning) delivered contradictory messages and the conflict often characterized their relations.

◆ Deterioration of the political situation negatively affected the cooperation programs. The Palestinian side linked the level of cooperation with the willingness of Israelis to proceed with the peace process and reach final settlements. In times of crisis in the relations between the two sides, activities decreased and negative images ruled.

◆ The asymmetry and inequality between Palestinian partners and differences in the level of professionalism allowed Israelis to dominate the initiatives (controlling and running the programs) and take a proactive role in all stages, from initiation to implementation.

◆ Differences in cultural codes, socioeconomic patterns, quality control, qualifications and capacities all created obstacles in dealing with the Israelis. The well-established society and institutions that typify the Israeli side cannot be compared to the society in transition and nation/state building stage in which the Palestinians are engaged.

◆ The negative impression that many organizations and NGOs created with respect to carrying out cooperation programs bolstered the image that these programs do not fulfill public needs and serve only elite groups. Most organizations working with similar Israeli organizations failed to create a balance between their internal work and the cooperative work, and this situation widened the gap between these organizations and the public.

◆ Grassroots organizations were not targeted in most cooperation projects, which were increasingly identified with the elite class from both sides. For the Palestinians, most of the people involved represent the middle class and the elite connected to the PA institutions and figures. From the Israeli

side, the traditional peace camp is composed of the Ashkenazi elite and the economically established class.

◆ The ad hoc type of programs, the "funding opportunities" driven agenda (suiting the requirements and priorities of an RFP), and changes in setting goals and target groups does not facilitate a continuous, cumulative process that identifies specific goals suited to needs rather than the requirements of donors.

◆ In some cases, Palestinians were opposed to certain Israeli organizations that were given funding by donor countries without having to specify their Palestinian partner or its eligibility. This is considered to be a colonial act on the part of some donors, which preferred Israelis as the responsible partners to run the projects and decide on the Palestinian partner. These subcontracting methods caused mistrust, negative images and even suspicion in some cases.

◆ A vast majority of the Palestinian organizations involved in implementing cooperation projects lacked the basic qualifications and capacities to compete with the Israeli counterpart and establish a relationship on equal footing.

◆ Some Palestinian organizations required that their Israeli partners provide a clear position concerning the national rights of the Palestinian people and their right for self-determination as a pre-condition for cooperation. The justification given by the Palestinian organizations was that they should not work with those who are against them. This attitude limited the scope of cooperation to the "converted," who are a minority in the Israeli society. Involving the mainstream and people against peace required expanding the circles of cooperation with no pre-conditions.

◆ Intensified settlement activities, attacks against the PA and civilians at the beginning of the second Intifada, and rejection of the separation wall and the separation barrier were used by many organizations as a reason to boycott Israelis, or ask that they oppose their government's policies. Only in this case would that Palestinian organizations be willing to continue their relationship with their Israeli partners. On the other side, Israeli solidarity groups which protested against the wall were welcomed by the majority of Palestinians, including those against cooperation and contact with Israeli organizations.

◆ Donors had a tendency to show that "business as usual," by getting the two sides to meet, especially in European capitals, had a negative impact on Palestinian public opinion, which considered this activity to be a luxury, especially when the resources were not being used for the benefit of the Palestinian people and their basic needs.

◆ According to the Palestinian perspective, most cooperation projects were financed by donations which were allocated – or were supposed to be allocated if these projects did not exist – to the Palestinian people. This assumption raised a serious public debate about the best ways to use this money to primarily help the Palestinians, and not to finance Israeli organizations at the expense of the basic needs of the Palestinian people.

◆ The correlation between political negotiations, the peace process, and People to People peace creates confusion. The role of these activities in supporting peace-making and peace-building continues to be vague and limited to the level of rhetoric. The use and effect of cooperation projects conducted by civil society organizations, including Track II diplomacy activities, on the political leadership was minimal.

◆ The cooperation was perceived differently by the political leadership. The Palestinian political leadership wanted to control this cooperation, and limit the contacts to political negotiation issues in order to maintain the negotiation positions and stands. On the Israeli side, the peace camp used dialogue and cooperation relations with Palestinians as an alternative to the formal relations which they used to enjoy when they were in power.

◆ The programs' outcomes were not brought to the public's attention. The media focused mainly on negative aspects, highlighting formal political negotiations, back channels and the photo opportunities of key political personalities from both sides.

◆ There has not been any preparatory work on either side. This has negatively affected the aims and priorities of the meetings. Preparing the community requires working internally to empower the community and support cooperation as a way which can help end the suffering caused by occupation, and in achieving peace.

◆ There was no coordination or sharing of experiences between organizations involved in similar activities. In many cases, similar competing projects took place simultaneously with no coordination on the level of donors or among the organizations implementing these projects. The fact that many activities involved participants from central areas (peripheral areas were ignored), created a roster of people who would be invited by different organizations to discuss similar topics and duplicate activities, especially those requiring a specific area of expertise.

◆ Tension was created by the competition between the PA and the civil society for donors' funding, and the attempt by the PA to control the NGOs money under the rubric of transparency and having the NGOs work conform to the development policies of the PA. In addition, some organizations were de-legitimized because of their objection to the PA control.

◆ Most of the project activities (except for professional cooperation in science and technology) were encounters, and did not include any practical component of working together on joint products which are visible and can be introduced to the general public.

Overall conclusions

A) Normalization versus patriotism: These two issues might appear to be unbridgeable, but the question of how a peace activist can be perceived as a national patriot on both sides still requires a satisfactory solution in order to avoid the increasing marginalization of peace activists in both societies. In this sense, peace activists might present themselves to their societies as defenders of the national interests of the other side, but these national interests should not contradict international civil human values. The peace activists should neither compromise nor comply with those interests that are against human values, and should insist on joint projects and normalization with the other side on the basis of these values – which are against all types of boycott. Peace cooperation projects and peace activists must resolve the objective tension that exists between particularism and universalism, and therefore while trying to meet public opinion on the particularistic issues, they must

work at the same time to bring public opinion closer to the universalistic humanistic approach.

B) Asymmetry versus reciprocity: Asymmetry calls for capacity building on one side in order to achieve equality and parity with the other side. At the same time, the asymmetry can no longer be used to justify escapism from fulfilling tasks, or postponement, or breaking agreed upon dates, or lack of professionalism, or the avoidance of self-building of capacities, or rejection of criticism. Moreover, asymmetry should not be used to justify the inability to show solidarity with the other side during difficult times of terrorism and violence. Edy Kaufman calls this positive reciprocity versus negative reciprocity, which refers to a situation where the stronger side will ask the weaker one to comply with certain conditions without looking for reciprocal ones from the stronger side (Kaufman 2005, p. 59).

C) Peace making versus normalization: In point (A) normalization was presented in its positive sense as the process of building relations with the other side based on international human values. Here we refer to the other side of normalization in the negative sense, to "defuse the conflict and educate the public to accept injustice as a reality of life" (Ghassan Andoni, 2003, p.2), while peace making is the process to change these realities and to transform them. In this sense peace cooperation projects should be built on a vision of change, otherwise they will simply be business projects that make people adapt to current realities instead of working to change them. With this process of peace making/conflict resolution, the projects can also avoid the trap of working in conflict management as an alternative to conflict transformation/ resolution.

D) Peace/security versus justice/human security: The idea of peace as a collection of joint projects was built on the idea of eradicating the direct threat to security that each side represents to the other. In this sense, the peace project of the Palestinians was based solely on getting rid of the occupation, while on the Israeli side it was built on the idea of becoming rid of the Palestinians (they are there and we are here, separate from one another). What is absent in these two visions to peace is a component that combines peace and state security, with elements of justice and individual security. This can be achieved by

reshaping the projects upon two additional principles. The first: Is the fair distribution of justice an alternative to absolute justice of one side against the other? Second: Equal implementation of individual security will make the citizens in both societies free from fear and free from want.

E) Short-term versus long-term: Because the peace projects are dependent on international funding, they were mostly short-term. However, the long-term issues posed by the projects still need to be resolved, including the issue of the "peace price." That is, each side must be able to define clearly and concretely the price that they would pay in order to achieve peace. The other issue to be resolved is the encapsulation of the needs and concerns of the other side in each side's vision of peace. These two issues, in addition to the points mentioned in D above, would serve to propel the peace making/building/ conflict transformation projects from being short-term projects to long-term projects of peace building and reconciliation (Walid Salem et al., 2005).

In addition, there are content issues that must be elaborated in order to move the peace projects towards sustainability and impact.

F) Political versus professional: Professional cooperation projects have contributed a great deal to the good of both peoples during the last 38 years, in particular, professional cooperation in the fields of health, education and research. It is worth noting that cooperation in the field of health continued without stopping during the last years of the Intifada and crisis between the two peoples. This is simply because health issues cannot wait.

However, as opposed to this, one of the problems of cooperation projects was their apolitical nature, where professionalism worked sometimes despite political guidelines. This was especially the case for the Palestinians who tend to focus on developing political guidelines for all projects. This concern must be properly addressed by the cooperative peace projects.

G) Participation versus patronization: This recommendation is self-explanatory. It calls for participation in the projects' overall cycle, including needs assessment, planning, organization, follow-up, monitoring, and evaluation as opposed to patronization by one side.

◆ Working with the mainstream in both societies – outreach to all men and women, different age groups, disabled and non-disabled, all professions, all secular and religious groups, and so on.

This also includes designing projects with a view to the needs of the people and not conversely, that is, do not design the projects and then work to convince the people of their importance.

There is a need to establish grassroots organizations and strengthen and work with existing ones, as well as promote joint political movements that develop joint agendas for peace between the two sides. Nonviolent participatory acts should be promoted, as opposed to "talking boxes." (Dialogue without mutual action).

All of the projects should be open and transparent, open to scrutiny. The use of the media to disseminate the projects' outcomes and to inform the public about their activities is very important in this regard.

Working with the mainstream on both sides will also require combining bilateral and unilateral projects. The unilateral ones in each society will be used to promote a process of humanizing the other, and for initiating public dialogue about the price of peace and reconciliation with the other side.

◆ Working with donors on sustainable peace building and a conflict transformation agenda. This will include a shift by the international donors from a stand of neutralism to involvement, where they become partners in the projects because they are not part of the conflict and can provide the input of civic international values. Also, they can help bring lessons from other international experiences to project content, disseminate experiences of other successful projects, and help avoid overlapping projects, partiality and short-term effects.

Recommendations

1) Conduct a comprehensive evaluation of Israeli-Palestinian civil society cooperation based on the 4 strategies of cooperation.

2) Train Palestinian professional evaluators in the relevant evaluation methodologies, theories in the field of peace and conflict resolution, and the experience of different countries in this regard.

3) Further evaluation should include theoretical approaches, comparison with other countries, and a SWOT analysis.

4) Special focus should be given to grassroots evaluations, building non-violent grassroots and social movements that promote voluntarism for the sake of peace.

5) Special attention should be given to the challenging issues of reconciliation/ past and future/and other confrontational issues of the Israeli-Palestinian context.

6) Special recommendations are needed on how to gain the support of the mainstream in both societies.

7) A network should be developed for the purpose of exchanging evaluation experiences, training evaluators, developing a code of ethics, and providing standards for qualified evaluations.

8) Special recommendations are needed regarding the strategies of civil society peace cooperation in times of conflict, such as the current Intifada.

Bibliography

A. Books and research articles

A. Anan, Kofi (2002). *Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations*. New York: United Nations.

Abu Mazen (Mahmmoud Abbas) (1990). *Hadhehe Al-Etesalat, Lematha?* Jerusalem: Palestine Publishing House.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Ya'acov, et al. (2005). *The Israeli-Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000-2004: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management*. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.

Bjorn, Hettne (1991). *Approach to Study of Development and Peace*. Sweden: Padrigu Papers.

Churck, Cheyanne, and Shouldice, Julie (March 2003). *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions Part II: Emerging Practice and Theories*. Londonderry: INCORE, the University of Ulster Derry.

Hector, Gross Espiel (1998). "Universal International Security and Regional Security." In Moufida Gousha et al., *What Kind of Security? Paris: UNESCO* (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization).

Kaufman, Edy (2005). "The quest for reciprocity in an asymmetric conflict: problems and prospects of Israeli-Palestinian academics engage-ment." In *Breaking the Wall: The Social Responsibility of Palestinian and Israeli Academics and Intellectuals at Times of Violent Conflict: An Introspective Search*. Barcelona: The Center of Contemporary Culture of Barcelona.

Kaufman, Edy and Jonathan Kuttab (1986). "An exchange on dialogue." *Journal of Palestine Studies.*

Kaufman, Edy (1988). "The antiradar and the peace camp in Israel: A critical introspective." *Journal of Palestine Studies*.

Korber Sifting, *Europe and the Future of the Middle East: An Agenda for Peace*. Minutes of meeting (1996). No.106

Konrad Adenauer and Palestine Consultancy group and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (24/11/1997). *Is Oslo Alive?* East Jerusalem.

Laderach, Paul (2005). *The Little Book About Conflict Transformation*. The Netherlands: The European Centre for Conflict Prevention.

Keating, Michael et al. (2005). *Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground (the Case of Palestine)*. London: Chatham House.

Moufida, Goucha (November, 2001). *Human Security Conflict Prevention and Peace*. UNESCO (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization).

Moufida, Goucha (April 1998). *What Kind of Security?* United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Kaldor, Mary et al. (2004). "A human security doctrine for Europe." Paper presented to the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy

Mendelssohn, Everett, (June 2001). "The peacemakers: NGO efforts in the Middle East 1948-2001." Internal Document: Not intended for citation or publication.

Quaker United Nations Office (March 2004). "Bridging the Gap: Proposals and Precedents for Third Party Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."

Said, Edward and Budieri, Mousa (1994). *Ara'a Neqdeyah Hawal Mo'askar Al-Salam Al-Esraeli Al-Felasteni, Wa Al-Hewar Al-Felasteni-Al-Esraeli*. Bethlehem: Alternative Information Center.

Said, Edward (April 1994). "The Limits of Cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis." *News from Within*. Vol. x. No. 4.

Salem, Walid (2005). "The anti-normalization discourse in the context of Israeli-Palestinian peace building." In *Breaking the Wall: The Social Responsibility of Palestinian and Israeli Academics and Intellectuals at Times of Violent Conflict: An Introspective Search*. Barcelona: The Center of Contemporary Culture of Barcelona.

Salem, Walid et al. (2005). "Creating Positive Facts on the Ground: A Viable Palestinian State." Stanford University, USA.

Salem, Walid and Edy Kaufman (2004). *Lessons Learned on Palestinian Israeli Civil Society Peace Building: A Historical Perspective* (unpublished study).

Stufflebeam, D.L. (1983). "The CIPP model for program evaluation." In G.F. Madaus, D.L. Stuffelbeam and M.S. Scriven (eds.). *Evaluation Models*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 117-141.

Shin, Wha Lee (2004). *Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in East Asia*, (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural organization) UNESCO.

Tongeren, Paul Van et al. (2005). *People Building Peace II: Suggested Stories of Civil Society*. Boulder, London: Lyne Reiner Publishers.

Tongeren, Paul Van et al. (1999). *People Building Peace I: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*. European Center for Conflict Prevention in cooperation with IFOR and the Coexistence Initiative of State of the World Forum.

Ziedani, Said "Obstacles to Peace in the Experiences and Expectations of Israeli and Palestinian Societies." In Baskin, Gershon et al. (1999). *Creating a Culture of Peace*. Jerusalem: IPCRI (Israeli Palestinian Center for Research and Information).

B. Evaluation reports

1. *Peacemaking or Normalization*, Beit Sahour, Briefs, EuroMesco, Ghassan Andoni, 2003.

2. *People to People: An Evaluation and Future Prospects*, Stanley Bruce Consultants, European Commission, presented at the Jerusalem Conference initiated by Canadian, Norwegian, and EC delegations, 5 April 2003.

3. *Yes, PM—Years of Experience in Strategies for Peace Making: Looking at Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Activities 1993-2002*, IPCRI, December 2002.

4. *Peace Building Under Fire: Palestinian-Israeli Wye River Projects*, eds. Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-On, April 2004.

5. *Going Against the Wind: The Role of NGOs in Jerusalem under an Ongoing Conflict*, by Nimrod Goren in cooperation with Mohammed Nakhal, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2005.

6. *Insight into the Impact and Feasibility of the People Program*, unpublished paper, Lili Habash, 1998.

7. *The Palestinian Ministry NGOs* (2002), The PNA vision to the role of the Palestinian NGOs in the current crisis.

C. Research reports

Herzog, Shira and Hai, Avivit (2005). "The Power of Possibility: The Role of People- to-People Programs in the Current Israeli-Palestinian Reality." Economic Cooperation Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

"Arab-Israeli Research Cooperation 1995-1999." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* Vol. 4, No. 3, Scham Paul (September 2000).

The Evaluation of Cooperation Between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs: A Joint Perspective*

Maya Kahanoff, Walid Salem, Rami Nasrallah
and Yana Neumann

Introduction

This research study was initiated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as part of its Civil Societies in Dialogue program. The basic goal of the program is to create conditions for effective dialogue between the Palestinian and Israeli civil societies. UNESCO decided to launch this preliminary study on cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations with a view towards helping it design future Civil Societies in Dialogue projects.

Our mission was twofold: to summarize lessons learned from Palestinian-Israeli cooperation, and to recommend guidelines for future cooperative endeavors. Specifically, we were asked to review evaluations that had been conducted on various joint projects, a difficult mission in light of the scarcity of evaluation in this field.

_____
* Project consultant: Dr. Rita Sever

This report was prepared jointly by the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS). It was compiled on the basis of two previous research reports carried out in parallel by the two institutes which examined the perspectives of the two civil societies on Palestinian-Israeli cooperation. Conducted during February-July 2005, these studies were presented separately by each partner to UNESCO; both reports are included in this publication.

The challenge in writing this report was to combine the two separate perspectives into one comprehensive document of consensus. Since the emphasis was on reaching *agreements* regarding the necessary guidelines for cooperation and evaluation, this joint report may not reflect existing differences/divergences in approaches, assumptions and analyses, stemming from our different societal and organizational realities (which emerge in the separate reports). Therefore, in some places we refer the reader to the original separate reports. Indeed, one should read all three reports – the original Israeli and Palestinian reports, and then the joint report – in order to get a comprehensive picture. In this way the reader will have a better grasp of the separate and joint perspectives, as well as the specific and unique characteristics and difficulties each side faces.

The first part of this report deals with Israeli-Palestinian cooperation: chapter one presents a summary of findings regarding cooperation, as perceived in both civil societies; chapter two proposes guidelines for future cooperation projects. The second part of the report focuses on evaluation: chapter three outlines the main gaps in the current evaluation of cooperative projects, and chapter four proposes a comprehensive set of guidelines for project evaluation in this field.

I. Summary of findings regarding cooperation

The findings presented in this chapter are based on a review of the existing literature on evaluation studies that were carried out by a number of institutions, donors, and independent researchers. Since formal and systematic evaluations were scarce, we conducted several interviews with central figures in various NGOs in

order to informally gather their insights and impressions, so as to supplement our data and obtain a fuller picture. Ten Israeli organizations and eleven Palestinian organizations, representing different forms of activity (dialogue, peace building, advocacy, reconciliation, etc.) were chosen. In addition, four international funding organizations were selected for an in-depth study of their perceptions of and experience with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list of evaluation reports and organizations interviewed).

It should be noted that this is neither a systematic nor a random sample, but rather one that aims to reflect the diversity of organizations in the field, and relates to the different categories of organizations in our mapping of the field. We also considered it important to reflect variance in locations from which the evaluations of cooperation were made, such as variance in distance and closeness, or in involvement and detachment from the local conflict. We expected this variance would illuminate areas about which we would otherwise have been unaware.

We hope the effort to represent multiple perspectives on Israeli-Palestinian cooperation will expand our understanding both of the potential of this work and of its challenges. To this end, we included various stakeholders involved in Israeli-Palestinian cooperation efforts: the local/insider point of view represented by Israeli NGO directors; the international/outsider point of view represented by donors and by international representatives who have accompanied cooperation efforts for a considerable time; and the professional evaluators or academics who seek an integrative view of this field.

As can be seen in the different reports, the Palestinian and the Israeli teams chose different categories to present the various forms of action chosen by NGO's. Consequently, the field was mapped slightly differently by each team. These differences can illuminate different aspects of the same phenomena, as seen in the solidarity category, and in other cases may stress different foci and conceptions prevalent in each society. While the categories chosen by the Palestinian team were People Cooperation, Solidarity, Healing and Reconciliation, and Coordinating Separate Activity, the Israelis chose Peace-Building, Peacemaking and Advocacy/Protest. The brief descriptions below illuminate the similarities and differences in these approaches.

The Palestinian team's categorization:

People Cooperation – This is the most common strategy, used by both the Israeli and Palestinian peace movements. The main assumption of this strategy was and still is that peace building between the two peoples is a bottom up process that must be built step by step, and as a long term endeavor. Those who call for such a strategy believe that it is very important to continue bringing together academics, young people, women and other social and economic sectors from the two peoples in order to promote peace from the grassroots up.

Solidarity – This strategy was practiced until the beginning of the 2000 Intifada by Israeli radical left wing organizations (such as the Israeli communist party, Yesh Gvul and others), who oppose the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. These organizations tend to struggle against the "crimes" of the occupation against the Palestinian people. The main characteristics of solidarity activity are: focus on action rather than people; work in Israel aimed at transforming mainstream positions and increasing awareness and support for Palestinian rights.

Healing and Reconciliation – This strategy includes two trends: one tends to work on healing and reconciliation with a view towards the future, while the other tends to emphasize addressing the past of the two peoples.

Coordinating Separate Activity – The idea behind this strategy is that peace is created between former enemies. The idea of reaching agreement is not to develop coexistence or love between the two sides, but rather to enable the parties to live as separate autonomous entities – thus the emphasis on separate activities in each society and the coordination between them. According to this strategy, peace work should focus on protecting and striving to fulfill each side's distinct interests. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the peacemaker to continue to be a national patriot in his/her own society, and not to defend the rights of the other side.

The Israeli team's categorization:

Peace-building activities: attempts to create infrastructure for peace or conflict transformation both in terms of material or structural activities (such as capacity building in health, economics, or environment), and in terms of attitudinal

transformation, trust building, and promotion of open communication channels between the societies. The goals of these processes are generally long-term and can be framed within the larger effort to build or strengthen civil societies, achieve a high level of trust between them, and maintain communication.

Peacemaking activities: attempts to promote political or policy changes that further conflict resolution and peace. Forms of activity in this category are: strategic planning, attempts to influence decision-makers, support of official peace processes, initiation of second-track diplomacy processes, and grassroots political dialogue. Peacemaking work can be conducted by NGOs from within political institutes – for example, think-tank work on policy papers to be presented to politicians and policymakers, support or development of policies promoted in track 1 – or outside the official institutes, such as second-track diplomacy, political dialogue at various levels, and diverse activities that promote peace.

Advocacy/protest activities: attempts to challenge existing policy and the political process. Here we include organizations protesting against the government or military and seeking to generate support for their positions through demonstrations, public symposia, and the mass media.

It should be noted that there is a certain degree of conceptual overlap between the two categorizations. For example, peace-building, people cooperation and healing could be subsumed under one approach based on the attempt to link people and create the necessary societal infrastructure (emotional, cognitive and physical) for peace. The peace-making category could include the strategy of coordinating separate activities – attempting to promote peace through separate but parallel actions in one's respective society (for example, the Nusseibeh Ayalon initiative). Finally, the advocacy and solidarity categories seem to relate to similar issues, from different and complementary perspectives – "advocacy," representing internal acts of Israelis advocating and protesting against structural and institutional injustice conducted by the state, while "solidarity" refers to actions aimed at solidarity with the Palestinians who suffer from injustices inflicted upon them by the state.

This overlap between the two categorizations may be viewed simply as different labels for the same phenomenon. Yet, this very difference may suggest the existence of two different underlying concepts, or divergent frames of constructing the social-political reality and the desired relationship between the

two sides. We noted that while the common Israeli frame used the categorization of "peace," the salient frame for the Palestinians was embodied by the "conflict" categorization. In this regard, the Palestinians may have felt that the terminology of peace-building elegantly avoids recognizing and addressing the real conflict on the ground, and thus preferred the terms of conflict resolution and transformation. The tension between these two approaches may be discerned in reading the two separate reports (particularly in their respective choice of theoretical frameworks).

In the following section we will present our major findings regarding Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, including lessons learned, successes and challenges. The framework we chose to employ for data analysis and presentation is based on the CIPP evaluation model, which features the following components of project planning and implementation: context, input, process and product.

A. Context – refers to the external context within which project goals are selected and shaped. It refers both to socio-political situation and to the more specific scene of peace and conflict resolution organizations' (P/CRO) work in the field of conflict transformation.

B. Input - relates to the very initial stage of planning and designing the program – the choice strategy and procedural designs for implementing the strategy.

C. Process evaluation concerns implementation and encompasses such issues as the extent to which the project plan is implemented; defects in the procedural design or its implementation; and obstacles in the implementation process.

D. Product evaluation involves assessing performance and results in relation to previously diagnosed needs, and explicit or implicit success criteria decided upon at the beginning of the program.[21]

---

[21] For elaboration on the CIPP model, see the Israeli and Palestinian reports in this publication.

122

A. Context: *Findings regarding the context of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation*[22]

Before addressing the organizations themselves and the strategies they choose, it is important to note the difficult intercommunity reality within which they work.

General asymmetry of social-political context

The extreme difference in contexts within which each of the sides works perpetuates asymmetry between the parties. Differences in relative societal development stage, socio-economic status and culture, and physical realities have an effect on the agenda each side brings to the cooperation and on their respective conceptions of the political value of cooperation.

Difference in relative societal development stage, socio-economic status and culture

The two societies are at different developmental stages. Israeli society is a well-established democratic one while Palestinian society is still in the formative stages of fighting for its independence. While Israel has reached a maturation point at which its institutions and hegemony are capable of being deconstructed, criticized and challenged, Palestine is still a fragile democracy under occupation. This point has implications regarding the type of activity each side chooses, the level of unity and criticism tolerated within each society, and so on.

The developmental stage obviously has socio-economic ramifications. Many donors and organizations remarked on the inequality of resources (such as trained human resources, professionalism and equipment) between the Israeli and Palestinian organizations. This gap may sometimes manifest itself in Israeli domination of the initiatives (controlling and running the programs) and in the proactive role they may assume during the different stages – from initiative to implementation[23].

---

[22] This section presents our joint thoughts regarding the context of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. For further elaboration on the unique context of cooperation on each side, the reader is referred to the separate Palestinian and Israeli reports in this publication.

[23] It should be said, however, that this is not always the case: there are projects in which Palestinians are more proactive or equal partners in the projects.

Differences in cultural codes, socio-economic patterns, quality control, qualifications and capacities all created obstacles between the two sides. The well-established social institutions that typify the Israeli side cannot be compared to the Palestinian's society in transition and nation/state-building stage.

Israelis and Palestinians encounter very different daily and physical realities, the different contexts within which participants exist. The limits on freedom of movement encountered by Palestinians on a daily basis due to the military control over many areas including curfews, limited movement through road blocks, the separation wall, etc., create two very dissimilar contexts.

Many interviewees mentioned the limited freedom of movement that has recently increased due to the separation wall, which is a severe challenge to cooperation. Some organizations found solutions in the form of more unilateral work, and fewer joint meetings.

This asymmetry of contexts results in different agendas, goals and focus of cooperation – sometimes even clashing. As one of our interviewees stated: "The two sides have different agendas. The Palestinians are more political: they are interested in politically influencing Israelis. Israelis are more interested in the process and Palestinians in the results." One of the donors, reflecting on the different goals the two sides seek to advance, said: "The Israelis want to prepare the ground for a sustainable peace and signing a final status agreement, while the Palestinians want to advocate their cause and influence the Israelis."

This difference may be phrased as a political vs. non-political agenda, action oriented vs. process, aiming at peace vs. justice, etc. The point is that quite often this difference goes unnoticed, or unaddressed. The contradictory agendas as well as the challenge (and difficulties) of searching for a common agenda did not receive enough attention, and was not reflected in the cases used for evaluation.

Different conceptions of cooperation based on the political context

We found that cooperation was perceived differently in the two societies. On the Palestinian side the political leadership sought to control the cooperation ventures (without being able to do so in practice, for various reasons), and limit the content with respect to political negotiation issues in order to maintain their negotiation positions and stands. At the same time, on the Israeli side, the peace

camp used dialogue and cooperation relations with Palestinians as an alternative to the formal relations they used to have when they were in power.

Effects of the Palestinian context on cooperation – Intensified settlement activities, attacks against the PA and civilians by the Israeli army and by Israeli settlers, and the construction of the wall/separation barrier have placed the Palestinian organizations working with Israeli counterparts in a very difficult situation. The Palestinian people are suffering on the one hand, and there is pressure and demands by some organizations to respond to the suffering by boycotting Israelis on the other hand. Walid Salem, in his paper about "anti-normalization discourse," noted that the Palestinian organizations working for peace were accused of normalizing their relationship with the enemy. This accusation severely affected their potential for having an impact on Palestinian society (Salem et al., 2005, p. 87-102).

Internal Palestinian issues – Palestinian NGOs encountered other difficulties stemming from the competition between the PA and civil society for donor support and the attempt by the PA to control the funds available to NGOs. Using accusations regarding transparency, the PA tried to ensure that NGOs' work conform to the development policies of the PA. In addition, some organizations were de-legitimized because of their objection to PA control.

Effects of the Israeli context on cooperation – the general feature of the context in which Israeli organizations operate is the tension between internal and external opposition. On the one hand, they face the anti-normalization (and cooperation) of their Palestinian counterparts, and on the other hand they face resistance within their own community, which increased in the wake of terror attacks against the Israeli civilian population.

Internal Israeli issues – Hermann, in her article "The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement 1967-1998" (Hermann, 2002), notes that despite their diversity, all of the political agendas put forth by the peace movement were criticized over the years, mostly by centrist and right-wing organizations or individuals, though the left-wing establishment also expressed reservations about certain tenets. The mildest criticism was that the peace activists were politically naïve: they were ignorant of the dominant role that power plays in interstate and intercommunity relations, and did not fully understand that Israel's existence was dependent on its ability to maintain military superiority. Critics also questioned

the movement's basic loyalty to Zionism and the Israeli national interest. The peace activists were accused of lacking patriotism, preferring the Arab/Palestinian cause over the Israeli/Jewish one, and giving precedence to "bleeding-heart," universalistic values (Hermann, 2002: 109).

The factors mentioned above have implications for the scope of the populations targeted by the projects, since only certain Palestinian organizations and individuals were prepared to continue cooperation in the existing reality. On the Israeli side, the de-legitimization of the left and peace movements also meant a limited target population. In both cases the context restricted access to spoilers[24], extremists, and security people.

Donor-organization relationship context

Many organizations and some evaluation reports noted a phenomenon which they termed "donor-driven agendas." We learned that donors' decisions may have great influence on the field of action chosen by organizations, but do not necessarily reflect needs on the ground. Another issue mentioned in this regard was the difficulty of long-term planning. A few organizations mentioned the problem of providing a long-term plan given that donors change their focus every few years.

The ad-hoc type of program, the "funding opportunities" driven agenda (suiting the requirements and priorities of calls for proposals), and the changes in setting goals and choosing target groups do not allow for a continuous, cumulative process and identification of specific goals which suit grassroots needs, rather than the requirements of donors.

Another point raised concerning the donor-organization relationships context was that in many cases, similar competing projects took place concurrently, with no coordination among donors or among those organizations implementing the projects.

Last but not least, many donor-organization relationships were not always perceived eye to eye in both societies. Some Palestinian organizations noted a tendency on the part of donors to demonstrate "business as usual" by bringing

---

[24] Peace process spoilers – those who attempt to undermine negotiations towards peace.

the two sides together, especially in European capitals. This, they claimed, had a negative impact on Palestinian public opinion, which considered this a luxury, especially if resources were not used for the benefit of the Palestinian people and their basic needs.

Another point raised regarding the use or distribution of funds was that according to the Palestinian perspective, most of the cooperation projects were financed by funds which were allocated – or were supposed to be allocated if these projects did not exist – to the Palestinian people. This assumption raised a serious public debate about the best ways to use this money to primarily help the Palestinians, and not to finance Israeli organizations at the expense of meeting the basic needs of the Palestinian people.

B. Input: *Findings regarding the pre-implementation stage*[25]

Evaluation of input relates to choice of program strategy, and choice of procedural designs for implementing the strategy. Three central challenges to the input stage of cooperation projects were identified which may be categorized as following: strategic planning, target population, and preparatory work.

Strategic planning

Several evaluation reports noted that many organizations lack long-term strategic planning. This may be the result of numerous factors, including a constantly changing reality that demands continual adjustment; funding provided to support short and limited, rather than long-term projects; difficulty in focusing and defining goals and suitable strategies. The absence of long-term goals, the ad-hoc nature of many of these projects, and the need to implement activities in a relatively short time did not allow for planning towards a cumulative process, which could have been modified and redirected during different stages of the work.

---

[25] The following are joint thoughts regarding the input component of Israeli Palestinian cooperation. For elaboration on the unique perspectives regarding this component, see relevant pages in the separate Palestinian and Israeli reports in this publication.

Target Population

The term "the usual suspects" was used frequently by both organization directors and donors when speaking about organizations, or officials participating in political dialogue. It appears that not enough effort was invested in recruiting a diverse array of participants and ensuring that different populations were represented in these endeavors. Thus, grassroots organizations were not targeted in most cooperation projects, which in turn began to be identified more and more with the elite class from both sides. From the Palestinian side, it may be concluded that most of the people involved represent the middle class and the elite, connected to the PA institutions and figures. On the Israeli side, the traditional peace camp is over-represented by the Ashkenazi elite and the economically established class.

The fact that many activities involved participants from central areas created a pool of people who would be invited by different organizations, discussing similar topics and duplicate activities, especially those that require specialization in a specific area of expertise. Aside from the English-speaking mainstream elites (which comprised most of the groups), there were only a few limited attempts to expand the target groups and reach marginalized and peripheral groups, people who oppose dialogue or peace spoilers and extremists on both sides.

On the Palestinian side, this characteristic of target groups has generated some negative reactions directed towards the people involved in cooperation programs, rather than opposing the idea of dialogue and interaction with Israelis.

We would like to highlight this point, since it is highly relevant to the general legitimacy and perception of the field of Israeli – Palestinian cooperation.

Lack of preparatory work

One of the essential initial stages in creating a project is that of preparatory work. Many interviewees, on both sides, stated that preparatory work prior to the encounters with the other side was rarely conducted. This, they claimed, negatively affected the aims and priorities of the meetings. Preparing the community requires working internally to empower the community and promoting support for cooperation. Hardly any effort was invested in gaining political legitimacy, nor community legitimacy for the project.

Another preparatory stage rarely utilized is that of professional training of personnel, based on previous experience and knowledge. Most NGOs lack a written body of knowledge. Vast knowledge exists within people and organizations but not in a format that can be passed on from one to another, or that can assist a process of professionalization in this field.

Dialogue design

The design and content of most dialogue programs was found to be partial and insufficient. On the one hand, there were many "dialogue encounters" that lacked concrete action, did not produce any tangible changes and contained no component of practical work together on joint products. This, in turn, could have been used to gain visibility and generate increased public participation. Conversely, the design of "Professional to Professional" stressed joint action, generally avoiding real political dialogue and getting to know the other party.

Another underemphasized area in these projects was a familiarity with each side's problems and fears, perceptions and ways to change them.

C. Process: *Findings regarding the process of implementation[26]*

Cooperation in the course of an actual project may be greatly influenced by the extent to which the project design has taken into account the parameter of good partnership – between the organizations involved, and between staff and participants. But there are always factors regarding the project and the cooperation which are not taken into account or spelled out in advance. In addition, there is a constantly changing context with which organizations must cope during the implementation process.

Divergent agendas

The Palestinian organizations were, and still are, challenged with the dilemma of how to continue rejecting occupation on the one hand, and to cooperate with

---

[26] The following are joint thoughts regarding the process of cooperation. For further elaboration on the different perspectives of the cooperation component, see the separate Palestinian and Israeli reports.

organizations from the occupier society on the other – without compromising their own legitimacy within Palestinian society. In order to overcome this dilemma some Palestinian organizations demanded from their Israeli partners a clear statement concerning the national rights of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination as a pre-condition for cooperation. The Palestinian organizations justified this by stating that they could not work with those who are against them.

The Israeli organizations and project participants have also raised the question of how far they can move towards their Palestinian partners without losing the Israeli constituency altogether. In this regard, Perlman and Schwartz (1999) discussed the dilemma of wanting to cater to and be empathetic towards the Palestinian partner and establish a shared political agenda, while fearing to alienate the Israeli public by challenging their collective self-interest.

These two attitudes limited the scope of cooperation to the "converted" from both sides.

There were also disagreements regarding funding allocations in projects. In some cases, Palestinians objected to Israeli organizations which were given money by donor countries, without having to specify their Palestinian partner, or its eligibility. This was perceived as a monopolistic, or "colonialist" act, supported by some donors. They were accused of preferring the Israelis as partners, giving them the responsibility for running the projects and deciding on the Palestinian partner and what level of involvement would be entrusted in him. This method of "subcontracting", as the Palestinians dubbed it, caused mistrust, negative images and even suspicion in some cases.

Asymmetry

Asymmetry, raised by all organizations and donors, was stated as problematic during the entire process of program implementation. A majority of the Palestinian organizations involved in implementing projects of cooperation lacked the basic qualifications and capacities to compete with their Israeli counterparts and establish relations on an equal footing.

In political dialogue projects it was stated repeatedly that the group composition is often asymmetrical. The Israeli group typically consists of experts on the topic

at hand, while the Palestinian side more often consisted of officials. This lack of symmetry created problems in the dialogue because the Israeli academics could speak freely and creatively about ideas whereas the Palestinian officials had to take into account social and political taboos.

In professional to professional cooperation, the Israeli group generally had more professional training, was more fluent in English, and had more resources.

Working toward a better reality within the conflict context

There is an inherent tension in conflict transformation aimed at peace-building within a violent context and in a conflict zone. It is extremely demanding to try and create a new reality (of symmetry, peace, understanding, and equality) while being enmeshed in a very different one. This difficulty was found to be prevalent within different organizations, in the working relations between organizations, and in the implementation of a given project both conceptually and emotionally. This problem was also expressed by Perlman and Schwartz in their evaluation report (2000:12-13): "P2P [people-to-people] necessarily encounters conceptual difficulties because it must cope with, and in some ways indeed mirrors, the reality in which it is being conducted. Because P2P is not conducted in a vacuum, a detached 'fantasy island' posture is simply untenable. This inevitable feature of P2P presents difficulties at virtually every level of activity, including the nature of relations between partners and the choice of content and methodology of a given project. All this prompts the fundamental question of how P2P can both reflect and reframe reality at the same time?"

D. Product: *Findings regarding the product of cooperation*[27]

The comment heard most often regarding the product (i.e., the implementation results) concerned the difficulty in evaluating success, both because of the problem in defining the concept of success as well as its measurable criteria.

---

[27] The following are joint thoughts regarding the product of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation**.** For further elaboration on this component of cooperation, see the Palestinian and Israeli reports.

Defining success

One major challenge in defining success for many of these projects concerns the divergent perceptions of what constitutes a successful or good product. In general there is a gap between Israelis and Palestinians in this regard.

The correlation between political negotiations, the peace process, and people-to-people activity creates confusion. The role of these activities in supporting peace-building and peacemaking continues to be vague and limited to the level of rhetoric. The use and the impact of cooperation projects on the political leadership, as conducted by civil society organizations, including track II diplomacy activities, was minimal. These points raise questions regarding the success of P2P activities. When examining other dimensions it is apparent that there are also successes, such as: opening communication channels where none existed previously between direct participants; affirmation of the relevance of dialogue amid intense conflict, with the actual dialogue affirming certain principles such as the feasibility of a just peace, the necessity of cooperation, dialogue, and commitment in the path to peace; and the project's contribution to raising awareness.

There are a few challenges stated by organizations regarding the final product (or results) of cooperation effort. Several concerns were raised regarding dialogue: the usefulness of dialogue in a political vacuum; the issue of normalization and asymmetrical power; and the purpose of dialogue. The main criticism is that one cannot engage in dialogue for dialogue's sake without taking into account the above elements.

Another common challenge facing many projects was the lack of a multiplier effect. Some projects included one-time activities that are not part of a larger plan for multiplying their impact on beneficiaries or institutions. Other projects, while being of longer duration, did not invest in achieving a wider effect on the surrounding community or society.

One limitation on the possible multiplier effect is the limited access to media. In general, program outcomes *were not* widely publicized and thus opportunities for impacting a wider public – beyond that of the target group – were missed in most cases.

A challenge to the possibility of having an impact on the wider society on the Palestinian side was explained by the negative impression created by many

132

organizations and NGOs, especially due to the cooperation programs that were perceived as not fulfilling public needs and serving only elite groups. Most of the organizations working with their Israeli counterparts failed to create a balance between the internal work and the cooperative work, and this situation widened the gap between these organizations and the public.

II. Guidelines for future Palestinian-Israeli cooperation

In this section we will propose some guiding principles for future cooperation based on our findings. As the CIPP model (Context, Input, Process, Product) relates to different stages in the life of a project, we suggest it as a useful tool to guide project planning and to construct essential parameters for cooperation during project development.

The following recommendations refer to issues of context to be taken into consideration at the outset of any cooperation venture, the input to the project and the actual partnership that the two organizations should invest in, and recommendations regarding the process of implementing such programs. Finally, we outline recommendations for project outcome and products (or results) that should be emphasized in any cooperation project.

A. Context

Our first general recommendation is to *consider structural, political-social and cultural context* in the design and implementation of cooperation programs. Acknowledgement of the different social-political structures at the outset is useful both for understanding the different needs of each society and for structuring the project accordingly. Projects that disregard the different contexts, or assume equality in context on the two sides, will soon encounter difficulties due to varying expectations based on differentiated needs assessment and goals. For example, in the past, the Israeli working assumption was based on peace-building, viewing the transitional agreement as a good basis to engage in a process of reconciliation. The Palestinian working assumption, on the other hand, was that the dialogue with the Israelis is a trigger to reach a comprehensive peace agreement, which is

a requirement for normal relations and close cooperation. These two assumptions failed and there is a need to rethink the motive behind cooperation. We propose the concept of *conflict transformation*[28] as a frame for cooperation between the two sides – addressing and embracing their different needs (and working assumptions). Changes in the socio-political context during the project should be taken into consideration, and projects should be adjusted accordingly.

Another factor that should be observed regarding cooperation is that of diversity versus uniformity. In many cases, although funded by different sources, organizations produce the same kind of projects. As a result, there are similar projects with similar goals and setups that are not coordinated. For example, there are many organizations pursuing projects on non-violence that do not cooperate with each other, and may not even be aware of one another. It is essential that similar efforts be coordinated and cooperation initiated between different organizations. At the same time, diversity in projects is desirable so as to have a cumulative impact that can generate change on the ground. At present, the different activities are fragmented and do not serve a cumulative or complementary process. It is therefore recommended that the organizational context be taken into account at the start, by both donors and organizations, and that before forming a partnership program, managers and donors investigate existing projects and explore the best way to supplement and contribute to a cumulative effect.

B. Input

Designing the project

Following the analysis of the context, and having identified the niche of influence in which action is to be taken, it is recommended that a local participatory *needs assessment* be conducted. Involving local beneficiaries in the needs assessment and goal definition could enhance the chances that the project will be suitable to the local and general context.

---

[28] Galtung (1969, 1996) proposed the conflict transformation model. According to his theory, conflict should be viewed as a triangle with attitude (A), behavior (B), and contradiction (C) as its vertices. In order to promote transformation in the conflict situation, each one of the underlying elements should be addressed. For further elaboration, see the Israeli report.

Given the different context in which the cooperating organization exists, there should be an acknowledgement and enabling of different *goals and strategies* that are adapted to societal needs and circumstances. Cooperation should focus on defining one overall goal, along with a multitude of sub-goals and strategies that address the interests, concerns and needs of each side as well as the common interest.

The project design should include long-term goals, including the desired impact, and the multiplier effect to be achieved through the project. In other words, projects should affect both inter- and intra-levels of community in order to enhance participation and ensure support (i.e., replace the existing perception that cooperation serves only one side). The broad goals of conflict transformation should be addressed. Cooperating organizations should ask themselves how their project and goals are set in the wider picture of conflict transformation. We recommend that two main goals or dimensions of change be addressed in every cooperation project: one that considers the material dimension, with a concrete product and an identifiable action of change; the second, that regards the psychological dimension, promoting a change in attitudes among participants.

One of the central stages identified as lacking is that of *strategic planning*. It is essential to choose the strategy or strategies that would be the most efficient and feasible for achieving the declared goals. It is advisable to use the help of a professional steering committee that includes the different stakeholders in order to discuss and review past experience and design the most suitable strategy. The project strategy and general design would also benefit from consideration of past lessons learned, experience in the local conflict and in other places around the world. It is thus recommended that the design of cooperation programs be based on both *theoretical and practical experiences***.**

Explication of implicit theoretical assumptions

We recommend examining the basic assumptions (conscious or unconscious) or theory on the basis of which a project is designed[29], along with their implications

---

[29] When referring to a theoretical framework or underlying assumptions we do not mean strictly in the academic sense, but to the project initiators' assumptions and theories regarding the possible promotion of change through the action proposed.

for project design and project assessment. The success of a program should be evaluated in relation to the criteria stemming from these assumptions or theories.

In this regard we should mention Weiss's theory based evaluation (TBE) (cited in Churck, Cheyenne & Shouldice, 2003). According to this approach, the aim of the evaluation is to unravel the set of hypotheses upon which people build their programs, thus enabling a review of the project design and strategies and the making of needed modifications at an early stage. The stated hypotheses can also serve as guiding criteria for assessing the project's success at the end.

In a similar vein, Connell and Kubisch (1996) describe three stages of implementing the TBE model: 1. Surfacing and articulating a theory of change; 2. Measuring a project's activities and intended outcomes, and 3. Analyzing and interpreting the results of an evaluation, including their implications for adjusting the initiative theory of change and its allocation of resources.

Target Populations

When considering the *target population* suitable for participation in the project, it is important that both sides attract a variety of populations, not just middle class English speakers from central, easily accessed cities. The phenomenon of a closed and limited circle of participants has been identified as a major flaw in many cooperation initiatives. When identifying the target population for participation in a project, it is important to maintain equality and symmetry between the participants (i.e., if a program is dealing with academics, it should recruit academics from both sides, rather than academics from one side and intellectuals or politicians on the other).

Designing the partnership

Aside from the project design, it is recommended that partners devote time to designing the partnership among themselves: differences in context are a central part of the asymmetry between the sides. Asymmetry is experienced both at the organizational level and often between the participants, and acknowledging the existing asymmetry at the outset is suggested as an initial stage in order to shape the partnership and project itself.

There are a few possible methods for coping with the issue of asymmetry. One of the options is to include unilateral or parallel work as part of the concept of cooperation. Rather than expecting symmetrical actions by each party and full coordination and cooperation, we propose that each organization works in its respective society, while cooperating and coordinating the general steps and goals. This parallel work method could be most useful in times where there are physical difficulties in holding meetings between the sides, and when suspicion and mistrust between the societies are high. The Nusseibeh Ayalon initiative is an example of such an initiative that addresses each organization's constituency needs, fears and aspirations.

When the sides decide on full joint cooperation, the asymmetry should be acknowledged, discussed, and decisions regarding forms of coping between partners should be taken in advance. Successful coordination and decision mechanisms on the managerial level should support similar processes between the participants themselves.

On the organizational level, the asymmetry can be addressed – and perhaps even minimized – by addressing the limitations that the weaker side faces, and performing capacity building and skill building in order to upgrade the professional expertise of the parties, even before the project's launch. So as to avoid enhancing the dominance of the stronger side, it is suggested that capacity building be initiated and led by a third party. Another possibility is that resources be divided inequitably between the sides, taking into account their differing sets of needs.

Another method to contend asymmetry could be the use of each side's relative strength. Creating cooperation in which participants or organizations bring different spheres of knowledge or skills could create a strong partnership, in which every participant is appreciated for her/his added value. This might serve to minimize the experience of asymmetry between the sides.

Last but not least, another form of cooperation that could be useful is a trilateral cooperation with a neutral third organization, from outside the region. A third party could act as a stabilizing agent vis-à-vis the difficulties, and serve as a mediator or moderator when necessary.

The *identity of the organization* and participants should also be considered. We noted that one of the central criticisms was that the participants (both the organizations and the players) were "the usual suspects." Thus, it is recommended to identify small local organizations and grassroots organizations, as these are often better connected to the local context than are larger organizations situated in central places. Support of local cooperation efforts could create geographical diversity as well as address varying local needs. In the past, grassroots organizations were almost excluded from taking an active role in cooperation projects. We believe that the integration of these organizations is essential in order to guarantee wider participation and involvement of different sectors, rather than limiting participation to elite groups and closed circles.

Preparatory work

Apart from designing the project and the partnership, preparatory work regarding the wider society should also be conducted. One of these necessary preparatory steps, which should be carried out separately by each side, is the promotion of intra-communal dialogues in order to enhance bridge-building within a society. This type of action could create a supportive environment that would provide the necessary *local legitimacy* for participants to take part. Furthermore, involving the community in the initial stages of project design could later encourage the community to take an active role in peace-building.

In addition to the local communities, it is also important to address and enhance the interface with political figures and various national institutions (such as the Ministry of Education), in order to gain support and recognition. *Political level recognition* may have the explicit effect of gaining legitimacy for the project. The implicit effect of linkage to politicians, which should be apparent at a later stage, is the possible impact of the cooperative effort on the leadership and political level.

Preparatory work is necessary also within the partnership. *Building trust* between the partners is essential as the changing context may pose unexpected difficulties, and experience has proven that only those who invested in trust building survived troublesome times such as the second Intifada. Trust building

between the participants should be included in the project design in order to create a long-lasting commitment between the sides.

A final remark regarding the input stage is that partners should be equally influential with respect to the project design. Inequality during the design stage will undoubtedly have negative consequences, raising arguments that reflect the different agendas of each side during the implementation process.

C. Process

Maintaining a stable partnership between organizations is one of the foremost factors that can contribute to successful implementation. One element that should be maintained and addressed is that of *equal joint management*. Cooperation partners should be sensitive to the domination of one side, and should attempt to create equal footing between the partners, serving both parties. Ongoing sharing, joint deliberation, and continuous joint decision-making, while negotiating the different agendas, and acceptance of the differing narratives during the process are invaluable.

It is essential to *acknowledge – and accept – different means*, strategies, approaches and standards during a project's implementation. The differences between the sides will inevitably show themselves during the process and accepting them, or trying to understand them, would be advantageous. For example, while it was stated that in many workshops or educational programs there have been differences in approaches to facilitation between the two sides, the facilitators can accept this difference and view it as a resource rather than having one side conforming to the other. Accepting differences and learning from them may enhance professional capacities and promote friendship and trust between the parties.

Reciprocity in responsibility and commitment is another invaluable factor. Both sides should demonstrate full responsibility for the project. Lack of reciprocity in commitment may result in domination by the stronger party. When encountering asymmetry during the process of cooperation, the acknowledgement of different means of reciprocity may support the partnership. For example, if one of the sides has access to academics and theoretical data, the other may

have access to central activists; both should be acknowledged as different, but reciprocal contributions to the project. Similarly, if one side has better English language skills and thus writes and conducts most of the communication with the donors and external figures, the other side may reciprocate by handling problems with participants, when these occur.

Program management could benefit greatly from *periodical feedback and reflection meetings*. Topics should include the extent to which the program is proceeding towards the expected goals, changes in context which should be taken into account, adaptations of demands, and the relationship between participants (are there any major problems which should be addressed? are there any flaws in the initial design which should be addressed?), and so on. Discussion and reflection meetings regarding the program could also be utilized for a feedback session between organizations.

Financial and administrative transparency is critical, both between the various stakeholders and donors. It is recommended that the budget be managed professionally throughout the program, and necessary adjustments be made according to budgetary considerations. It is further recommended that flexibility in the use of the budget items and timelines be allowed, so that partners can respond to changes in context.

Another essential component is to *create continuity* despite the contingencies of reality that are encountered. Creative solutions to difficulties posed by reality (such as more unilateral work, internet communication rather than direct contact, etc.) can contribute to the continuity of an established process. Continuity is important both on the managerial level and the participant level. Lack of continuity could lead to disappointment on the other side, and thus have negative impact on attitudes and stereotypes regarding the other.

Separate unilateral work with the participants is an important feature of the process. Unilateral meetings serve to air the concerns and thoughts of participants among themselves, as it is usually threatening to do so in the presence of the other side.

D. Product (results)

Impact and multiplier effect

One of the products to be achieved, regardless of the project goal, is the creating of more knowledge regarding the constraints and concerns of each side, which can in turn result in a change regarding stereotypes, and act as a counter to mutual demonization.

Every program should attempt to have as wide an impact as possible. Products of programs, be they a change in attitudes, or material products, should be disseminated widely, in order to create a multiplier effect whereby the direct products of the project continue to wield influence beyond the program's termination. These effects could be promoted by disseminating products of cooperation to the wider public and issuing publications regarding the experience.

Building knowledge

A by-product of any project is that of experiential knowledge. The knowledge and experiences (insights, skills, techniques, etc.), acquired throughout the project, should be documented, collated and disseminated, in order that the organization itself and others may benefit from it. We further propose establishing forums in which experience and knowledge could be shared between partners involved in cooperation ventures in similar fields.

Contributing to conceptualization of the field

Another important potential product, worthy of investment, is that of conceptualization and development of a theoretical basis for conflict transformation interventions, connecting theory and practice in this field. Experience-based conceptualization could contribute to the general understanding of cooperation in conflict zones, augmenting the state of the art, and serve as a useful tool for practitioners both locally, and in other conflict zones.

Recommendations Regarding Cooperation: Concluding Remarks[30]

1. *Expanding the definition: cooperation toward conflict transformation*

A holistic approach is advocated (as elaborated earlier in this report), inspired by Galtung's (1969, 1996) model for conflict analysis and conflict transformation. This approach suggests that institutional, attitudinal, and behavioral changes are all required in order for a conflict transformation process to succeed. Therefore, we propose a conceptual expansion of the field of NGO cooperation, to include, in addition to those organizations advancing dialogue in civil societies, advocacy or protest NGOs as well.

At first glance these organizations may not seem relevant to the discussion on cooperation, as they generally work outside mainstream institutions and against their policies (and hence are sometimes called radical or oppositional), and often are excluded from the map of NGOs working for peace. However, we maintain that the critical and challenging perspectives these organizations promote are crucial for a serious discussion of conflict transformation. Moreover, we believe that these organizations are important actors that should be included in any emerging forum for dialogue in civil society (especially with regard to the Israeli arena). Their importance stems mainly from the fact that most peace NGOs stress commonalities, cooperation, and symmetrical visions of the future, whereas these organizations are more attuned to the current injustices and asymmetry in power relations, thus acting on a different level of transformation, namely, the structural level, aiming to balance the power- relations between the sides. Their attempts to relate to the grievances, and act together with the "other" against injustice, are one way of responding to the Palestinians' criticism regarding the lack of a political agenda and a self-critical perspective among their Israeli counterparts. This aspect can complement the work of peace-building and peacemaking NGOs.

On the Palestinian side, the recommendation to widen the field is relevant vis-à-vis the inclusion of grassroots organizations, ex-prisoners, trade unions and

---

[30] The first part of this summary may be more relevant to Israeli society, while the second part of the conclusions may more closely reflect the Palestinians' concerns.

student movements. It was stated that their involvement and potential contribution is vital for genuine conflict transformation and peace-building, since they hold very central and influential positions within Palestinian society.

Viewing the field as an ecosystem – Based on the successful South African experience (Taylor, 2002), it seems useful to view the field as an ecosystem in which different organisms have different and distinct activities that complement one another and are necessary for conflict transformation. In his article, Taylor suggests viewing peace and conflict resolution NGOs and anti-apartheid NGOs (which generally took more risks and actions against the apartheid policies and regime) on a continuum. He writes:

> "The real significance of P/CROs (peace/conflict resolution organizations) in South Africa lay in how they complemented the broader anti-Apartheid struggle, how they meshed with other social actors struggling for progressive social change…. P/CROs did not operate in isolation. Their impact resulted from interactions with the other components of a complex multi-organizational field characterized by manifold reciprocal inter-organizational links and influences". (ibid.)

Taylor concludes:

> "These organizations overlapped and combined, influenced and penetrated each other, evolved together, and eventually came to project a new "emergent reality"- a virtually non-racial democratic South Africa" (ibid.)

The combined approach we advance in this paper could be useful in choosing organizations and projects for participating in the Civil Society for Dialogue Program, so that the different categories of activities – peace building, peacemaking, and advocacy/protest – are represented. We believe this will create a more balanced and heterogeneous field, enabling an integrated and comprehensive transformation process.

2. *Emphasizing reciprocity (as opposed to asymmetry)*

Asymmetry calls for the capacity building of one side so that it can achieve equal footing with the other side. At the same time, we call attention to the misuse

of this concept of asymmetry to justify the failure to fulfill one side's tasks, or postponement, or breaking agreed upon dates, or lack of professionalism, or avoidance of self-building capacities, or rejection of criticism. In this regard we propose switching the focus from "asymmetry" to "reciprocity", to acknowledge the disparity between the two sides, while demanding that both parties engage in cooperative work to invest their utmost in the joint projects (and reciprocate according to their strength, or some agreed upon criteria).

3. Incorporating national interests into cooperation

As stated above, both sides face the criticism of their own societies regarding cooperation with the "enemy"[31] and lack of patriotism. The perception on both sides of peace activism as anti-nationalistic or unpatriotic demands a satisfactory solution in order to stem the increased marginalization of these activists in both societies. In this sense it may be recommended that peace activists present themselves to their own societies as defenders of their national interests while at the same time stressing that these national interests should not contradict international civil human values. Peace activists should not comply with interests that are counter to human values, and should insist on cooperating with the other side on the basis of these values (including opposing all types of boycott). Peace activists may need to work within this tension – between particularism and universalism – in a creative manner, such as addressing their respective communities' particularistic issues, while working to transform their opinions in a universalistic humanistic direction.

4. Developing a vision of change as a basis for cooperation

A vision relating to the desired change sought by peace and conflict organizations is essential and must guide any cooperative venture. This should take the form of a vision that combines peace with justice and human rights, along with long-term and short-term goals.

---

[31] On the Palestinian side the criticism is generally that those cooperating with Israelis are attempting to normalize the relationships without combating the occupation.

Peace-making should be a process of altering and transforming realities. In this sense, peace cooperation projects should be built on a vision of change; otherwise they risk resembling business projects promoting adaptation to current realities instead of working to change them. This process of peace-making and conflict resolution can also help projects avoid the trap of working in conflict management as an alternative to conflict transformation and resolution.

The peace notion in many joint projects was built on the idea of eradicating the direct threat to security that each side represents to the other. For the Palestinians, this simply meant getting rid of the occupation, while on the Israeli side, quite often the main idea was to rid themselves of Palestinians by promoting plans for complete separation. What is missing on both sides is a vision that combines ideas of *peace and justice, national security and human security*. These principles must be incorporated into project goals and guidelines, their equal implementation benefiting both societies. For example, security should be advanced on both the national and individual levels, such that the citizens in both societies will be free from fear, and a fair distribution of justice should serve as an alternative to the absolute justice of one side against the other.

It was also concluded that because the peace projects have been dependent upon international funding, they were mostly short-term and disregarded long-term objectives. We argue that the *long-term issues of these projects must be addressed*, including the question of "the price of peace". Each side should define clearly and concretely the price that it is willing to pay in order to achieve peace.

The vision that we consider necessary should also include the needs and concerns of both sides such that each side, while working with its own constituencies, will make sure to include and address the other side's needs and concerns in their vision of peace.

We believe that addressing these issues will gradually bring about a shift from the short-term projects of peace-making/ conflict transformation to the more long-term programs of peace-building and reconciliation. This, however, is not meant to suggest that the former are unimportant: the consideration of current issues and short-term goals are necessary steps as well in moving the peace projects towards sustainability and impact.

III. Evaluation of the Evaluations

In view of the final goals of this research – to assess existing evaluations of cooperation efforts and to identify areas needing further evaluation – we would like to start with a general statement regarding the overall scarcity of ongoing documentation, monitoring practices, and systematic evaluation. In a review of the literature we conducted of existing evaluation studies (that had been carried out by various institutions, donors, or independent researchers), we found that most organizations do not make a point of ensuring ongoing documentation and monitoring, and internal systematic evaluation is scarce.

When viewed through a short historical prism, it appears that awareness of the need for evaluation arose only after the collapse of the Oslo Accords. At that time, many people began questioning what went wrong, while donors wanted to ensure that their money had been invested usefully and had generated positive results. It would appear that the survival instinct, the desire to be effective and prove they were useful, were the main catalysts for writing evaluations, but these drives tended to highlight positive aspects and neglected problematic areas.

Perhaps the idealistic nature of those involved in cooperative endeavors, the need to preserve optimism and not lose hope in light of the grim situation, have also contributed to the absence of a critical orientation in the evaluation reports.

The material we gathered reflects varying degrees of formal and professional standards of evaluation. Only a few of the documents are formal evaluation reports; others are internal evaluations conducted by the NGOs' staff; still others are of a more sporadic, impressionistic nature. Thus, we supplemented the formal written reports with interviews conducted with central figures in various NGOs along with some major donors in this field. In addition, we reviewed academic studies, articles, and some book chapters (see Appendix 1 for a detailed list).

Evaluation model

Most evaluation reports that we found were conducted by researchers who did not accompany the project throughout its course but rather made a "one-time appearance," generally at the end of the project. The projects are usually not

monitored as they take place, and central critical events that may contribute to success or failure are not accounted for.

Many interviewees stated that the evaluations they conducted were intended primarily for donors – who were interested in assessing output rather than outcome or impact – and were generally similar to a "checklist" of activities that took place. Most organization directors stated in the interviews that this sort of expost facto evaluation is not helpful to the organization itself because it is usually carried out at the end of the project, does not contribute to the understanding of causes of success or failure, does not identify barriers and thus cannot help improve the project while it is in progress. Furthermore, it does not help accumulate knowledge or suggest new conceptualizations for future projects. Yet this type of evaluation, which aims to supply information to decision makers and donors so as to help them decide whether to continue or stop funding projects (known as summative evaluation), was found to be the prevailing type. We did not find evaluations which accompanied ongoing projects, which are intended to assist staff in improving programs while the project is still underway (known as formative evaluation)[32].

The following are major gaps that we identified in the evaluations of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. We will discuss them in terms of political, theoretical and methodological aspects.

Political context

Most evaluations underemphasized and underestimated the *centrality of the political and social context* and the disparity of the reality in which the two sides exist. The fact that the Palestinians consider themselves to be in a transitional period, which should lead to national liberation and independence, created a discrepancy in the agenda of dialogue activities. It seems that Palestinians wanted a clear end game, while Israelis preferred to focus on the process.

These asymmetric contexts dictate to a large extent the possibilities and the limitations within which various projects operate. However, most evaluations did

---

[32] We will further elaborate on this other type of evaluation in the last section which presents our recommendations for evaluating cooperation in this field.

not take this factor into account. The implication of the context on the needs and resources at the disposal of each society were not reviewed, nor was their implication on project design. Therefore, a very significant dimension of a project within a dynamic conflict zone was not evaluated, that is, its flexibility and capacity to adjust to changing circumstances (i.e., the extent to which the programs are flexible in coping with the context), to redefine goals, to adapt its design and target group.

Implicit theoretical assumptions

Most of the evaluations do not examine the basic assumptions or theory on which the project is actually based. For example, the underlying assumptions of many encounter programs between Palestinians and Israelis are that meeting the other reduces stereotypes and eases feelings of hostility – theoretically based on the "contact hypothesis." However, we often found that there was no evaluation of change or of the project's impact on the individuals participating in it, as well as on the wider society. Rather, evaluations often focus on outputs such as number of participants and meetings held rather than on outcomes desired. The implication of this focus is that the findings fail to evaluate the project's success vis-à-vis criteria which stem from the project goal and its theoretical assumptions. A comprehensive and theoretically based evaluation may help identify weaknesses and blind spots that are often overlooked as the project is actually underway.

Comparative Perspective

Most of the evaluations we examined lack a comparative perspective and do not use lessons learned from other conflict areas and experiences. A disadvantage of this narrow approach is that it perpetuates the ad hoc and limited nature of the projects.

In addition, we found a *lack of knowledge management*. Another overlooked aspect of evaluation was the accumulation and exchange of knowledge. Evaluations generally were not published, with the few exceptions of the Yes, PM and Wye River projects. A special conference on "People to People: An Evaluation and Future Prospects" initiated by Canadian, Norwegian and EC delegations (Jerusalem, 5 April 2005), attracted a large audience which was

148

extremely interested and involved and commented on the need for additional such forums.

Methodology

We found that most evaluations written for donors emphasized quantitative results that attested to the project's success while neglecting any study and analysis of the project's content, process, and impact. Very often what is missing is a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to evaluation studies.

Most evaluation studies do not employ a variety of complementary methods for data collection (questionnaires, interviews, participant observations, analysis of documents). The use of multiple methods could contribute to creating a fuller picture and a well-grounded understanding of the project's success, obstacles and challenges.

Partial approach to evaluation. Most evaluations gave a general picture without thoroughly examining various components of projects such as: quality or dynamics of inter-organizational cooperation, budget management and allocation, composition of target groups (diversity regarding men–women, elites–peripheral marginal groups, consensus–opposition/spoilers/extremists).

Lack of participatory inputs of evaluation. Quite often, criteria used for the evaluation are arbitrarily generated by the evaluator, the donor, or project manager, without any systematic or structured procedure. We found that most evaluations do not take into consideration or include the perspectives of the various stakeholders involved in the project – donors, organizers, facilitators, participants, the wider community. In many cases this results in a failure to incorporate and integrate varying, and at times conflicting, data. Thus, the criteria used are mostly partial, limited and superficial.

Status of evaluation in the field – a neglected area

Our overall impression is that evaluation has only very recently become recognized as important and offering a potential contribution to the field. Its status within these cooperative projects is marginal and almost non-existent. When evaluation has been employed, it was usually in response to donor demand

rather than interest on the part of the organization in learning, improvement or quality control. Moreover, evaluation results were not used by organization directors for the benefit of improving specific programs, developing project staffs and cooperation relationships, or helping to sustain the project.

IV. Guidelines and recommendations for future evaluation

The need for evaluation as an integral component of projects

A major finding of this research study was that the scope of evaluation currently being conducted is very limited. In the first section of this report we noted the general scarcity of ongoing documentation, monitoring practices, and systematic evaluation. We found that most organizations do not make a point of ensuring ongoing documentation and monitoring, and internal systematic evaluation is scarce.

At the same time, in our study evaluation was cited as a need both by organizations and donors, who expressed a new awareness about the potential contribution of evaluation, both conceptually (as a means of supporting a process of professionalism in the field and enabling the building of a body of knowledge) and instrumentally (to guide decision-making and assist in the development and improvement of programs throughout their course).

We recommend developing and applying evaluation processes and mechanisms as an integral part of projects in this field. What is needed are comprehensive and systematic evaluation practices, including a combination of formative and summative evaluations, that encourage reflection in action and documentation, and which are theoretically based, methodologically sound, and well-balanced (i.e., with a stronger critical orientation). This measure is expected to help develop and improve programs in the field, to encourage self-reflection and enable organizational learning, ultimately contributing to the general learning process and professionalism in the field. We cannot overemphasize the contribution of good documentation for better understanding, and the importance of building a database as a basis for analysis and reflection.

Moreover, an evaluation process, of the participatory kind, should facilitate the involvement of all stakeholders, including donors, in (all stages of) project management. This, in turn, is expected to increase both impact and sustainability of projects. Consequently, we recommend allocating funds for ongoing evaluations, to accompany projects in the field, and presenting this as a basic requirement for all funded projects. That is, we suggest that *evaluation should be obligatory* for all projects included in the UNESCO forum.

In the following section we offer guidelines and criteria for a systematic and comprehensive evaluation

1. Evaluation as a continuous process (rather than a one-off exercise)

Conflict situations are dynamic; changes happen, often quite rapidly. It may be difficult to establish a moment for evaluation. Therefore, evaluation should be regarded as a process of continuous self-reflection. It is an opportunity for learning rather than an examination or a judgment, and the learning from evaluation needs to be fed back into the program, as well as channeled to those with managerial or funding responsibilities.

Evaluation should accompany projects along their course, using both formative and summative functions of evaluation. The formative evaluation – collecting and reporting data during the course of a project, providing ongoing feedback to project staff – can contribute to improving a program while it is still taking place, in program design and during the implementation process. The summative evaluation – judging a program based on the accumulated evidence about how it met the stated goals of the project, can contribute to the assessment of project success, impact and accountability, helping decision makers and donors decide whether to continue funding a given project.

The combination of these two tools may lead to better understanding of the causes for a project's success or failure, and help identify barriers to conflict transformation. As such, it can enable *the accumulation of knowledge,* contributing to new conceptualizations for future projects.

2. A participatory action evaluation

A great deal has been written about the importance of people's participation to ensure sustainable work to build peace. We recommend that evaluation should be *participatory*, and involve all of the stakeholders from the project's inception. The evaluator should help project organizers, facilitators, participants and donors interactively define their shared goals as a project evolves, and effectively monitor and assess them. A participatory evaluation encourages an active and continual focus on goal definition and achievement throughout the project. It seeks to make explicit the goals and motivations of all stakeholders, to analyze how these evolve over time, and to encourage the stakeholders to use the goals which have been identified as a step towards identifying explicit, contextually defined, criteria of success by which a project might by evaluated.

The action evaluation process may help various interest groups to define their shared project goals, as well as employ creatively the diversity of their differences and divisions, as a means of enriching their efforts. Ultimately, the stakeholders may come to a shared agenda, grounded in their common goals and values for what (objectives) should be accomplished, and why (motivations). Shared goals will help to set up or fine-tune the action plan on how (intervention strategies) these should be accomplished.

This frame of evaluation views goal setting as a continuous process throughout the life of the project, since new goals or opportunities might be discovered, or goals might need to be reconsidered, as they encounter resistance or other obstacles to implementation.

The formative stage can use the awareness of discoveries, gaps and contradictions as opportunities for reshaping and fine-tuning a project design. Project holders will be asked to function as "reflective practitioners", by standing outside the situation and, becoming more aware of their actual goals and strategies for action, while experimenting with new ones. This stage should be accompanied by constant feedback sessions. Project participants are to be invited to define key indicators of success and ways of measuring them – setting the stage for the final, summative stage of Action Evaluation.

When the project reaches its conclusion, or is at a stock-taking point, participants will use their evolved goals to establish criteria for retrospective assessment. This can be based on internally relevant standards to assess a project's

success, or be externally based on the internally- derived agreements about its goals.

3. A comprehensive approach to evaluation

In the following section we suggest a comprehensive model for evaluation which can be used for both planning, and evaluating peace and conflict transformation projects. The CIPP model for program evaluation, originally presented by Stuffelbeam, 1983 (and cited in Sever, 2002:3), combines a summative-judgment with an improvement/formative orientation. The model includes four components to be evaluated: context, input, process, and product. These may be used both to guide decision-making in different stages of the project, in a framework of formative evaluation, and to supply information for accountability in a framework of summative evaluation (a combination is recommended). Below is a description of each of the four CIPP components that may serve as a criterion, reference point, or guideline for evaluation and discussion during the different stages of programs.

a. Context evaluation may serve as a basis for selecting and shaping project goals, and refers to needs assessment, perceptions about problems that warrant change, and efficacy of institutional goals and priorities. In other words, it concerns the choice of objectives and assignment of priorities. Evaluation criteria within this category may be formulated as follows: to what extent were the project's objectives attuned to the needs of the populations served, their strengths, weaknesses, and problems?

As the centrality of the socio-political context in all projects concerning Palestinian-Israeli cooperation became apparent in our study, we recommend that evaluations take into consideration the political context and the implications of the divergent realities in which the two sides exist in terms of project design, implementation and outcome. As these asymmetric contexts dictate, to a large extent, the possibilities and the limitations within which various project operate, evaluations should take this factor into account. In addition, each project should be evaluated on its flexibility and capacity to adjust to changing circumstances – that is, can it redefine goals, adapt the design and target group, and the like.

b. Input evaluation relates to choice of program strategy, and choice of procedural designs for implementing the strategy. Evaluation criteria may include: to what extent was the strategy chosen reasonable (vis-à-vis what is being done elsewhere and what is proposed in the literature), relevant, feasible, responsive to the assessed needs?

Evaluations may add a *comparative perspective* to project planning, summarizing lessons learned from other conflict areas and experiences in similar endeavors. This may also be used later on, when evaluating the outcome of the project, in comparison with other experiences.

Other aspects of organizational input to be evaluated at this stage are: the recruitment of target group, group composition and program planning and activities.

c. Process evaluation concerns implementation, and encompasses such issues as the extent to which the project plan is implemented, flaws in the procedural design or its implementation, and obstacles in the implementation process. Within this category an examination is made of decision-making practices, and symmetry/asymmetry in cooperation between organizations- vis-à-vis both the administrative and substantive/professional levels.

d. Product evaluation involves assessing performance in relation to previously diagnosed needs, and examining the results with regard to the following questions or evaluation criteria: to what extent has the program met the needs of the target population; to what extent has it achieved the goals defined by the project. In addition to evaluating program *output* (such as number and type of attendees, meeting content and process), the evaluation at this summative stage examines the program's *outcome* and *impact* on the participants, their local communities, and the broader community and society at large.

These may be assessed in terms of the *short-term goals* of the project, or the micro level (such as what was the effect of the program on the participants' attitudes, knowledge, beliefs and behaviors). A *mid-term* evaluation will look at issues such as: did the participants develop any type of dialogue/ social action program, and a review of the *long-term goals,* or the macro level, will consider such issues as the dissemination of positive attitudes, lowering

154

incidence of hostility between groups, etc. These will be explored with respect to the project goals and/or the theory of change on which the project is based.

Theoretical background. We recommend that where possible, each evaluation report should include a theoretical analysis and discussion chapter that contributes to the conceptualization of the field.

4. Recommendations regarding methodology

a. ***Choice of research methods*** – we recommend using a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. While most evaluations emphasize quantitative results as a means of assessing a project's success, it is important to supplement this with the study and analysis of the project content, process and impact- conducted by qualitative methods. This could contribute to creating a fuller picture and a more sound understanding of a project's success, obstacles and challenges.

We highly recommend using *multiple methods* of data gathering in order to get the best picture, allowing for triangulation of data sources (such as questionnaires, interviews, participant observations, document analysis).

b. **Need for better *measurement*** – We recommend extracting clear and relevant indicators that reflect the implicit theoretical assumptions. We further recommend employing professional quality control of the tools in use (validity and credibility). When possible, use tools that have already been validated, or else validate them by triangulation of the findings presented by different tools (observations, interviews, questionnaire, etc.), or inter-subjective/ human reliability by two researchers or more, categorization, etc. We propose that the entire sphere of measurement should be guided by a professional consultant who is an expert in this field. Moreover, we recommend that each evaluation report should include the tools that it used for measurement.

c. ***Professionalization of the field*** – We recommend that *experts* who have professional evaluation and social research skills, as well as theoretical knowledge in the field of conflict management and resolution, dialogue, and reconciliation should perform the evaluations.

Since evaluation is itself an intervention in an ongoing process, the team should be equipped with sensitivity and ability to engage in a dialogue when needed (between the evaluator and the various stakeholders; between the Jewish and the Palestinian evaluators, and so on). This is especially important in conflict situations since at times an evaluation can provoke new and unexpected tensions.

Finally, we recommend specific training for evaluators and representatives from various Palestinian and Israeli organizations working in this field, and *establishing a forum of researchers/evaluators* for exchanging knowledge and discussing dilemmas that arise in evaluation work in this important and sensitive field.

d. **Balanced and more critical evaluations** – In light of our findings (a prevalent tendency to emphasize the positive side of a project) it is necessary to balance the evaluation, to look at both the advantages and disadvantages. We recommend guaranteeing that the measurement is performed seriously, credibly and in a reliable manner. Critical thinking is important for a learning organization.

Adding an external, independent evaluator (in addition to the internal evaluator) may help ensure that the evaluation will not be influenced by particular interests and pressures.

Thus, we recommend a combination of external and internal evaluations. Each of these has an advantage: the external evaluator may be less biased and more reliable, while the internal evaluator may be more relevant. The benefits of external evaluation are mainly objectivity and reliability; the benefit of internal evaluation is its accessibility to the insider point of view which helps understand the project context and goals as they are understood and interpreted by the people themselves. Consequently, the two types of evaluators may complement each other.

We further propose that in a contested situation it is an advantage to have a team with diverse perceptions, experiences and regional/gender/ethnic/ linguistic identifications, as this may make more people comfortable when called upon to give their views.

Finally, we would like to emphasize the need for educating the public and raising awareness for organization directors and donors as to the importance and necessity for evaluation. A statement by UNESCO to this effect, accompanied by a targeted budget allocation would establish a new norm and help advance evaluation practices in the future. We recommend that 5-10% of a project's budget should be earmarked for evaluation, and evaluation should be a built-in component of the projects.

Summary

The need for built-in evaluation in every project

Evaluation was cited as a need both by organizations and donors, who expressed a new awareness about its potential contribution, both conceptually (supporting a process of professionalism in the field, building a body of knowledge) and instrumentally (guiding decision-making and advancing realization of the project's goals).

An ongoing evaluation process over the course of the project, involving donors, project directors and staff can help in developing and improving a program, encourage self-reflection, and facilitate organizational learning. In addition, an evaluation process, if shared, could contribute to the general learning process and professionalism in the field. We cannot overemphasize the contribution of good documentation for better understanding and the importance of building a database as a basis for analysis and reflection.

The optimal evaluation, in our opinion, is a comprehensive one that combines both a formative orientation (collecting and reporting data during the course of a project) and a summative orientation (judging a program based on the accumulated evidence about how it meets the project's stated goals). We also wish to emphasize the need for a systematic evaluation that is based on professional skills and theoretical knowledge in the field of conflict resolution, dialogue, and reconciliation. It is therefore also necessary to invest in training professional evaluators as well as establishing forums for exchanging knowledge between evaluators and organizations in the field.

In order to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations outlined in this report, *an advisory, professional body for consulting and monitoring the field* should be established. We recommend the creation of a local body that will specialize in this specific field and will comprise the professional backbone of UNESCO regarding the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue initiatives. This would be an intermediate committee, consisting of local professionals that can mediate between the donors and the applicants, help guide selection processes, and monitor program implementation and evaluation. Such a body could develop a systemic view and guide the accumulation of knowledge. We believe that this type of mechanism would greatly contribute to the professionalism of the field, from the beginning of the application process through the final evaluation. The selection of applications could be based on immediate evaluation of the local context, thus promising that projects are not driven by exterior motives and agendas, but rather are connected to the local context and to the broader evaluation of the process of conflict transformation.

The advisory body could begin with the process of evaluating the project applications and their compatibility within the given context. Furthermore, the initial evaluation of the application could take into consideration the way the project complements or enhances other efforts to advance conflict transformation, dealing with structural, attitudinal or behavioral dimensions.

The working process, starting with the initial evaluation of the proposal as stated above, would further include support of the evaluation process throughout the project as well as periodical evaluation of the broader field of conflict transformation.

In this light, we propose the following three functions for the advisory body:

1. To present UNESCO with recommendations regarding which projects to support. The advisory body will examine proposed projects according to several criteria:

   a. Added value of the proposed project – does the particular project add anything beyond what already exists?

   b. Professional quality – the body should evaluate the level of professionalism of the executing organizations.

c. Is the project theoretically based (rather than a re-invention of the wheel)?

d. Does it have a built-in evaluation component (of satisfactory quality?)

2. To act as a steering committee that can serve as nucleus for any chosen committee, accompany the project throughout its course, and offer professional consultation

3. To accumulate knowledge and create channels for its dissemination.

Our recommendation is that this body consist of Palestinian and Israeli professionals, as well as UNESCO representatives who would represent the interests and perspectives of the international community.

Bibliography

A. Books and research articles

Anan Kofi, A. (2002). *Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General*, United Nations, New York.

Bar-Tal, D. (2001). "Why does fear override hope in societies engulfed by intractable conflict, as it does in the Israeli society?", *Political Psychology*, vol. 22, no. 3, 601-627.

Baskin, Gershon et al. (1999). *Creating a Culture of Peace*, Israeli Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), Jerusalem.

Bjorn, Hettne (1991). Approach to Study of Development and Peace, Padrigu papers, Sweden.

Fitzduff, M. (1995). "Managing community relations and conflict: Voluntary organizations and government and the search for peace," in: N. Acheson and J. A. Williamson (eds.), *Voluntary Action and Social Policy in Northern Ireland*. Aldershot: Avebury.

Galtung J. (1969). "Conflict as a way of life," in: H. Freeman (ed.), *Progress in Mental Health*. London: Churchill.

Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage.

Gidron, B., Katz, S. N. and Hasenfeld, Y. (eds.) (2002). *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hermann, T. (2002). "The sour taste of success: The Israeli peace movement, 1967-1998," in: B. Gidron, S. N. Katz and Y. Hasenfeld (eds.), *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 94-129.

Hector Gross Espiel (1998). "Universal international security and regional security," in: Moufida Goucha (ed.) *What Kind of Security?*, UNESCO (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization).

Kaldor, Mary et al. (2004), "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe." Paper presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Police.

Kaufman, Edy (2005). "The quest for reciprocity in an asymmetric conflict: problems and prospects of Israeli- Palestinian academics engagement in peace building," in: Josep Romaneda, Pere Vilanova, Walid Salem and Edward Kaufman (eds.) *Breaking the Wall*. The Center of Contemporary Culture of Barcelona, Barcelona.

Keating, Michael et al. (2005), *Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine*, Chatham House: London.

Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (2000). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Moufida, Goucha, (2001). *Human Security Conflict Prevention and Peace*, UNESCO (United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization).

Moufida, Goucha, (April 1998), *What Kind of Security?*, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Perlman, L. and Schwartz, R (2000). "A preliminary stocktaking of Israeli organizations engaged in Israeli-Palestinian people-to-people activity." Manuscript submitted for publication in *SID Journal: Special Issue on People-to-People Peace Building*.

Laderach, Paul (2005). *Conflict Transformation*. The European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The Netherlands.

Rouhana, N.N. (2000). "Interactive conflict resolution: theoretical and methodological issues in conducting research and evaluation," in: P. Stern, A. George and D. Druckman (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War: Techniques and Evaluation*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Salem, Walid (2005), "The anti-normalization discourse in the context of Israeli- Palestinian peace building," in: Josep Romaneda, Pere Vilanova, Walid Salem and Edward Kaufman (eds.) *Breaking the Wall*. The Center of Contemporary Culture of Barcelona, Barcelona.

Salem, Walid and Kaufman, Edy (2005). *Lessons Learned on Palestinian Israeli Civil Society Peace Building: A Historical Perspective*. Washington: Lynne Rienner Publishers (forthcoming).

Sever, R. (2002). "60 seconds on…: conceptual framework for evaluators." unpublished manuscript.

Skinner, H. et al. (2005). "Promoting Arab and Israeli cooperation: Peace building through health initiatives." *http://image.thelancet.com/extras/04art3217web.pdf, p. 4*.

Solomon, G. and Kupermintz, H. (2002). *The Evaluation of Peace Education Programs: Main Considerations and Criteria*. Research conducted for the Center for Research on Peace Education, Haifa University, Haifa.

Stuffelbeam, D. L. (1983). "The CIPP model for program evaluation," in: G.F. Madaus, D.L. Stuffelbeam and M.S. Scriven (eds.), *Evaluation Models*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 117-141.

Taylor, R. (2002). "South Africa: The role of peace and conflict-resolution organizations in the struggle against apartheid," in: B. Gidron, S.N. Katz and Y. Hasenfeld (eds.), *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 69-93.

Tongeren, Paul Van et al. (2005). *People building Peace II: suggested stories of civil society*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner publishers.

Tongeren, Paul Van et al. (1999). *People building Peace I: 35 inspiring stories from around the world*. European Center for Conflict Prevention in cooperation with IFOR and the Coexistence Initiative of State of the World Forum.

B. Evaluation reports

Peacemaking or Normalization, Beit Sahour, Briefs, EuroMesco, Ghassan Andoni, 2003.

MECA internal evaluation reports and other materials.

162

Palestinian Israeli Civil Society Co-operative Activities, Naseef Mu'allem Helsinki workshop no.27+28, 1999.

People to People: An Evaluation and Future Prospects, Stanley, Bruce Consultant, European Commission, presented at the Jerusalem Conference, initiated by Canadian, Norwegian, and EC delegations, 5 April 2003.

Evaluation of Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), AB, February 2004.

Yes, PM – Years of Experience in Strategies for Peace Making: Looking at Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Activities 1993-2002, IPCRI, December 2002.

Peace Building Under Fire: Palestinian-Israeli Wye River Projects, eds. Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-On, April 2004.

Evaluation Report of the Project: Guiding Principles for Dialogue and Cooperation Between Academics, submitted to UNESCO by Maya Kahanoff and Ata Qaymari, February 2005.

A Preliminary Stocktaking of Israeli Organizations Engaged in Palestinian-Israeli People to People Activity, by Lee Perlman and Raviv Schwartz. Paper presented at the workshop on Evaluating Israeli-Palestinian Civil Society Cooperative Activities, Helsinki, Finland, November 1999.

Evaluation Study: Crisis Prevention and Peace-building Projects of NGOs in Israel Supported by the German Federal Foreign Office, IFA (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations), Dr. Angelika Timm and Dr. Oliver Wils.

Going Against the Wind: The Role of NGOs in Jerusalem under an Ongoing Conflict, by Nimrod Goren in cooperation with Mohammed Nakhal, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2005.

Insight into the Impact and Feasibility of the People Program, unpublished paper, Lili Habash.

The Palestinian Ministry NGOs (2002), The PNA vision of the role of the Palestinian NGOs in the current crisis.

C. Research reports

Herzog Shira, and Hai Avivit (2005). *The Power of Possibility: The Role of People- to-People Programs in the Current Israeli-Palestinian Reality*, Economic Cooperation Foundation and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

a. Research reports on health cooperation projects

Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in the Health Field 1994-1998 – Study Report, JDC, Al-Quds University, by Tamara Barnea, Ziad Abdeen, et al., May 2000.

Serving Palestinian Children with Disabilities: Child Development Program, Idna Village 1999-2001 – Final Project Report, AJJDC, UPMRC, PIHCG, by Randi Garber, Jihad Mashal, and Kate Sugarman.

Development of Palestinian Lending Centers for Assistive Devices and Medical Equipment 1997-2002, Final Project Report, JDC, UPMRC, Yad Sarah, by Randi Garber, Jihad Mashal, et al.

The Virus Does Not Stop at the Checkpoint, by Tamara Barnea and Rafik Houseinni, Am Oved, 2002.

b. Scientific cooperation

Scientific Cooperation and Peace Building: A Case Study of USAID's Middle East Regional Cooperation Program, by I. Kumar and I. Rosenthal, 1998.

c. Interfaith

What Works: Evaluating Interfaith Dialogue Programs, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 123, July 2004.

d. Intellectual cooperation

Palestinian and Israeli Intellectuals in the Shadow of Oslo and "the Al-Aqsa Intifada" Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv, 2002.

D. Interviews

List of organizations interviewed – International

1. EU Partnership for Peace
2. Swiss Foreign Ministry Representative Office
3. Heinrich Böll Institute

List of organizations interviewed – Israeli

1. Bat Shalom – Israeli women's organization for a just peace
2. ECF – Economic Cooperation Foundation
3. ICAHD – Israeli Committee against House Demolition
4. IPCRI – Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information
5. Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies
6. MECA – Middle East Children's Alliance
7. Middle East Young Leadership Program
8. Peres Center for Peace
9. PRIME – Peace Research Institute in the Middle East
10. The Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace

List of organizations interviewed – Palestinian

1. Palestinian Group for Monitoring Human Rights
2. DATA – Studies & Consultation
3. One Voice
4. Al Quds University
5. Human Rights Activist
6. Jerusalem Center for Women
7. Palestinian Center for Peace and Democracy
8. Riwaq
9. Fafo AIS
10. Passia
11. Panorama Center

Proceedings from Workshop

Civil Societies in Dialogue
Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Reevaluated:
Issues, Dilemmas and Future Prospects*

May 24th, 2006

Notre Dame of Jerusalem Center

Following the completion of the joint Israeli-Palestinian report, "An Assessment of Cooperation Between Palestinian and Israeli NGOs," a workshop was held by the International Peace and Cooperation Center (IPCC) and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS) with the support of UNESCO. The purpose of the workshop was twofold: to share the findings with Palestinian and Israeli organizations working in the field, with the aim of promoting discussion of the main issues and recommendations; and to receive feedback and recommendations to be incorporated into the final, updated report.

The workshop was comprised of three parts: a presentation of the main findings of the evaluation study by the Israeli and Palestinian principal researchers (Dr. Maya Kahanoff and Walid Salem), with comments by Dr. Adnan Abdelrazek and Dr. Helena DeSevillia; open discussion of the main issues of cooperation; and participants' discussion of evaluation.

The following pages summarize the main points and issues, a summary which supports and elaborates upon the issues and dilemmas raised in the joint report.

The context of cooperation

The centrality of the context within which Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations (PCR/Os) operate, and its wide implications on the viability and

prospects for cooperation, was highlighted. It was noted that the general context in which NGO's have been working in the last few years is that of mistrust: though bridges were built during Oslo, cooperation did not remain stable throughout the harsh events of the Second Intifada and its aftermath. "It is astonishing and painful to witness how quickly and intensely the two societies shifted from being partners to becoming enemies. This was colored, among other things, by the shift in the Israeli perception of the Palestinians from victims to aggressors and in the Palestinian perception of the Israelis from peace seekers into oppressors" [..] "Among the Israeli peace groups was a strong feeling that the "Palestinians" betrayed them (even personally), while many Palestinian activists felt that the Israeli peace groups were useless if not part of the conspiracy. Very few, if any, engaged in self-reflection and posed the question of what did WE do wrong" (a Palestinian participant). The above description raises basic questions regarding the efficiency of Israeli – Palestinian cooperation and their contribution to the advancement of peace or prevention of violence.

A related issue that was brought up and discussed regarded the disparity in the definition of the goals of the cooperating parties in a conflict situation marked by an asymmetric relationship. It is clear that the decisions-makers' outlook affects the framework within which they understand, define or aim for in their cooperation. Thus, according to the Israeli side, "Conflict management is the central theme; the Israeli attitude is currently no two-state solution, no peace – therefore conflict management is necessary". This statement was challenged and questioned. The Palestinian stance that was expressed was very different: "No way! We were promised a two-state solution in 1990. There is disagreement regarding what the sides are talking about: are we talking about conflict management? Peace building? Conflict transformation? Conflict prevention?" (a Palestinian participant). It was agreed that it is important to coordinate, or negotiate the term used, since the terminology and discourse frames the action; it was suggested to employ a wider frame that should be agreed on by both sides.

Recommendations suggested:

◆ Partner organizations should discuss and agree on a theoretical perspective by which to lead activities – e.g., conflict transformation, or conflict

management. One participant suggested, "Israelis use conflict management – we Palestinians should use conflict management to create a transformation" (a Palestinian participant).

◆ More modest goals than making peace should be set: something more limited like taking the others perspective, or gradually and jointly developing a mass of people involved.

◆ A general recommendation was made by a number of participants regarding the necessity that each side look introspectively and critically at itself, identify its own shortcomings and its role contributing to failures in cooperation. It was further suggested to carry an internal societal dialogue on sensitive issues to each society. One of the participants noted the difficulty entailed in such an endeavor: "sometimes dialogue with the other is easier than dialogue within our own society…. it is very easy to criticize the other but one must be introspective regarding one's own action – everyone should be looking at his own society. The work we are doing is damage control, the thing is that when there is a political change we will be there with our dialogue" (an Israeli participant).

Identity of NGOs and individuals operating in the field

The issue of organizations identified in the field of Peace and Conflict Resolution was discussed by a number of participants. One commentator discussed the problem with organizations not being natural forces of social change: "Many organizations were established by self-appointed people and run as a business […] some organizations were formed because they had money. "I'm afraid that donors' money and other services have become a major factor in turning some dialogue groups into business enterprises, with vested interest in the quantity of meetings rather than in their quality and end results. "(a Palestinian participant).

It was also stated that grassroots organizations are generally not identified or involved under the umbrella of peace and conflict transformation activities and that in general organizations tend to compete against each other for budgets rather than cooperate: "I would like to mention organizations who aren't here – Ta'ayush, Gush Shalom, those working in Hebron and those that do not ask for

budgets – those organizations do exist." (an Israeli participant); "We are not good at coordinating – we compete rather than collaborate" (an Israeli participant).

Recommendations suggested:

◆ Invest in *natural agents* of change such as teachers, cultural activities social movements rather than in self-appointed individuals and organizations: "efforts and resources should be invested in agents of change such as school curricula; media programs; cultural activities; and other popular community activities. Dialogue groups should discuss and use experts in order to build common concepts, attitudes, and people in a position to be affected by these agents of change" (a Palestinian participant).

◆ *Unite efforts:* "Peace groups and individuals should focus, from time to time, on one single issue and promote mass mobilization around it" (a Palestinian participant).

◆ Move towards *professionalization of the field* "we should set some standards and structures that will help us define the professional identity of those to be involved. This will help us decide on how we meet, what we do, models of cooperation" (an Israeli participant).

Target population

Criticism regarding target population for projects was voiced on a number of fronts touching on the issue of the identity of those invited for second track dialogue and cooperation. For example, it was said that "donors want to see people of caliber, so we have to bring them to the meetings, rather than others". Regarding geographical origin and composition of groups a criticism was made that participants from areas that were difficult to access were not made part of the dialogue. In this regard one of the participants challenged the over- representation of Palestinians from East Jerusalem in these joint ventures : "My question to the Israelis is: who is your target population? To me East Jerusalem is occupied territory. I am afraid Israelis find it easier to found cooperation with Palestinians from East Jerusalem, which leads to the second question: what peace are we

talking about, piece or peace […]? If you concentrate on East Jerusalem, there will be a day when you will find it very difficult to find someone to cooperate with from the West Bank and Gaza, which are in a cage" (a Palestinian participant).

Language also tends to be a limiting criterion for widening target population: "I think the language gap is very important because it brings only certain populations – no refugees, no one uneducated – and so we stay with the same audience – educated upper classes. The audience needs to be widened" (an Israeli participant).

Recommendations suggested:

◆ Widen target population to include more diverse population "The Palestinians interviewees said that grass-roots people, women, and especially ex-prisoners should be involved as central agents of change. " (a Palestinian participant).

Building a sustainable partnership

The need to rethink cooperation, explore various frames of cooperation, and discuss their implications was emphasized. It was noted that in the current circumstances cooperation is a difficult task, both on the inter-organization level and on the inter-personal level. It was argued that "building a team of people with different socio-demographic backgrounds, different professional training and the baggage of being adversaries is a difficult task. We should examine ourselves first." (an Israeli participant).

Contending partners, it was suggested, have to discuss the difference in meanings of the term cooperation for the two sides, and based on this new understanding of the concept, design accordingly: "There is currently no good theory or maybe no theory about building partnership between adversaries. A departure point could be how the Israeli and Palestinian teams worked together".

Asymmetry was mentioned as a major *challenge to cooperation*, as it manifests itself in many different forms and stages of the project. It is evident also in the motivation to cooperate – "We have asymmetry in suffering and in relationship.

What we should ask is why people do not want to join these meetings. What we have to do is change the occupation and then look at our relationship. There cannot be symmetry under these circumstances" [...] "Palestinians underestimate the importance of these gatherings, the possible impact of cooperation". Israelis and Palestinian generally have different goals: "Israelis come to gatherings to meet the other community and learn rather than suggest solutions"(a Palestinian participant). The low motivation of Palestinians to cooperate reflected by low numbers of participation was explained not as the result of mistrust but by "the feeling that the contribution (of the cooperation or joint venture) is minimal" (a Palestinian participant).

Recommendations:

◆ *Partnership* should be discussed, conceptualized and agreed upon at very initial stages. It should thereafter be continuously discussed as the program and relationship develops. Team building, inter-group dynamics, and conflict escalation models should be used.

◆ A number of ways to tackle asymmetry were mentioned. One of them entails using the stronger side's knowledge to *empower the weaker side* "Asymmetry is a problem in all projects, but if you acknowledge it through capacity building then you can lessen it"(an Israeli participant). It was suggested that empowerment or mentoring should be performed by a third party in order to prevent a paternalistic approach by the Israelis.

◆ *Reciprocity* rather than an attempt to create symmetry was yet another suggestion discussed. However, when discussing the concept of reciprocity it is necessary to translate it into actual actions: "I sense the problem of non-reciprocal relations between partners in many of the past P2P projects was not the lack of a rhetorical commitment to reciprocity, but the much more elusive task of translating that commitment into a structural and inter-personal reality" (an Israeli participant).